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Quotes:
”There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more dangerous to handle,
than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer (innovator) has enemies
in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those
who would profit by the new.”
Machiavelli
”...a choice made with uncertainty-colored glasses on rather than blinders is
a superior choice, one that can engender justifiable rather than false confidence in
one’s actions.”
Adam M. Finkel
”When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in num-
bers, you know something about it; but when you cannot express it in numbers,
your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning
of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of
science.”
Lord Kelvin
”For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, neat, and
wrong.”
Henry L. Mencken
”All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
George E. P. Box
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to identify how uncertainty in fire safety
system effectiveness should be considered in a new risk-informed design
fire tool, B-RISK. Specific objectives were to collect the available data on
fire safety system effectiveness from the literature, investigate methods
to improve fire safety system effectiveness data collection, develop the
risk-informed design fire tool to propagate the uncertainties, and recom-
mend methods to rank the sources of uncertainty for fire safety system
effectiveness for appropriate model selection. The scope of the research is
limited to the effects of systems on fire development and smoke spread
and does not include the effects of the fire on systems (such as loss of
structural integrity) or interactions with occupants. Sprinkler effective-
ness data from recent New Zealand Fire Service data is included with a
discussion of the uncertainty in this type of data and recommendations
for improving data collection. The ability of the model to predict mul-
tiple sprinkler activations is developed in conjunction with a hydraulic
submodel in B-RISK to include water supply pressure effects on sprin-
kler effectiveness. A new method of collecting reliability data on passive
fire protection elements such as doors was developed. Data collected
on the probability for doors in shared means of escape to be open and
the time doors are open during occupant evacuation using this method
is presented. Available data on smoke management system effective-
ness is listed, along with a discussion of why there is more uncertainty
associated with these systems compared with sprinkler systems. The ca-
pabilities of B-RISK for considering fire safety system effectiveness are
demonstrated using Australasian case studies.
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FEDth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fractional effective dose of thermal radiation [-]
g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gravitational acceleration [9.81 m/s2]
h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Height or head [m]
hc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heat of combustion [MJ/kg]
HRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heat release rate [kW]
HRRPUA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heat release rate per unit area [kW/m2]
K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sprinkler discharge coefficient [L/min√
kPa
]
λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Exponential decay parameter [-]
m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Magnetic field vector [gauss]
m1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Magnetic field vector at door position 1 [gauss]
m2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Magnetic field vector at door position 2 [gauss]
µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mean [-]
OD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Optical density [OD/m]
P () . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Probability (scale of 0 to 1)
P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pressure [kPa]
φ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Angle of magnetic field to vertical axis [o]
Q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flow rate [L/min]
RTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Response time index (m s1/2)
ρ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Density [kg/m3]
σ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Standard deviation [-]
Tamb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ambient temperature [oC]
Td . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Detector temperature [oC]
Tgas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gas temperature [oC]
Tact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Detector activation temperature [oC]
t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time [s]
tact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Detector activation time [s]
θ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Door open angle [o]
u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X-direction velocity [m/s]
w′′ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sprinkler spray density [mm/min]
ASET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Available safe egress time
BCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Building Consent Authority
BCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Building Code of Australia
BIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Building Industry Authority
BIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Building Industry Commission
BRANZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Building Research Association of New Zealand
C/AS1-C/AS6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Zealand acceptable solutions for fire safety in
buildings
CFAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Consolidated model of fire growth and smoke
transport
C/VM2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Zealand verification method for fire safety in
buildings
DBH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Zealand Department of Building and Hous-
ing
DTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Deemed to satisfy
EHH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Extra high hazard
ELH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Extra light hazard
FDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire Dynamics Simulator
FIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fire indicating panel
FLED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire load energy density
FM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Factory Mutual
FPANZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire Protection Association of New Zealand
FRST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Foundation for Research, Science and Technology
FTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flux time product
GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gross domestic product
GER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Global equivalence ratio
HVAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
I2C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inter-integrated circuit
IFEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International Fire Engineering Guidelines
IQP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Independently qualified person
ISO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International Organization for Standardization
MSI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ministry of Science and Innovation
NFIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Fire Incident Reporting System
NFPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Fire Protection Association
NIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Institute of Standards and Technology
NZBC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .New Zealand Building Code
NZD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Zealand dollars
NZFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Zealand Fire Service
NZS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Zealand Standard
OH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ordinary hazard
QRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quantitative risk assessment
RF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radio frequency
ROO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Room of origin
RSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Required safe egress time
SME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Single means of escape
SSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sprinkler System Certifier
TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Territorial authority
TALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total acceptable loss of life
UL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Underwriters’ Laboratories
WS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Water supply
XML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Extensible markup language
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
AN architect wants to eliminate an exit stairway to conserve valuable space in ahigh density area high-rise building. A building owner thinks that putting in
fire-rated wall assemblies will be more cost-effective than installing a sprinkler sys-
tem. A historical organisation wants to know what the best options are to improve
the fire safety of their buildings and contained artefacts within a limited budget but
limiting the impacts on the authenticity of their facilities. Traditional prescriptive
fire safety regulations would not allow such flexibility in design, and while modern
performance-based fire safety regulations potentially may, it is currently difficult to
quantify the potential effects of these and other decisions on building fire safety.
Under traditional prescriptive fire safety regulations the building design is es-
sentially specified by the regulations and there is generally little room for flexibil-
ity or trade-offs to make a building more fit-for-purpose. The performance-based
paradigm shifts the regulatory requirements from specific building design itself to
the societal objectives that the building design is intended to achieve. Any building
design is allowed so long as it meets this performance criteria. In the case of fire,
performance-based objectives may be the life safety of occupants or rescuers, the
protection of property, or the protection of the environment. However, it is difficult
to accurately quantify the effects of fire safety systems on the level of risk, so it be-
comes difficult to determine if trade-offs among systems achieve the required level
of safety [1]. Can a means of escape be removed if a smoke management system is in-
stalled? Can the fire resistance rating of fire compartments be reduced if a sprinkler
1
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system is installed? In a performance-based environment, the building regulator as
society’s representative has a difficult task in determining what is acceptable, par-
ticularly so because it is difficult to quantify the effectiveness of fire safety systems
over the lifetime of buildings.
In the wider societal context, knowledge of system effectiveness is also nec-
essary to evaluate where scarce economic resources should be spent. Are air bags
more effective at saving lives than sprinkler systems per dollar of cost to society?
Would more lives be saved per dollar by installing automatic defibrillators in build-
ings rather than smoke management systems?
The need to research the quantitative effect of fire safety systems on build-
ing fire safety has been discussed in the literature. In the move towards risk- and
performance-based fire safety design Notarianni and Fischbeck [2] identified “seven
major barriers to determining and documenting achievement of agreed upon levels of fire
safety”, one of which was that “no standardized methods exist to incorporate reliability
of systems.” At an October 2006 meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, the Interna-
tional Forum of Fire Research Directors which includes members from the Building
Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ), the Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), FM Global, the National Research Council of Canada (NRCC),
and the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) among others, listed:
• ”to improve our ability to predict the impact of active fire protection sys-
tems on the fire growth and fate of combustion products; and
• to estimate the various contributions to uncertainty and to incorporate
them into hazard and risk analyses”
as two of their top five research priorities [3] for developing the next generation
of performance-based fire safety design tools [4]. Beyler [5] stated that “the reliability of
fire suppression systems remain[s] a subject of great uncertainty due to our unwillingness
or inability to assess reliability from historical data.” A New Zealand example where the
inability to quantify fire safety system effectiveness was a substantial barrier to eval-
uating alternative fire designs occured in the single means of escape determinations
in 2005-2006, which will be discussed in detail later in Chapter11.
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There is no question that there is uncertainty in our current ability to quantify
the effectiveness of fire safety systems. It is impossible to expect that we will be able
to predict the fire safety systems’ effectiveness over the lifetime of a building with
certainty, because building contents, human behaviour, and occupancy will change
as the building use changes, technology advances, and society evolves. This re-
search does not attempt to remove all uncertainty in this matter, but it does attempt
to define a process to consider the uncertainty in the effectiveness of fire safety sys-
tems for the purpose of performance-based building fire safety design. Bernstein [6]
discusses the three main dangers of quantifying risk in general: “exposure to dis-
continuities, the arrogance of quantifying the unquantifiable, and the threat of increasing
risk rather than managing it”. These potential pitfalls should be remembered when
making risk-informed fire safety decisions.
This research study has a number of objectives related to uncertainty in esti-
mating fire safety system effectiveness. The first is to discuss the historical context
of the fire problem and building fire regulations, and how it has influenced the cur-
rent fire safety environment in New Zealand and led to the need for this research.
Second, to explore the available data on overall system reliability and efficacy, char-
acterising the uncertainty and observing where technological progress may allow
for improvements in data collection to provide better fire safety system effective-
ness information to inform fire safety design. The third is to develop the ability of a
new probabilistic-deterministic model to include the effects and uncertainties of fire
safety systems. A probabilistic-deterministic model allows probability distributions
to describe the uncertainty in the input parameters used in a deterministic model,
providing an estimated range of output possibilities given the uncertainty in the in-
puts. The fourth is a discussion of the relative contribution of different sources of
uncertainties for typical design scenarios and the adequacy of the model to provide
a “consistent level of crudeness” [7] with the variability in the scenario inputs. The
fifth is to demonstrate how the new model might be applied for fire safety design.
Due to the diversity of topics covered in this document there is no explicit literature
review. Instead, literature review is embedded in appropriate sections as required
for individual systems or other topics such as fire risk models.
The scope of this research is limited to the effect of fire safety systems on the
early development stages of the fire. Thus the effects of fire on passive system ele-
ments once it reaches a fully developed state are not included. Occupant response
during a fire is not explicitly considered, although the behaviour of people will af-
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fect the performance of fire safety systems and these effects are implicitly included
in the data. Examples are occupants wedging open a fire door or shutting off a
sprinkler valve.
The first chapter discusses the background and development of building regu-
lation in western countries, focusing on New Zealand in particular, and the reasons
why this research is important for future fire safety in New Zealand. Recent cost es-
timates for fire risk in New Zealand buildings are included. The current practice for
considering fire safety system effectiveness in New Zealand for performance-based
fire safety building design is discussed. Definitions of terms describing system ef-
fectiveness and uncertainty classifications are introduced.
Chapter 2 covers existing fire risk computer models that have been developed
around the world. The structure of the new risk informed fire design tool B-RISK is
described. As this work was completed over a period of three years during which
time B-RISK was evolving through versions, various versions were used for differ-
ent sections of this thesis. The version used for each section is listed in the chapters
and in this overview.
Chapter 3 explores existing studies and data sources which provide informa-
tion on sprinkler system effectiveness. Some of the results of Chapter 4 are included
for comparison. This chapter is based on a paper that was submitted to the journal
Fire Science Reviews.
Chapter 4 examines recent New Zealand Fire Service data on fires in sprin-
klered buildings. This chapter is based on a paper that was published in the journal
Fire Technology.
Chapter 5 analyses the uncertainty in the ability to predict the initial time of
sprinkler activation. A comparison between model uncertainties and natural vari-
ability is included for two scenarios. The suitability of using a two-zone model as
the deterministic engine for the model is discussed. This chapter is based on a pa-
per that was presented at the 10th International Symposium on Fire Safety Science
held at the University of Maryland in June 2011. A preliminary version of B-RISK
that was essentially a modified version of BRANZFire was used as the determinis-
tic model with the commercial packages @Risk and Excel used for the probabilistic
inputs and for collating the outputs for this chapter.
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A new method of modifying sprinklers to measure their thermal response is
described in Chapter 6. The modified sprinkler response is compared to actual
sprinklers in wind tunnel tests and a fire compartment test and thermal response
models, including B-RISK. The thermal detector response models in B-RISK ver-
sions 23 and 48 are compared to BRANZFire 2011.2 in this chapter.
The methods used in the new model to estimate the effects of sprinklers on fire
development are the topic of Chapter 7. A comparison of the model’s capability to
estimate the activation of multiple sprinklers is included that is based on a paper
that was presented at the SFPE 9th International Conference on Performance-Based
Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods held in Hong Kong in June 2012. B-RISK
version 17 was used for this portion of the chapter. An illustrative example of the
effects of changing water supply on the number of sprinklers activated in B-RISK is
then given, for which B-RISK version 28 was used.
Existing data on the effectiveness of passive building elements is described in
Chapter 8.
Chapter 9 describes the development of a novel method of collecting door ef-
fectiveness data. Data from the new method is presented.
The uncertainties regarding smoke management system effectiveness are cov-
ered in Chapter 10. Smoke detection uncertainty is included because smoke detec-
tors are used as a means of activating a smoke management system.
Four relevant case studies are introduced in Chapter 11. Two examples of risk-
informed fire safety design in New Zealand are presented; the analysis of the Type
5 alarm introduction to the fire safety acceptable solution C/AS1 completed by En-
right in 2003 [8], and the set of determinations regarding single means of escape al-
ternative designs for highrise residential buildings in Auckland in 2005 and 2006.
A third regional example of risk-informed fire safety design in a commercial office
building in Australia, the 140 William Street building in Melbourne, is also included.
The areas of focus for this research which are driven by the outcomes of these case
studies are introduced. A fourth case study on a fire that occurred in a seniors’ as-
sisted living complex in Alberta, Canada is included to demonstrate the influence
of fire safety systems on fire development and as an example of building regulation
changes due to fire safety system effectiveness.
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A discussion of how the model would be used for risk-informed fire safety en-
gineering is included in Chapter 12. Two of the buildings from the case studies from
Chapter 11 are used in this chapter. B-RISK version 48 was used for this chapter.
Chapter 13 provides a set of conclusions and recommendations for future work.
1.2 Cost of fire in New Zealand
According to the World Fire Statistics Centre [9], the direct cost of fire losses in New
Zealand ranged from 165 million NZD to 180 million NZD from 2005 to 2007, which
was approximately 0.11% of gross domestic product (GDP). Indirect costs were esti-
mated at 0.007% of GDP in 2004. The cost of firefighting organisations, fire insurance
administration, and fire protection to buildings was estimated at 0.16% GDP, 0.08%
GDP, and 0.24% GDP, respectively. The cost of fire protecting buildings as a percent-
age of GDP in a number of countries can be seen in Figure 1.1, and the percentage of
the fire losses as a percentage of the total amount spent on fire protection can be seen
in Figure 1.2. While New Zealand was below average in fire protection spending for
the countries considered, fire losses in New Zealand were low relative to the total
amount of fire protection spending, indicating that New Zealand building practices
may be more conservative than in other countries.
A study completed in 2005 by Business and Economic Research Limited for
the NZFS estimated the total annual cost of the fire risk in New Zealand to be 1.02
billion NZD, or 0.79% of the national gross domestic product [10]. The components
of the estimated annual cost of fire from the study can be seen in Figure 1.3. Of the
total cost of fire, 285 million NZD or 28% was estimated to be spent on building fire
protection features annually.
1.3 A synopsis of building regulations
The value of this research project is driven by the current and proposed future build-
ing regulation system in New Zealand. This section contains a description of the
prescriptive- and performance-based approaches to building regulation and a brief
overview of building regulation development with a focus on New Zealand.
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Figure 1.1: Cost of fire protection in buildings by country as a percentage of GDP [9].
1.3.1 Prescriptive-based vs. performance-based
Building regulations are generally described as being either prescriptive-based or
performance-based. Prescriptive-based approaches provide specific criteria for build-
ing design and can be thought of as binary - either the design meets the criteria or
it does not [11]. While prescriptive-based regulations are very specific on how build-
ings are to be built, they often do not discuss the rationale behind the requirements.
The inflexibility and lack of information on the intent of prescriptive-based building
regulations has been cited as creating barriers to international trade, restricting inno-
vation in building design, reducing building cost-effectiveness, and even affecting
the competitiveness of goods and services [12,13,14].
The concept of performance-based building regulation is to eliminate specific
prescriptive criteria for the construction details of buildings, and to replace them
with performance requirements that must be met to satisfy the regulations. Varia-
tions of performance-based regulation concepts have been adopted by many coun-
tries including New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the UK [15]. This has not just
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Figure 1.2: Fire losses as a percentage of fire prevention costs (including fire fighting or-
ganizations, fire insurance administration, and building fire protection feature
cost [9].
been limited to building regulation, but other areas such as transport [16] and finan-
cial regulation (where the approach is known as principles-based regulation [17]).
Meacham defines the requirements of performance-basis as follows: “In its most
complete form, a performance-based approach includes acceptance (performance)
criteria which can be quantified, measured, and/or calculated and verification
methods which together serve as the metrics and methods for demonstrating com-
pliance” [15].
1.3.2 History of fire safety regulations
The first known building code is generally attributed to Hammurabi, written in 229
BC and included in his code of laws. The first law pertaining to buildings reads
”If a builder builds a house for someone, and does not construct it properly, and
the house which he built falls in and kills its owner, then the builder shall be put to
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Figure 1.3: Annual total cost of fire in New Zealand in 2005 [10].
death.” This is an example of a performance-based building code, essentially stating
that the house must only be designed to protect the owner’s life from structural col-
lapse, with no specification as to how the builder should achieve this requirement.
Many of the early prescriptive building fire safety regulations were driven by
reactions to large loss fires, and were designed to prevent large-scale urban confla-
grations. While the London fire of 1666, the Baltimore fire of 1904, and the Chicago
fire of 1871 are often discussed in recent literature, a quick Google search for great
fire of [insert city name here] reveals many other cities that suffered similar disasters
(in no particular order):
• Great fire of Toronto, 1849, 1904
• Great fire of Boston, 1872
• Great Fire of New York, 1776, 1835
• Great fire of Rome AD, 64
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• Great fire of Montreal, 1789
• Great fire of Christchurch, 1908
• Great fire of Seattle, 1889
• Great fire of Vancouver, 1886
• Great fire of Melbourne, 1897
• Great fire of Sydney, 1890
• Great fire of Atlanta, 1917
• Great fire of Baltimore, 1904
• Great fire of Calgary, 1886
to name a few, although the scope of the fire damage varies and the definition
of a “great fire” is not always consistent. According to Tacitus, the Roman emperor
Nero’s reaction to the 64 AD Rome fire included restrictions on building materials
such that they were impervious to fire [18]. The 1666 London fire and subsequent
rebuilding provides a classical example of reactive prescriptive requirements after a
large fire. Historical accounts of the fire [19] describe the city as having many timber-
clad structures, with narrow streets and causeways between them. The narrow sep-
aration between buildings at street level was often diminished further as the upper
stories often overhung the street. In 1667, an Act for rebuilding the city of London
was passed, which included such prescriptive statements as requiring the exterior
of all buildings in and about the city to be of brick or stone, or brick and stone [20].
Other fires where there was a large loss of life but less property loss also caused
prescriptive requirements to come into force for the protection of life. For example,
the Triangle Waist Company fire in 1911 New York led to the Factory Investigation
Committee Report of 1912 [21] which resulted in many changes including the adop-
tion of exit signs. Building codes in most Western countries remained prescriptive
documents until the concept of the performance-based approach became popular in
the second half of the 20th century.
The origin of the modern performance-based approach is usually attributed
to the Nordic countries where the mention of such approaches began in 1963, cul-
minating in the Nordic Committee on Building Regulations Report 28, issued in
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1976 [22]. Canada experimented with a performance based section in the National
Building Code of Canada 1965 [23]. Section 9, Housing, included a single statement
for fire protection, “appropriate requirements for the protection of life in the event of fire
and to restrict the spread of fire throughout the building or to other buildings should be
in accordance with good practice [24].” The United States began discussing “systematic
approaches” to fire safety in 1971 [25].
Meacham [15] provides an overview of the transition of building codes from
prescription-based to performance-based in many countries worldwide, including
Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Japan, England and Wales, Japan, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and the United
States of America. The following section discusses the history of building regulation
in New Zealand.
1.3.3 A history of New Zealand building regulations
1.3.3.1 1886-1990
The history of building controls in New Zealand can be traced back to the 1886 Mu-
nicipal Corporations Act which gave the power to make bylaws “for any purpose in
relation to... buildings ...” [26] to local authorities, setting the stage for the local admin-
istration of building controls at the municipal level, which still partially remains at
present. A timeline of significant events in New Zealand building regulation related
to fire safety is shown in Figure 1.4.
The New Zealand Standards Institution (which later became the New Zealand
Standards Institute and is now Standards New Zealand) was set up in 1932 as a re-
sult of the Napier earthquake of February 3, 1931 which resulted in 258 fatalities [27].
The standards organisation initiated a Building Code Committee in May 1934 and
published model building bylaws from 1935 onwards [28]. Most municipal author-
ities recognized the model building bylaws from 1964 until the national building
code was created in 1991, but by the late 1970s the bureaucracy had proliferated
to the point where there were 60 Acts involved in building regulations [22], admin-
istered by 213 territorial authorities (TAs), comprised of city, town, and borough
councils, along with 22 regional authorities, 19 United Councils and over 400 special
purpose authorities. This TA structure had essentially remained unchanged since
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Figure 1.4: Timeline of events in New Zealand building regulation history.
1876 [29]. Widespread concern was raised that overbearing and segmented building
controls were substantially increasing building costs without corresponding bene-
fits to the stakeholders. The need to reduce the proliferation of building controls
and the resultant spending on administration was identified by many stakehold-
ers at the Forum of Building Controls held in February, 1982 by the Department of
Internal Affairs [30].
The concept of a performance-based national building code was discussed in
New Zealand as early as the early 1980s by the Office of the Review of Planning and
Building Controls [31]. The 5-level Nordic methodology previously established was
recommended for use in New Zealand, and is described as follows:
1. (a) the overall statement of the properties of a building that must be re-
garded as important from the point of view of society and individual
members;
(b) the main properties specified as the overall goal level classified in func-
tional areas, and principles laid down for the realisation of the specified
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intentions;
(c) operative requirements in order that principles laid down under [statu-
tory requirements] within the various functional areas may be applied
in the design and construction of buildings;
2. instructions or guidelines laid down for verification of compliance with the
requirements;
3. supplement to the regulations with examples of acceptable solutions, deemed
to satisfy the regulations [31].
The Office of the Review of Planning and Building Controls also performed a
cost-benefit analysis of building controls in New Zealand, and concluded that the
minimum direct cost of controls was $100 million annually with indirect costs of up
to $200 million annually or 10% of the total cost of building in New Zealand at the
time of the report [31]. The government established the Building Industry Commis-
sion (BIC) in February 1986, which wrote a number of reports culminating in their
1990 report “Reform of Building Controls.” The primary objectives of the BIC were
as follows:
(a) to determine within a suitable economic framework the most appropriate le-
gal and regulatory provisions for buildings and building construction and
maintenance consistent with the public interest (including health, safety,
and amenity aspects); and
(b) in those areas where it is considered that such objectives are best achieved
through minimum performance standards, prepare an appropriate, sim-
plified, uniform, performance-oriented national building code, which will
bind the Crown [22].
NZS 1900, which was the model bylaw at the time, was sometimes seen as
a national building code, but since it did not “bind the Crown” it could only be
implemented as a local bylaw [31]. The 1990 BIC report laid out the structure of the
proposed New Zealand Building Code. The report recommended that regulatory
intervention be limited to:
(a) provisions safeguarding people’s well-being where there is insufficient as-
surance that voluntary arrangements, such as market forces, self-regulation
or self-interest will do the job;
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(b) provisions protecting other people’s property, including public property,
that might be threatened by a building or building activity; and
(c) provisions related to the national interest, to follow clear Government di-
rection or to reflect existing policies [22].
The report lead to the New Zealand Parliment passing the Building Act 1991
and subsequently the Building Regulations 1992, which included the first national
and performance-based building code in New Zealand. While New Zealand has
been seen internationally as being one of the most successful countries at imple-
menting a performance-based building code [14], it has not been a perfect transition.
A lack of knowledge and methods to evaluate the ability of building designs to meet
society’s objectives has impaired the adoption of performance-based design prac-
tices and has resulted in some major failures, such as the leaky buildings discussed
later in this chapter. To address these issues for fire risk, the fire engineering pro-
gramme at the University of Canterbury was developed [32], where this research was
conducted. One of the major sources of funding for the Canterbury fire engineering
programme from the outset has been the New Zealand Fire Service Commission.
The fact that the New Zealand Fire Service Commission continued to fund the Can-
terbury fire engineering programme through extremely difficult economic and so-
cial conditions in the 1990s [33] is a testament to the commitment in New Zealand to
develop methods for performance-based building fire safety design.
1.3.3.2 1991-2004
Under the Building Act 1991, the Building Regulations 1992 were introduced, which
included the New Zealand Building Code (NZBC) as the first schedule. The build-
ing code included 4 clauses on fire: C1 - outbreak of fire, C2 - means of escape,
C3 - spread of fire, and C4 - structural stability during fire. The requirements of
the building code can be met by following an Acceptable Solution as laid out in an
compliance document (for fire, a single Acceptable Solution up until 2012 known as
C/AS1 [34]), by following an accepted verification method, or through an alternative
solution using specific design methods. The Building Industry Authority (BIA) was
created to manage the new building legislation. A method of resolving building-
related disputes known as determinations was introduced, which was legislated in
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the Building Act 1991 [35]. Determinations function as a sort of “case law” for alter-
native solutions [15] and provide building design practitioners with some guidance
on what is required for an alternative solution to be granted consent.
The Building Act 1991 introduced the building consenting process, replacing
building permits. This process gave the Territorial Authorities (TAs) the power to
accept or reject building applications. The Building Act 1991 also introduced the re-
quirement for compliance schedules if the building contained any active fire protec-
tion features, including sprinkler systems, smoke management systems, automatic
doors, emergency warning and lighting systems, and any “other mechanical, electri-
cal, hydraulic, or electronic system whose proper operation is necessary for compliance with
the building code [35].” The compliance schedule specifies the inspection and main-
tenance requirements for the building. The compliance schedule is issued by the
TA.
The new system was far from perfect, and many of the flaws were exposed by
“leaky building” problems. While this issue was not directly related to fire safety,
it is worth mentioning because the difficulties in implementing performance-based
regulation in fire safety are comparable to weathertightness. Also, changes were
made to the New Zealand building regulations as a result of the leaky building
problems that affected other areas including fire safety. During the 1990s, a trend
towards a ‘Mediterranean’ style of housing became popular among New Zealan-
ders, with minimal eaves, exposed balconies, and monolithic claddings over timber
frames [36]. The combination of these features, along with reduced quality control
on junction management with flashing and other sealing methods, resulted in water
entering the framework without being able to dry. Additionally, high quality inte-
rior finishes became desirable which required drying the framing timber from 24%
to 16% moisture content. Kiln drying raised the cost of boron preservative treat-
ment because it causes some of the treatment to evaporate, but it was thought that
the lower moisture content would reduce the risk of wood rot and borer attack [37].
Therefore NZS 3602:1995 (Timber and Wood-based Products for Use in Building) [38] re-
moved the requirement for radiata pine framing members to be treated providing
they had been kiln dried to 18% moisture content or less, if they were not to be in
contact with the ground or any position where the timber moisture content would
exceed 18%. The combination of the water entering the building structure and the
lack of treatment resulted in some framing elements rotting within two years of con-
struction [39]. A large population of buildings were constructed using these practices
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 16
and due to the nature of the leaky building problem the full cost is still uncertain,
although it has been estimated at 11.3 billion NZD [40] or more than ten times the
estimated annual cost of fire risk in New Zealand.
In 2002, the BIA appointed a Weathertightness Overview Group to investigate
the leaky building problem in New Zealand. Their report pointed out a number of
issues with the building control system in New Zealand at the time [39]. Cases where
it was both too difficult and too easy to get alternative solutions (particularly in the
case of cladding systems) through the consent process were discussed. One of the
reasons given for this was a lack of skill among the TAs and building certifiers for
evaluating alternative solutions. There was evidence that documentation of alter-
native cladding solutions did not provide details of the weathertightness design at
the time of consent. Also, it was apparent that hubristic practices resulted in a lack
of thorough building design and implementation review at the building consent,
construction, and code compliance stages.
Implementing new fire safety system design practices could result in similar
problems if the ability to quantify the changes in effectiveness is not developed. The
change in fire risk may not be apparent until a sufficient population of buildings
is available using the new design practices and until a sufficient number of fire in-
cidents have occurred to create meaningful statistics, and by this time the cost to
retrofit or rebuild flawed buildings to meet society’s acceptable level of risk could
be substantial.
1.3.3.3 2004-2012
Due in large part to leaky building problems [41], the Building Act 2004 was intro-
duced, and the BIA was replaced with the Department of Building and Housing
(DBH). The purpose of the DBH was to “consolidate building and housing regula-
tory and dispute resolution functions into one agency” [42]. The Building Regulations
1992 (including the building code) remained under the new Building Act.
The first review of the NZBC since it was enacted in 1992 was undertaken
by the DBH in 2007 [43]. The lack of quantification in the NZBC performance re-
quirements was identified as a major concern, citing the previous determinations on
multi-storey residential buildings. It was proposed that the NZBC be modified to
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provide explicit performance requirements as well as required design fires and fire
scenarios that included requirements for design fire parameters, occupant response
characteristics, and active and passive fire system properties.
1.3.3.4 2012
Following the recommendations of the 2007 review, substantial changes were pro-
posed to the NZBC requirements for fire in 2010 [44], and implemented in 2012. The
four original clauses were replaced by six new clauses. The new clauses introduce
quantitative guidance for tenability limits, internal lining performance, and fire-
fighting access and water supplies, which is a departure from the previous building
code. A new verification method C/VM2: Framework for fire safety was introduced
which provides quantitative criteria for performing fire safety design, including de-
sign fires, pre-travel activity times, and movement speeds for calculating total evac-
uation time, as well as specifying the ten scenarios to be considered.
The changes allow the use of acceptable solutions C/AS1-6, the verification
method C/VM2, or alternative design to meet the New Zealand building code re-
quirements. However, alternative design is expected to be limited by the Build-
ing Consent Authorities (BCAs) to structures that are not “conventional buildings”
such as towers, bridges, and tunnels. The acceptable solution method has been de-
scribed by the DBH as analogous to a home cookbook for simple and generic build-
ing designs, while C/VM2 is compared to a restaurant chef in keeping with the food
preparation metaphor [45]. The development of probabilistic methodology is consid-
ered in the realm of the master chef for the moment but it is seen as the future for
fire safety design in New Zealand.
1.3.4 Fire safety system performance considerations in C/VM2
Currently, the verification method C/VM2 includes the following considerations for
the effectiveness of fire safety systems. Section 3.1.1 which describes the parameters
for pre-flashover design fires for design fire scenario 1, states:
For sprinkler protected buildings the fire is assumed to be controlled, i.e. con-
stant heat release rate, after the sprinkler activates based on RTI and activation
temperature.
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This approach to estimating the effect of a sprinkler system on a fire is shown
graphically in Figure 1.5, and is also described in the International Fire Engineering
Guidelines [46].
Section 3.1.2 describes the parameters for post-flashover fires. It states:
It is expected that flashover will not occur in a sprinkler protected controlled fire.
Section 3.2, which describes the structural design fire “based on complete burnout
of the firecell with no intervention”. The effects of sprinklers is included in the follow-
ing statement:
The effects of sprinkler intervention on the structural design fire may be included
by reducing the design fuel load energy density by 50% except in the case of
primary elements whose failure could cause disproportionate collapse (e.g. iso-
lated columns in a multi-storey building leading to sudden and complete failure)
where there should be no reduction.
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A number of general rules that should be followed when modelling fires to
C/VM2 are included in section 4.0. The following address modelling the effective-
ness of passive fire protection systems:
• ii. Fire/Smoke doors with self closers are assumed closed unless being used
by occupants. During egress, doors are assumed to be open for 3 seconds
per occupant or for the duration of queuing whichever is the lesser.
• iii. Doors without self-closers are assumed to be open during the analysis.
• iv. Doors being used for egress are assumed to be half-width for ventilation
flow calculation.
• v. Smoke control doors are assumed to have zero leakage area, except for a
10 mm gap at the sill.
• vi. Fire rated construction is considered to have no leakage.
• vii. Unrated walls are assumed to have leakage areas that are proportional
to the surface area of the walls. Leakage area is equal to the wall area
multiplied by 0.001 m2/m2.
• Fire rated doors that are not smoke control doors are assumed to have a
10 mm gap over the height of the door (nominally a 3 mm gap on four
sides).
• Windows are assumed to break at either 500oC or when the fire becomes
limited by ventilation and the heat release rate reduces whichever occurs
sooner.
Section 6.3 discusses calculation of detection time for determining required
safe evacuation time (RSET). It states:
The detection time shall be determined from the deterministic modelling con-
ducted by the fire engineer. It is expected that the model used to calculate the
detection time should use an appropriate fire model for this analysis that incor-
porates a ceiling jet algorithm which includes the upper layer or a CFD code that
solves for the velocity and temperature directly.
Scenario 10 is intended to demonstrate the effect of a fire safety system failing.
The description is given as:
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Test the robustness of the design by considering the design fire with each key fire
safety system rendered ineffective in turn.
It is stated that “ only the FED(CO) criterion is to be met”. The definition of key
fire safety systems is given as:
smoke management systems, and fire and/or smoke doors or similar fire closures.
Fire sprinklers and automatic fire alarms installed to a recognised standard are
considered to be sufficiently reliable, that the robustness test described here need
not be applied.
1.4 Key documents and standards related to specific fire safety design
A number of documents have been published which are pertinent to probabilistic
methods for performance-based fire engineering. This section discusses three of
them and the information that they present regarding the consideration of fire safety
systems in probabilistic risk analysis.
1.4.1 International Fire Engineering Guidelines
The International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG) [46], endorsed by Australian
(the Australian Building Codes Board), New Zealand (the Department of Building
and Housing), American (the International Codes Council), and Canadian (NRCC-
IRC) organizations, discusses appropriate methods of analysis for fire engineering
design. The IFEG is split into four parts.
Part 0 has been written separately for all four of the signatory countries, and
discusses the regulatory environment in each country. Part 1 describes the process
that is recommended for fire engineering, splitting it into five stages. The first step
is the Fire Engineering Brief (FEB), followed by analysis, evaluation of results, con-
clusions, and report preparation. Different approachs are described, including com-
parative or absolute, qualitative or quantitative, and deterministic or probabilistic.
Part 2 describes simple methods for analysis which are mostly deterministic.
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Part 3 includes a limited amount of fire engineering data. Short sections on
smoke control and suppression system effectiveness are included, as well as a sec-
tion on spread through separations. Data included in these sections is very limited
and the spread through separations section does not discuss the probability that
the separation may be compromised before ignition. Qualitative methods are usu-
ally limited to small deviations from the prescriptive solutions, sometimes using the
”Delphi” approach where a panel of experts are used to evaluate the acceptability
of the design.
1.4.2 PD7974
The British Standards Institution Published Document 7974 [47] is a code of practice
for the ”application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings” and is
comprised of eight subdocuments (including PD7974-0). PD 7974-7:2003 provides
information specific to probabilistic risk analysis, including principles, techniques,
and data. PD7974-7:2003 provides guidance for estimating fire safety system effec-
tiveness for probabilistic risk assessment purposes, but it also provides the follow-
ing caveat:
“The application of PRA can be severely limited by data availability. Determin-
istic and prescriptive fire engineering techniques have typically bridged the gaps
between what data are readily available and what are absent by taking a conser-
vative approach. The same approach cannot be readily used in PRA studies.” [47]
Guidance from PD7974-7:2003 on individual systems will be discussed in the
pertinent sections of the following chapters.
1.4.3 ISO documents
Subcommittee SC4 of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) tech-
nical committee TC92 is tasked with developing standards and guidance for fire
safety engineering [48]. Documents produced by this subcommittee include Technical
Report 13387:1999 which has 8 parts, Technical Specification 16732:2005 which pro-
vides fire risk assessment guidance, and Technical Specification 16733:2006 which
describes design fire scenario and design fire selection.
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1.5 Defining effectiveness
The effectiveness of fire safety systems have been defined and categorized with dif-
ferent approaches. The nomenclature defined by Thomas [49] will be used for this
study. For a system to be effective, the first requirement is that it is in place, oper-
ational, and for active systems, ready to respond if a fire occurs. Reliability will be
used to describe this condition of the system. Another term that has been used is
operational reliability [50]. The reasons why a system may not be operational or ready
to respond can vary from being willfully disabled, a damaged component that is not
able to operate, or that the system is down for maintenance, among others. Avail-
ability is a term that is used to describe the inability of the system to respond due to
inspection, maintenance, testing, or modification work [51]. For the purposes of this
research, reliability will be used to describe the state of the system prior to the fire,
and as such is not considered temporally.
Once a system is in place and ready to respond to a fire, it must be able to per-
form the function that it is intended for. The term efficacy will be used in this study
for this purpose. Another equivalent term that has been used in other studies is
performance reliability. Efficacy is used in the model to estimate how well systems af-
fect fire development temporally in comparison to their design intent. In the model,
efficacy depends on the specific fire scenario being considered. For example, fire
location, fire heat release growth, and room geometry may influence the efficacy of
a sprinkler system, by affecting the time that the sprinkler system activates. In turn,
the available water supply pressure will determine if sufficient water is available to
suppress the fire.
Effectiveness is a measure of the overall performance of the system in fire.
Reliability and efficacy are multiplied to estimate the system effectiveness.
1.6 Uncertainty
There are many different sources of uncertainty in fire safety design, and many may
be nearly impossible to quantify. Different sources of uncertainty become impor-
tant depending on whether prescriptive-based or performance-based building reg-
ulations are used. There is little uncertainty in acceptable building design under
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prescriptive-based regulation because the acceptable method is specified directly in
the regulations, although there can be linguistic uncertainty due to interpretations
and there also can be uncertainty when the building occupancy, purpose, or de-
sign do not exactly fit the categories in the regulations. The main uncertainty in
prescriptive-based codes is in the intent of the code because it is not generally speci-
fied. Performance-based regulations reduce the uncertainty in the intent of the code
but increase the uncertainty in the ability of a specific building design to meet the
requirements of the regulations. This must then be estimated by modelling, com-
parison, expert judgement [52,53], and other means.
Several studies have considered uncertainty for performance-based fire safety
design. Notarianni [54] included the effects of uncertainty in building geometry, ven-
tilation, weather, building materials, room of origin, fire parameters, combustion
products, and chemistry on the time to untenability using Monte Carlo runs of the
two-zone model CFAST. Notarianni also looked at a municipal model for calculating
the benefits of residential sprinklers, where sprinkler effectiveness was modelled by
using a sprinkler reduction factor on premature deaths due to fire.
Lundin [55,56,57,58] studied methods of quantifying model uncertainty in smoke
temperature and layer height predictions from zone models using the CFAST model.
Frantzich [59] developed a QRA method for fire safety that considered uncertainty
and applied it to a health care facility and a hotel [60].
Siu [61] discusses uncertainties in deterministic fire models. Siu and Aposto-
lakis [62] discuss combining diverse information sources including, direct data, in-
directly applicable data, and expert opinions for suppression effectiveness using
Bayes’ theorem.
The large number of taxonomies for uncertainty indicates that there is a large
degree of uncertainty in even classifying uncertainty [63]. The classification system
considered in this research was developed by the Danish Energy Agency for the
purpose of QRA [55]. This system classifies uncertainties as resource uncertainty, as-
sumption and decision uncertainty, model uncertainty (commonly known as epis-
temic uncertainty) and input uncertainty (also known as aleatoric uncertainty).
Resource uncertainty includes big-picture factors such as uncertainty in project
management and quality control, the quality of available research, and available
analytical methods. For example, a certain type of sprinkler might be specified by
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the designer, but if a sprinkler with different response parameters is installed by
mistake then the sprinkler will not respond as predicted by the designer. Resource
uncertainty is not generally considered in this study and is difficult to quantify but
it can significantly influence the performance of a fire safety design.
An example of resource uncertainty in sprinkler system effectiveness occurred
in Palm Beach, California, when a contractor was found to be installing sprinkler
heads that were not connected to the water supply [64]. Some sources of resource un-
certainty such as the above example are addressed by the requirements of standards
for specific fire safety systems.
Decisions and choices made in selecting models and assumptions include un-
certainty. For modelling fire, a variety of models are available, ranging from simple
correlations to zone and field models. Decision uncertainty can become more of an
issue with a more complex model. A simple hand calculation based on one input
parameter will have less decision uncertainty than a more complex zone or field
model. An example of decision uncertainty within a zone fire model is the choice
of plume air entrainment and ceiling jet submodels. The a priori simulations of the
Dalmarnock fire test [65] demonstrate how decision uncertainty can affect the out-
come of a prediction when there are a large number of degrees of freedom in the
model. Several modellers were given a set of input data and produced substantially
different results using the same two computer fire models, FDS and CFAST. The
new NZBC fire safety clauses and verification method C/VM2 address some of the
decision uncertainty in fire safety design by specifying some model input param-
eters; for example, tenability, design fire, and evacuation parameters are defined.
However the choice of model is still left to the designer.
Epistemic uncertainty is the uncertainty in the modelling processes employed,
and is a function of the model. A key consideration for the selection and use of a fire
model is the accuracy of the model. However, the principles of “consistent level of
crudeness” [7,32] apply: if the certainty in the input parameters to the model is low,
then the accuracy of the model itself is less important.
Aleatoric uncertainty considers natural variability. Aleatoric uncertainty de-
pends on the situation being considered. Some of the input parameters for a specific
fire that is being reconstructed will be known with much more certainty than in the
case of a building fire safety design QRA. For instance, the point of origin and ge-
ometry of the room of origin may be known in a reconstruction, and depending on
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extent of damage, the relevant material properties of the fuel and surrounding ma-
terials can be measured. In the case of building fire safety design, the geometry of
the building and the contents can change over the lifetime of the building and thus
should be factored into the modelling scenario.
Typically fire models are verified by comparing model predictions with exper-
imental measurements. The goal of experiments is to minimise the aleatoric uncer-
tainty, i.e. control the input parameters as closely as possible. In this situation, the
fit of the model to the experimental data can be improved by increasing the com-
plexity of the model; for example, by going from a zone model to a field model or
from a simpler field model to a more refined field model. Increasing the complexity
of the model allows it to be adjusted to fit the results more closely. However, this is
not representative of the use of a model within a design or reconstruction context.
In order to provide benefit to society, a fire model must either be able to provide
additional information or insight into a real-world fire scenario beyond what can be
observed, whether it is to reconstruct a past fire or to consider risks from future fires.
Any real scenario has less information available and less control of input parameters
than an experimental fire; that is, there is more aleatoric uncertainty. The verifica-
tion data provides useful information on the model uncertainty, because aleatoric
uncertainty is minimised. If the aleatoric uncertainty in the scenario that is being
considered is greater than the model uncertainty, then the accuracy of the model is
likely sufficient for the intended purpose. An example of this concept is presented
in Chapter 5 when estimating the first sprinkler activation time.
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CHAPTER 2
A REVIEW OF FIRE RISK MODELS AND AN
INTRODUCTION TO B-RISK
This chapter contains a review of existing fire risk models with an emphasis on their
capabilities to include the effects of fire safety systems on fire. The project which
this research was conducted under and the new risk-informed fire safety building
design tool B-RISK which was developed as an outcome of the project are described.
2.1 Existing fire risk models
Quantitative, deterministic tools for fire engineering have developed substantially
in recent years, ranging from simple analytical formulae, to experimental meth-
ods, to computer models. Computer models range from zone models (such as the
Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport or CFAST, developed by the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology or NIST in the US, and BRANZFire
developed by the Building Research Association of New Zealand) to field models
(such as the Fire Dynamics Simulator or FDS developed by NIST, and FireFOAM
developed by FM Global). Probabilistic models are also available, including the
@RISK package which is not specific to fire but can be applied to any deterministic
model. Some tools considering both probabilistic and deterministic dimensions of
fire risk management, including FIERAsystem and FireCAM developed by the Na-
tional Research Council of Canada’s Institute for Research in Construction (NRCC-
IRC), FIRE-RISK developed in Australia, and CRISP developed in the UK have been
developed but are not expected to be publicly available in the near future. None of
32
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these probabilistic-deterministic models specific to building fire risk were available
at the time this research was conducted and it was unclear if their development
would be continued. This section discusses how fire safety system effectiveness is
handled in the FIERASystem, FireCAM, CESARE-Risk, and CRISP models, and in-
cludes a list of other previous fire risk models.
2.1.1 FIERASystem and FireCAM
The National Research Council of Canada (NRCC) has developed two tools for
demonstrating the ability of designs to meet performance-based regulations: the
Fire Evaluation and Risk Assessment System (FIERAsystem) and the Fire Cost As-
sessment Model (FireCAM). These tools have both been described as probabilistic-
deterministic [1]. FireCAM was designed for residential and office buildings, and
FIERAsystem is targeted at light industrial buildings [2].
FireCAM considers six design fire scenarios in the room of fire origin: smoul-
dering, non-flashover, and flashover fires; each with the door open or closed [3]. Each
design fire is assigned a probability. A single zone model is used to calculate the
spread of fire and smoke. [4]. For detection purposes, the times of smoke detector
and sprinkler operation are estimated to coincide with the temperature in the com-
partment rising by 20oC and reaching 100oC, respectively. Sprinkler system effects
on the fire are handled as follows:
1. The installation and effective operation of a sprinkler system during a fire
will extinguish the fire, resulting in minimal damage to the building and
no loss of life
2. For the small probability that the sprinkler system fails to extinguish a fire,
the fire is assumed to burn as if there is no sprinkler system installed
3. Smouldering fires will not activate sprinklers as they do not generate enough
heat [5]
Factors for the reliability and effectiveness of the sprinkler system are esti-
mated. Sprinkler system reliability for non-flashover fires is estimated to be 25%
of that of flashover fires, presumably because of the number of fires that would
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be too small to operate the sprinkler system. The probabilities for the flashover and
non-flashover are modified by the sprinkler reliability and effectiveness factors. The
sprinkler system is assumed to have no effect on smouldering fires [6].
Passive feature effectiveness is considered in the probability that the door to
the fire compartment is open or closed and with the fire resistance rating of the
walls [5]. There was no mention found of considerations for smoke management
systems.
FIERAsystem is comprised of many submodels which could be run individ-
ually or collectively as a hazard or risk analysis. Fire development scenarios for
liquid pool fires, storage rack fires, and t2 fires are included. A two-zone model is
used for smoke spread [7,8]. The FIERAsystem suppression effectiveness model [9] is
a simple model with a single value ranging from η = 0 to η = 1. The model is shown
graphically in Figure 2.1. η = 0 corresponds to a automatic suppression system that
does not affect the fire (the heat release curve and all other functions remain the
same as if the suppression system did not activate). If η = 1, the suppression system
limits the HRR to the value at the time of activation. The suppression effectiveness
model does not affect a decaying HRR below the HRR at sprinkler activation, to
prevent increasing the HRR in these circumstances. The modified heat release rate
is then used to recalculate the thermal radiation heat flux, fire plume temperature,
and flame height.
Detection devices are assigned a reliability value which represented the prob-
ability that each would respond to the fire at the calculated time [10]. Calculated
activation times were assumed to be a mean activation time and normal probabil-
ity distributions were assigned for actual activation times. Local alarms, sprinklers,
heat detectors, and smoke detectors were all assigned a standard deviation of 10 sec-
onds.
FIERAsystem also included a Boundary Element Failure Model which appar-
ently modelled the failure of passive features due to fire [11]. It is unknown how ele-
ments that are compromised or open at the beginning of the fire were accounted for.
It also appears that the effects of smoke management systems were not included [12].
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Figure 2.1: The FIERAsystem sprinkler effectiveness model. Taken from Torvi et al [9].
2.1.2 CESARE-Risk
The Centre for Environmental Safety and Risk Engineering (CESARE) in Australia
developed a tool known as CESARE-Risk or FIRE-Risk that used a one-zone model
similar to FireCAM. CESARE-Risk was not available at the time of writing, but from
a review of available literature it appeared that CESARE-Risk did not consider sup-
pression or smoke management. There was some discussion of the failure of passive
elements [13,14,15,16].
CESARE-RISK included Monte Carlo analysis of a matrix of 384 runs, with
variations including three fire types (smouldering, flaming, and flashover), three
growth rates for each fire type, four ventilation states for the room of fire origin (door
and window open and closed), four ventilation states for further fire spread (apart-
ment of fire origin and stairwell doors open and closed), and occupants awake or
sleeping [17]. Continuous distributions were replaced by equivalent 3 point discrete
distributions. This approach is used in the fire growth, fire brigade intervention and
human response models. Fire spread beyond the room of origin is not considered in
the time dependent part of CESARE-RISK.
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2.1.3 CRISP
A fire risk assessment model developed by the Building Research Establishment
(BRE) in the United Kingdom is known as CRISP II, or Computation of Risk Indices
by Simulation Procedures [18]. CRISP II is described as object-oriented zone model,
where burning items gas layers, people, vents, smoke detectors, and walls are all
considered as objects [19]. There does not appear to be any mechanism for accounting
for automatic suppression or smoke management. Passive elements such as doors
and windows are considered as vents. Fire spread between items is not considered
in CRISP [20].
2.1.4 Other models
Hall and Sekizawa [21,22] provide a thorough summary of several fire risk modelling
approaches, including a synopsis of the calculation methodology and data sources
employed by these models. A number of models have been developed that use
a probabilistic network approach to predicting fire and smoke spread. Examples
include those by Elms, Buchanan, Dusing, and Platt [23,24], Ling and Williamson [25],
and Fitzgerald [26]. Event tree fire risk models have been described as early as 1980,
using both quantitative [27] and qualitative [28] approaches.
PD7974-7:20003 also discusses event tree, fault tree, and fire spread network
approaches [29]. Event trees consider the probability for a sequence of discrete events
to occur, usually with binary successful or failed outcomes for each event (as an
example, a sprinkler either controlling the fire or not controlling the fire). The prob-
abilities for each event outcome are multiplied to estimate a probability for specific
event sequences or scenarios to occur, which is then multiplied by the expected con-
sequences. A typical event tree is shown in Figure 2.2. The event tree approach was
used in the case studies discussed later in this chapter.
A fault tree is used in fire risk analysis to determine the overall reliability of a
system from component data, and is discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.
Several models have been developed for fire risk analysis in the nuclear in-
dustry, including COMPBRN [30] and others [31,32]. A method of evaluating fire risk
in telecommunications facilities known as the Central Office Fire Risk Assessment
(COFRA) procedure was developed to consider business interruption risk [33].
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L3 C3
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L6 C6
L7 C7
L8 C8
Event Probabilities
Figure 2.2: Typical event tree for 3 events, with event probabilities P1 - P3. Successful sprin-
kler fire control is represented as the second event.
2.2 MSI building safety design fire tool project
This research is part of a larger project involving the Building Research Association
of New Zealand (BRANZ) and the University of Canterbury to support risk-based
fire engineering in New Zealand, funded by the New Zealand Ministry of Science
and Innovation (MSI) (formerly known as the Foundation for Research, Science and
Technology), the New Zealand Building Research Levy, and the New Zealand De-
partment of Building and Housing (DBH). The overall project builds on fire safety
modelling capability developed in New Zealand with the goal of producing a tool
to support future risk-based building fire safety regulations and design. Figure 2.3
demonstrates how this project on fire safety system effectiveness fits within the
larger overall scope.
The tool uses the capabilities developed for the BRANZFire fire physics model
as the fire and smoke spread engine. A new design fire generator is being developed
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Figure 2.3: Flowchart showing an overview of the building safety design-fire tool for use in
a risk-informed regulatory environment. Taken from BRANZ.
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by other researchers to create probabilistic room contents design fire scenarios. A
module places room contents probabilistically with rules to make the item locations
realistic; for example, a piece of furniture will not be placed to block the doorway
into a lounge. Of the items placed in the room, one is randomly chosen to be the first
item ignited. An item-to-item fire spread model has also been developed by others
as part of this project, to continue the fire development as it spreads to multiple
items.
The MSI project at the time of this research is only considering the design fire
or fire development aspect of fire safety. In terms of fire engineering outcomes, the
tool is focussed on estimating the available safe egress time (ASET), or the time that
is available from the initiation of the fire until the building becomes untenable for
occupants. This does not consider the human behaviour and response to fire, for
both occupants and Fire Service responders. The tool may be extended to these
aspects in the future, by integrating with other tools that have been developed for
these aspects such as EvacuatioNZ [34] for occupant behaviour and the Fire Brigade
Intervention Model [35] (FBIM) for fire service responders.
The goal of this research as a part of the larger project is to develop the ability
of the new tool to model the effects of fire safety systems on the fire and smoke de-
velopment and spread in a risk-informed manner. Other effects of the system such
as occupant notification are not considered. The probabilistic nature of the new tool
allows fire safety system effectiveness uncertainty to be considered. Appropriate
input distributions for fire safety systems in the new model are discussed, as well as
methods for analysing the sensitivity of the model output to the relevant input pa-
rameters. Note that uncertainties will depend on the scenario being considered, so
results from this research should not be taken out of context for other applications.
2.3 Description of B-RISK
B-RISK samples input parameter distributions to create Monte Carlo input files and
then uses a deterministic model to estimate the spread of fire and smoke in build-
ings. Some features are then available to evaluate the individual deterministic or
combined probabilistic output. B-RISK has the capability to output model geometry,
layer height, and vent flows to Smokeview (a fire simulation visualisation software
developed by NIST) for visualisation.
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2.3.1 Deterministic fire and smoke spread model
A design fire generator with item-to-item fire spread capabilities has been devel-
oped to model the spread of fire [36]. Alternatively, global t2 or t3h fires can be speci-
fied. The HRR time history must be specified, either for the entire fire or for individ-
ual items if the item-to-item design fire generator is used. A burning rate enhance-
ment option is available to simulate the effects of the compartment on the HRR. A
two zone model is used to estimate smoke spread in up to ten compartments [37].
For the item-to-item design fire generator, a radiative heat transfer model is
used to estimate the heat flux that items not yet ignited receive from burning items [36].
The flux time product (FTP) model is then used to calculate when the item has re-
ceived enough energy to ignite [38]. Two mechanisms are used to estimate secondary
ignition: radiant heat from burning items igniting vertical surfaces and radiant heat
from the upper layer igniting horizontal (top) surfaces on unburnt items.
In early B-RISK versions, one of 2 submodels could be chosen for axisymmet-
ric plume entrainment; one developed by Delichatsios [39] and one by McCaffrey [40].
The current version only allows the Heskestad axisymmetric plume entrainment
model. Entrainment models developed by Harrison [41] are implemented for spill
plumes. An option for a “disturbed plume” is available which doubles entrainment
for plumes subjected to external air movement.
2.3.2 Systems in the deterministic model
The deterministic fire physics engine has considerations for the effects of sprinkler
systems, passive features, and smoke management systems. Either Alpert’s corre-
lations [42] or the NIST JET model [43] can be used to calculate ceiling jet temperature
and velocity for heat detectors. Alpert’s correlations do not consider the effect of
a hot layer and have been shown to overpredict heat detector activation times in
circumstances where a layer can form [44]. The thermal dectector response model by
Heskestad and Bill Jr. [45] is then used to estimate sprinkler activation.
The effect of sprinklers on the heat release rate can either be modelled as
having no effect, a “control mode” where the heat release is held constant at the
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value given when the first sprinkler activated, or approximate suppression using
the model developed by Evans [46].
The status of passive fire compartmentalisation features can be considered
during the fire by opening or closing vents. Flows through vents are calculated.
A description of the horizontal and vertical vent flow models can be found in the
BRANZFIRE technical reference manual [40], and are based on the CCFM.VENTS and
VENTCF2A algorithms developed by Cooper and Forney [47,48]. Vents are assumed
to open or close over 2 seconds by a linear increase or decrease in the width.
Fire resistance ratings are based on the standard fire severity test. A method
for estimating the actual time to passive element failure under real fire severity con-
ditions, developed by Nyman [49], has been incorporated in the deterministic model.
The model was developed from testing on light timber frame (LTF) and light steel
frame (LSF) passive assemblies. A glass fracture model by Parry [50] is included as
well, but does not predict fall out which is more important in terms of the integrity
of the compartment. Recent work by Wong [51] has been completed which provides
a probabilistic model for glass fallout, based on a limited number of window con-
figurations. Since the scope of this research does not include the effects of fire on
passive building elements, there is no further discussion of these features in this
dissertation.
Two features are available for modelling the response of smoke management
systems, in addition to the vent and heat detector algorithms listed above. If a smoke
detector is used to activate the system, Heskestad’s detector model in combination
with the smoke concentration model by Davis et. al. [52] can be used to predict the
time of activation. Pressurisation or extraction by mechanical means (fans) can also
be considered, although the fan can only be located in one layer. Either a specified
flow rate or a fan curve which calculates the flow rate based on the pressure differ-
ential can be used. If a layer is thin the model will consider the “plugholing” effect
where both layers are drawn through the fan.
A more detailed discussion of how specific systems are considered by the de-
terministic model is included in pertinent chapters where required.
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CHAPTER 3
STATISTICS AND OTHER EXISTING MEASURES OF
SPRINKLER EFFECTIVENESS
3.1 Introduction
As noted in the New Zealand and Australian risk-informed fire safety building de-
sign case studies discussed in Chapter 11, one of the most influential factors on fire
risk is the effect of sprinkler systems on fire development. Typically for design pur-
poses, an assumption of the effect of the sprinkler system on the fire’s HRR will be
made. A typical case is the control assumption discussed for C/VM2 in Chapter 1.
This assumes that the sprinkler system operates reliably and is able to perform the
job it was designed for. In reality, this may not always be the case, and can be ac-
counted for in probabilistic risk-informed fire safety design. Sprinkler performance
in fires may depend on the following factors:
• age and deterioration
• inspection, testing, and maintenance
• standards and technology available at the time of design
• modifications
• changes in building use or hazard being protected
• building design
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• other building systems, such as heating and ventilation
• water supply changes
among others.
By examining the performance of sprinkler systems and sprinkler system com-
ponents in past fires, estimates of future sprinkler system effectiveness can be made.
However, it is difficult if not impossible to determine the effect of a sprinkler system
on real fires in terms of heat release rate so a number of other criteria have been
used, such as:
• fire containment to room of origin
• number of sprinklers activated
• amount of damage to structure and property
• required amount of fire service intervention
• occupant injuries or fatalities
The differences in these criteria make it difficult to apply the reported sprinkler
effectiveness probabilities to fire risk modelling. The use of these criteria in the
studies identified in the literature is discussed in Section 3.3.
A number of studies have been published which provide information on sprin-
kler system effectiveness. Since automatic sprinkler systems were originally in-
vented and developed in the 1800s [1], there has been debate as to how effective
they are. An early reference to estimates of sprinkler effectiveness can be found
in the Preliminary Report of the New York State Factory Investigating Commission,
which was released in 1912 following the Triangle Shirtwaist fire. This report stated
that [2]:
“Testimony as to the efficacy of sprinkler systems varies, but the lowest estimate
of their proper working is 75 per cent and the highest 95 per cent.”
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It is unknown what information this testimony was based on. As the 20th cen-
tury progressed, several other organisations recorded information on the operation
of sprinkler systems. This chapter reviews the information currently available from
studies on sprinkler system effectiveness in the context of using this information for
risk-informed building fire safety design. This review does not generally attempt to
judge the value of existing studies as that judgement will depend on the context of
the approach to obtain the data and the data application. Some information from
Chapter 4 which describes sprinkler effectiveness estimates from recent NZFS data
is included for comparison.
3.1.1 Definitions
As discussed in Chapter 1, “reliability” is defined as the probability that a sprinkler
system will activate and supply water to a fire demand. “Efficacy” is defined as
the probability that the sprinkler system will affect the development of the fire as
specified in the system design objectives, given that it operates. “Effectiveness” is
a term describing the overall performance of the sprinkler system, combining both
the reliability and efficacy. These definitions have been used in other studies on
sprinkler systems, such as those by [3], “Availability” describes the probability that
the system will not be out of service for inspection, testing, or maintenance, and is
included in reliability.
This review does not consider the potential for sprinkler systems to fail when
there is no fire present. Such situations may include rupture due to freezing or
mechanical damage leading to water damage, or activation in non-fire conditions.
These types of failure are not generally directly considered in a building fire risk
analysis, but they may be relevant for other purposes, such as a cost/benefit analysis
for installing specific fire protection systems.
Sprinkler system reliability and effectiveness as defined do not directly trans-
late to impact measures; for example, reduction of property damage or a reduction
of fatalities. They are a measure of the ability of the sprinkler system to respond
and to meet the design objectives, respectively. As an extreme example, a “100%
effective” sprinkler system would not equate to a 100% reduction in loss, because a
fire must be present and reach sufficient size to activate the sprinkler system as de-
signed and thus there will always be a measure of loss in a sprinklered fire. Impact
measures are discussed later in this chapter.
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3.1.2 Types of sprinkler effectiveness studies
Two general approaches have been used in previous studies taken to quantify sprin-
kler effectiveness:
1. Component-based (fault tree)
2. System-based (incident data)
The component-based approach builds an effectiveness estimate for a system
from individual component data. The system-based approach estimates the effec-
tiveness of the entire system directly from past performance in actual fire incidents.
For design purposes, either approach have been used with data obtained from al-
ready installed systems or “expert judgement” estimates (which are not further dis-
cussed in this review of sprinkler system effectiveness studies) if data was deemed
to be lacking or insufficient. This review will compare the effectiveness estimates
obtained from component-based approaches and system-based separately, and sub-
sequently attempt to reconcile them to compare differences and similarities between
the values obtained through each approach.
3.1.3 Other sprinkler effectiveness review studies
Sprinkler effectiveness reviews have been conducted by Smith [4], Richardson [5], Bukowski
et al [6], Feeney [7], Koffel [8], and Sakenaite [9]. Several studies combine a review of
other sources and new data, including Finucane and Pickney [10], Budnick [11], and
Gravestock [12].
3.2 Component-based studies
Component-based studies of sprinkler performance use estimates of individual com-
ponent reliability and combine them using some approach, typically a fault tree, to
obtain an estimate of the system effectiveness. These studies typically provide a
reliability estimate for the system only since it is difficult to attribute efficacy to in-
dividual components. A notable exception was completed by Gravestock [12], who
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combined estimates of sprinkler efficacy in smouldering, flaming non-flashover, and
flashover fires with a reliability fault tree to estimate an overall effectiveness.
Component-based reliability data is either reported as a failure probability per
demand or a failure rate for a unit time. The following formula is used to calculate
per demand probability from a failure rate:
P (per demand) = 1− e−λt (3.1)
where λ is the failure rate and t is the time between maintenance, inspection,
or replacement. This equation is found in various sources (for example, Lees [13])
and can be used to convert the following component data from failure rate to failure
probability per demand, but it assumes the failure rate is constant over time and will
depend on the time period used so it is specific to each application. Thus, the data
here is reported in the same units and type as originally discussed in the literature.
Component-based reliability probabilities can be combined to estimate system
reliability through fault trees. A simple fault tree is shown in Figure 3.1. Individ-
ual component reliability probabilities can be combined, or if data on unique failure
modes for individual components is known then they can be included as well. Note
that the equations shown for the AND and OR logic assume that the reliability prob-
abilities are independent, which may not always be a realistic assumption if there
are significant common-cause failure modes. The fault tree used for a specific sprin-
kler system will depend on the components that are present in the system.
3.2.1 Sprinkler system component data
Table 3.1 shows the identified studies that provide sprinkler system component
data. Component data has been classified as related to sprinkler head operation
(Table 3.2), sprinkler piping (Table 3.3), valves (Table 3.4), pumps (Table 3.5), water
supplies (Table 3.6), and miscellaneous components (Table 3.7).
Moelling et al [14] evaluated sprinkler systems in four nuclear power plants us-
ing a fault tree approach. Failure was considered to be system failure to operate
on demand, and the performance of the sprinkler system after operation was not
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System 
Reliability
Failure 
mode BA
Failure 
mode BB
Component 
A
Component 
B
Psys = Pcomp A + Pcomp B – (Pcomp A)(Pcomp B)
PA = (PAA)(PAB)
Sub 
component 
AA
Sub 
component 
AB
PB = (PBA)(PBB)
PAA PAB PBA PBB
OR
AND AND
Figure 3.1: A basic example of a fault tree. The equations shown assume the probabilities
are independent. For the sprinkler system application, included components
could be water supplies, sprinkler heads, piping, valves, or other components.
Additional components and sub-component levels can be added as required.
considered. While specific information for each of the sprinkler systems was not
presented, probabilities for 8 failure modes were included. The source of the proba-
bilities used was not made explicit. Two of these were human-based: inadvertently
closed valves and failing to trip a manual release. System reliability was found to
be most sensitive to the probability of an inadvertently closed valve and the time
between inspections.
Finucane and Pickney [10] and Nash and Young [15] provided similar failure rates
for multiple sprinkler system components, apparently both sourced from 1972 UK
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Atomic Energy Authority data.
Budnick [11,16] collected inspection, test, and maintenance failure data on nine
types of component from six sprinkler systems in one facility.
Hauptmanns et al [17] employed the most comprehensive fault tree of the re-
viewed studies with 60 possible contributing events. Failure probabilities for each
event were assigned to a class ranging from 1 to 6 corresponding to an order of mag-
nitude failure probability from 0.1-0.8 to 0.00001-0.0001, respectively. For the specific
system considered in the analysis presented in Hauptmann’s paper, failure proba-
bilities of 7.1x10−4, 5.5x10−2, 6.4x10−5, and 3.1x10−3 were estimated for the sprinkler
piping network, alarm valve station, water supply, and pumps, respectively.
Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] looked at maintenance records from sprinkler
systems in Finland to estimate sprinkler reliability. The focus of the study was sprin-
kler systems in nuclear facilities but the authors concluded that there was an insuf-
ficient amount of data available from Finnish nuclear facilities so they also collected
data from non-nuclear facilities. The values listed in this paper were obtained from
the non-nuclear facilities, and Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen note that this data should
be used with caution due to “insufficient critical analysis of the data”.
Watanabe [19] estimated the failure rates of sprinkler subsystems and compo-
nents from the maintenance records of 97 sprinkler systems in Japan. These systems
included a total of 121,991 sprinkler heads and 707 piping arrays. Overall sprin-
kler reliability, capability (efficacy), availability, and effectiveness were estimated at
98.9%, 99.9%, 99.3%, and 98%, respectively.
Moinuddin et al [20] surveyed sprinkler systems in 23 high-rise office buildings
in Australia, out of a total of 60 buildings whose staff was contacted for information.
Moinuddin observed that the buildings that did not participate may have had a
lower standard of maintenance than those that did. The data was used in a fault-
tree analysis to estimate sprinkler system reliability for upfeed (water supplied from
the base of the building) and downfeed (water supplied by gravity from above)
configurations.
Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) is an organisation that collects reliability
data for the petroleum industry. Data is collected on several components that may
be relevant to specific sprinkler systems, including deluge valves and pumps [21].
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The focus of the dataset is on offshore oil and gas installations which may not be
applicable to onshore building sprinkler systems.
Brammer [22] conducted a study into the reliability of secondary water supplies
as required by the New Zealand sprinkler standard NZS:4541(2007) [23] in some cir-
cumstances. He also provided reliability estimates for single sprinkler system water
supplies. A case study for the water supply system for Adelaide, Australia was
included.
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Source Country Source of data Application focus
Watanabe [19] Japan Maintenance records Japanese buildings
Moelling et al [14] US Unknown US nuclear installations
Finucane and Pickney [10] UK UKAEA Systems Reliability Service General
Nash and Young [15] UK UKAEA Systems Reliability Service General
Budnick [11] US Collected from several sprinkler systems General
in one complex over 66 months
Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] Finland Finnish nuclear plant Buildings in Finland
electronic maintenance reports, (emphasis on nuclear)
non-nuclear building inspectionn statistics (emphasis on nuclear)
Hauptmanns et al [17] Germany OREDA, IAUT-AC report General
Gravestock [12] New Zealand New Zealand fire protection fire safety systems
industry surveys fire safety systems
Moinuddin et al [20] Australia Historical data from 23 Australian * Australian high-rise
high-rise office buildings aged 4 to 36 years* office buildings
SINTEF [21] Offshore oil and gas installation Oil and gas
(10 - 43 pieces of equipment from 1 - 9 installations) installations
Brammer [22] Australia and water supplies
New Zealand
Table 3.1: Studies providing data on sprinkler system component reliability.
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Description Source Unit Minimum Mean Maximum
Removal Watanabe [19] per demand 3.0 x 10−6
Deformation Watanabe [19] per demand 4.61 x 10−4
Leakage Watanabe [19] per demand 3.36 x 10−4
Obstruction (heat and water) Watanabe [19] per demand 1.467 x 10−3
Partition rearrangement Watanabe [19] per demand 4.89 x 10−4
Paint loading Watanabe [19] per demand 6.5 x 10−5
Failure Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 7.82 x 10−2
Fire detectors fail to function Moelling et al [14] per demand 1.99 x 10−3 2.97 x 10−3 4.45 x 10−3
Fail to open Moelling et al [14] per demand 1.00 x 10−6
Failure Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 1.50 x 10−4 1.70 x 10−4 1.80 x 10−4
Sprinkler installation Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 8.0 x 10−3 1.1 x 10−2 1.4 x 10−2
New (fail dangerous) Nash and Young [15] failures/year 3.10 x 10−2
Old (fail dangerous) Nash and Young [15] failures/year 5.10 x 10−2
Failure to flow water Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 2.0 x 10−2
Water released but Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 8.0 x 10−2
not in intended pattern
Table 3.2: Data on sprinkler head reliability.
Description Source Unit Minimum Mean Maximum
Pipe array Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 2.4 x 10−6 3.3 x 10−6 4.3 x 10−6
Gasket failure Budnick [11] failures/hour 5.00 x 10−7 4.00 x 10−6 1.20 x 10−5
Table 3.3: Data on sprinkler piping reliability.
C
H
A
PT
ER
3.
STA
T
ISTIC
S
A
N
D
O
TH
ER
EX
ISTIN
G
M
EA
SU
R
ES
O
F
SPR
IN
K
LER
EFFEC
TIV
EN
ESS
58
Description Source Unit Minimum Mean Maximum
Sector control valve mishandled Watanabe [19] per demand 2.08 x 10−3
Priming tank gate valve Watanabe [19] per demand 2.47 x 10−3
Deluge fail to open Moelling et al [14] per demand 8.9 x 10−4 1.9 x 10−3 3.6 x 10−3
Check fail to open Moelling et al [14] per demand 3.0 x 10−5 1.0 x 10−4 3.0 x 10−4
Closed inadvertently (ICV) Moelling et al [14] failures per hour 6.3 x 10−7 6.3 x 10−6 6.3 x 10−5
Alarm Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 2.0 x 10−3 2.94 x 10−3
Main stop Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 2.3 x 10−3 3.19 x 10−3
Zone isolation Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 2.2 x 10−2 3.17 x 10−2
due to tenancy changes
Ordinary stop Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 6.7 x 10−4 9.60 x 10−4
Non-return Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 1.1 x 10−3 1.76 x 10−3
Pressure reducing Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 4.77 x 10−3 1.04 x 10−2
Wet alarm Nash and Young [15] failures/year 4.0 x 10−5
Alternative alarm Nash and Young [15] failures/year 8.0 x 10−5
Main sprinkler stop Nash and Young [15] failures/year 2.0 x 10−4
Non-return Nash and Young [15] failures/year 1.0 x 10−2
Main stop Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 2.3 x 10−3
Non-return Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 1.0 x 10−2
Main sprinkler stop Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 2.0 x 10−3
Wet alarm Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 4.0 x 10−4
Alternative alarm Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 8.0 x 10−4
Post indicating Budnick [11] failures/hour 0
Alarm check Budnick [11] failures/hour 0
Outside stem and yoke Budnick [11] failures/hour 7.5 x 10−8 3.6 x 10−7 8.7 x 10−7
Main drain Budnick [11] failures/hour 0
Inspector’s test Budnick [11] failures/hour 2.3 x 10−6 8.3 x 10−6 1.8 x 10−5
Alarm Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 6.5 x 10−4 1.2 x 10−3 2.0 x 10−3
Deluge (Critical) SINTEF [21] failures/ 2.8 5.8 9.4
106 calendar hours
Deluge (All Modes) SINTEF [21] failures/ 12 21 31
106 calendar hours
Table 3.4: Data on sprinkler system valve reliability.
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Description Source Unit Minimum Mean Maximum
Starting device Watanabe [19] per demand 6.84 x 10−3
Fail to start Moelling et al [14] per demand 4.5 x 10−3 1.4 x 10−2 2.4 x 10−2
Diesel Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 8.41 x 10−2 1.21 x 10−1
Electric Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 1.27 x 10−2 1.90 x 10−2
Diesel Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 8.7 x 10−3 1.5 x 10−2 2.3 x 10−2
Electric Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 2.5 x 10−3 6.2 x 10−3 1.3 x 10−3
Diesel (Critical) SINTEF [21] failures/ 120 210 310
106 calendar hours
Diesel (All Modes) SINTEF [21] failures/ 680 840 1000
106 calendar hours
Electric (Critical) SINTEF [21] failures/ 24 72 170
106 calendar hours
Electric (All Modes) SINTEF [21] failures/ 120 210 340
106 calendar hours
Table 3.5: Data on sprinkler system pump reliability.
Description Source Unit Minimum Mean Maximum
Dual supplies Brammer [22] per demand 5.0 x 10−9 2.4 x 10−5
Town main Brammer [22] per demand 5.6 x 10−4 1.1 x 10−2
Pumped supply (diesel) Brammer [22] per demand 1.8 x 10−3 3.8 x 10−3
Elevated tank Brammer [22] per demand 1.9 x 10−4 1.8 x 10−3
Town main Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 1.87 x 10−4 3.72 x 10−4
Gravity tank Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 2.28 x 10−4 2.28 x 10−4
Storage tank Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 4.64 x 10−3 9.34 x 10−3
Water supply line (per m) Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 1.29 x 10−5 2.18 x 10−5
Town main Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 2.6 x 10−4 1.0 x 10−3 2.5 x 10−3
Storage tank Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 6.5 x 10−3
Pressure tank Ronty and Keski-Rahkonen [18] failures/year 1.0 x 10−3 2.0 x 10−2 9.3 x 10−2
Table 3.6: Data on sprinkler system water supply reliability
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Description Source Unit Minimum Mean Maximum
Pressure switch Watanabe [19] per demand 8.99 x 10−4
Down time Watanabe [19] per demand 3.7 x 10−3
Incomplete protection Watanabe [19] 1.03 x 10−4
Alarms fail to function Moelling et al [14] per demand 2.68 x 10−2 3.62 x 10−2 4.81 x 10−2
Personnel fail to trip manual release Moelling et al [14] per demand 2.00 x 10−1
Back-up batteries for diesel pump Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 2.68 x 10−2 4.92 x 10−2
Mains power in building Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 1.61 x 10−4 3.11 x 10−4
Building power generator Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 5.24 x 10−3 1.25 x 10−2
Pressure switch Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 7.82 x 10−3 1.17 x 10−2
Direct brigade alarm Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 5.27 x 10−3 9.57 x 10−3
Jacking pump Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 9.85 x 10−3 1.55 x 10−2
Back-up batteries for brigade alarm Moinuddin et al [20] per demand 2.57 x 10−3 6.71 x 10−3
Alarm motor and gong Nash and Young [15] failures/year 1.6 x 10−2
Accelerator Nash and Young [15] failures/year 7.9 x 10−3
Alarm motor and gong Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 1.6 x 10−2
Accelerator Finucane and Pickney [10] failures/year 8.0 x 10−3
Flow alarm Budnick [11] failures/hour 5.80 x 10−6 1.50 x 10−5 2.70 x 10−5
Motor gong Budnick [11] failures/hour 4.10 x 10−5 2.50 x 10−5 1.30 x 10−5
Fire department connection (FDC) Budnick [11] failures/hour 0
Table 3.7: Miscellaneous sprinkler system component data.
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Fault/Issue Office Apartment All building types
Inadequate supply 1.97% 2.38% 1.70%
Signalling fault 1.32% 2.38% 1.08%
Fire service inlet 0.66% 0.00% 1.01%
Flow switch 0.00% 0.00% 0.23%
Floor isolation 0.00% 0.00% 0.08%
Street valve 3.95% 0.00% 0.62%
Pump performance 2.63% 0.00% 1.47%
Pump start 3.29% 4.76% 1.24%
Hydraulic gong 0.00% 0.00% 0.15%
Anti-Interference gear 2.63% 0.00% 0.85%
Isolated 0.66% 0.00% 0.23%
Pressure switch 0.00% 4.76% 0.15%
Unprotected areas 1.97% 9.52% 2.48%
Table 3.8: New Zealand survey data on 1,293 sprinkler systems from 1999 to 2007 [12]
Along with providing a review of other sources and recommending fire safety
system component reliability distributions for risk assessment purposes, Gravestock
listed sprinkler system deficiency data from inspections in New Zealand, and also
collected survey data on 1,293 New Zealand sprinkler systems from 1999 to 2007,
shown in Table 3.8 [12]. Of the buildings included in the survey, 94% of office build-
ings, 76% of apartment buildings, and 89% of the total building population had
sprinkler systems with minor or no defects found. The apartment buildings had a
higher proportion of unprotected areas, pump start defects, and inadequate water
supplies, although it should be noted that there were only 42 sprinkler systems in
apartment buildings included in the survey so there is a large amount of uncertainty
due to the small population of buildings. Multi-storey office and apartment build-
ings accounted for approximately 10% and 3% of the survey results, respectively.
The category “all building types” included retail, crowd occupancy, healthcare, ed-
ucation, and industrial buildings in addition to office and apartment buildings.
It is difficult to directly compare component data from different sources, be-
cause of the variety of units and approaches taken, with no clear definitions of what
constitutes failure for each component.
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3.3 System-based studies
Total system-based studies generally use data from system operation in previous
fire events from a population of buildings to estimate measures of effectiveness.
The alternative approach is to obtain expert judgement through surveys or Delphi
methodology. The estimates of sprinkler effectiveness from these studies are always
on a per demand basis since the data comes from actual system demands.
A number of past system studies provide an estimate of sprinkler system ef-
fectiveness from fire incident data, shown in Table 3.9. The estimated effectiveness
ranges from a minimum of 70.1% to a maximum of 99.5%, which corresponds to
failure rates ranging from 60 failures in 200 fires to 1 failure in 200 fires.
The NFPA has published information on sprinkler system effectiveness in the
United States since 1897. Estimates of satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance of
sprinklers in fires are available from 1897 to 1964. It was noted that this data set
did not include numerous fires extinguished by one or two sprinklers. Informa-
tion on the rationale for unsatisfactory and satisfactory performance has not been
identified for the NFPA data from 1897 to 1925. The NFPA has noted that reporting
categories related to sprinkler performance were modified with the introduction of
the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) Version 5.0. This change was
intended to improve the estimates of sprinkler reliability from the NFIRS data [24].
Knudsen and Bygbjerg [25] presented data from Danish sprinkler system in-
spection reports from 2001, 2007, and 2008. Deficiencies were placed into four cate-
gories:
• Category A: significant defects/deficiencies that will prevent the entire system
from operating adequately (must be fixed before approval),
• Category B: defects/deficiencies that will prevent a portion of the system from
operating adequately (approval will lapse if not fixed in 2 months),
• Category C: minor defects/deficiencies (must be fixed in 12 months or de-
fect/deficiency is upgraded to category B), and
• Category BC: multiple category B or C defects/deficiencies that cumulatively
are expected to equate a category A defect/deficiency.
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On average, Knudsen and Bygbjerg found that 2% of inspected Danish sprin-
kler systems had sufficient problems to not be approved, while 40% of the inspected
systems had zero defects or deficiencies identified.
There are also studies that provide information on sprinkler system effective-
ness in terms of effects on the consequences from fire, such as fatalities, injuries, or
amount of building floor area consumed by fire. These studies are discussed in a
later section.
3.3.1 Definition of sprinkler system effectiveness
The definition of what constitutes an effective sprinkler system operation in a fire
event is not consistent between studies. Marryatt defines “satisfactory” sprinkler
operation as limiting the damage to the building and contents to 20% of the total
value involved. He defines “controlled” fires as “those which are extinguished by the
sprinkler system by the time the fire brigade arrives, or which would be extinguished even-
tually without supplementary action by fire brigades or others.” This definition is slightly
misleading as all fires will eventually extinguish once they have exhausted all avail-
able fuel supply. Hall Jr. [26] states that sprinkler effectiveness should be measured
relative to the design objectives of the system, in most cases limiting fire spread to
the room of origin.
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Data Collected Building Number Nominal Reported
Source Country From Years Population/Location of Events Effectiveness
Tryon and McKinnon [27] US 1897-1924 United States 32778 95.8%
Tryon and McKinnon [27] US 1925-1964 United States 75290 96.2%
Hall Jr. [28] US 1999-2002 NFIRS 5.0 data Not Reported 89%
Hall Jr. [29] US 2002-2004 NFIRS 5.0 data Not Reported 90%
Hall Jr. [26] US 2003-2007 NFIRS 5.0 data 44310 91%
Hall Jr. [30] US 2006-2010 NFIRS 5.0 data 47520 88%
US Department of Energy [31] US 1955-2003 US DOE facilities 251 98.8%
Miller [32] US 1970-1972 FM insured properties 1355 85%
Powers [33] US 1969-1978 City of New York 5709 97.0%
Taylor [34] US 1982-1986 US general office buildings 6400 per year∗ 81.3%
Linder [35] US 1988-1993 Industrial Risk Insurers 3446 94.9%
Baldwin and North [36] UK 1967-1968 UK fire brigade data 619 94%
Marryatt [37] Aus/NZ 1886-1986 Australia/New Zealand 9022 99.5%
Frank et al [38] NZ 2001-2010 New Zealand 1171 86%
Juneja [39] Canada 1995-2002 Ontario Fire Marshal data 2536 70.1%
Table 3.9: System-based sprinkler effectiveness studies which provide a direct estimate of sprinkler system effectiveness from past fires
in sprinklered buildings.
∗ Estimated
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3.3.2 Reporting of fires that do not activate sprinklers
A major source of discrepancy when comparing sprinkler effectiveness values be-
tween studies is how fires where the sprinkler system is not activated is handled. A
sprinkler system may not activate (ie. one or more sprinkler heads operating) in a
fire for one of the following reasons:
1. the heat released by the fire was insufficient to activate the sprinkler system
(whether or not the sprinkler system was present in the area of origin), or
2. the fire was large enough to activate a sprinkler system but a partial sprinkler
system was installed and was not present in the area of fire origin, or
3. the fire was large enough to activate the sprinkler system and one or more
sprinklers were present but failed to operate.
At one end of the spectrum, Marryatt [37] does not include any fires that did
not operate a sprinkler, for any of the three reasons listed above. Sprinklers were
reported activated in nearly all of the 49 fires that Marryatt considered the sprinkler
system operation to be unsatisfactory, with the possible exception of one incident
where the sprinkler system (and building) was completely destroyed in an explo-
sion - in which case water from the broken supply piping still extinguished the fire.
This is one factor that likely contributes to high reported values of effectiveness,
such as the 99.5% reported by Marryatt.
At the other end, Juneja [39] includes in the operational failures all fires where
a sprinkler system was installed in the building, including cases where the fire was
too small to operate the system and where the fire is remote from the sprinkler sys-
tem. This contributes to the low sprinkler effectiveness of 70.1% reported by Juneja,
relative to the other studies.
3.3.3 Reasons for sprinkler systems to fail to operate
Table 3.10 lists the reported reasons why sprinkler systems failed to operate in the
studies where this information was available. For studies that combined failures
CHAPTER 3. STATISTICS AND OTHER EXISTING MEASURES OF SPRINKLER EFFECTIVENESS 66
with ineffective operation, the reported percentage has been normalised to the to-
tal number of failures for comparison. The most frequent reason for sprinkler sys-
tem failure, ranging from 33% to 100% of the reported failures, is that the system
was shut off. Inappropriate systems, lack of maintenance, and manual interven-
tion are reported at similar frequencies from 5% to 33%. Damaged components and
frozen systems provide the minority of failures, generally near 2% with one outlier
in Power’s study [33] damaged components comprised 2 out of 6 failures, which is
likely a reflection of the small sample size of failures.
3.3.4 Reasons for ineffective sprinkler system operation
Table 3.11 lists the reported reasons why sprinkler systems that operated were in-
effective, normalised to the total number of ineffective operations. The most com-
mon reason for sprinkler systems to operate ineffectively was that the water did not
reach the fire, ranging from 19% to 55% of the reported cases. An inappropriate
system for the fire was the second most commonly reported reason, followed by
not enough water released. These reasons are inter-related, and could have differ-
ent root causes. For example, a partial coverage system may result in any of these
outcomes. A change in occupancy or hazard could also result in all three outcomes:
for example, a change in fuel package configuration could result in a portion of the
fire being shielded, or a system designed for a light commercial occupancy could be
insufficient if the use of the building is changed to storage of high-hazard materials.
Hall Jr. [26] noted that NFPA estimates of effectiveness “exclude partial systems as
identified by reason for failure and ineffectiveness equal to equipment not in area of fire”.
This approach is not likely taken in the other studies reviewed.
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Tryon and McKinnon [27] 1925-1964 Not specified 75290 96.2% 63% 15% 15% 3% 2%
Hall Jr. [28] 1999-2002 All sprinklers Not reported 89.3% 65% 5% 11% 16% 3%
Hall Jr. [29] 2002-2004 All sprinklers Not reported 90% 66% 10% 10% 20% 2%
Hall Jr. [26] 2003-2007 All sprinklers 44310 91% 53% 20% 15% 9% 2%
Hall Jr. [30] 2006-2010 All sprinklers 47520 88% 63% 5% 6% 18% 8%
US Department of Energy [31] 1955-2003 Water-based 251 98.8% 33% 33% 33%
Powers [33] 1969-1978 High-rise office buildings 254 98.8% 100%
Powers [33] 1969-1978 High-rise buildings (excl. office) 1394 98.4% 100%
Powers [33] 1969-1978 Low rise buildings 4061 95.8% 85% 12% 3%
Marryatt [37] 1886-1986 All sprinklers 9022 99.5% 100%
Mean 94.7% 73% 14% 10% 15% 9% 2%
St. dev. 4.4% 23% 10% 5% 4% 12% N/A
Table 3.10: Reported reasons for sprinkler systems to fail to operate.
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Tryon and McKinnon [27] 1925-1964 Not specified 19% 35% 21% 4% 4% 13% 4%
Hall Jr. [28] 1999-2002 All sprinklers 55% 7% 31% 2% 5%
Hall Jr. [29] 2002-2004 All sprinklers 41% 14% 29% 6% 4% 6%
Hall Jr. [26] 2003-2007 All sprinklers 43% 12% 31% 5% 4% 4%
[30] 2006-2010 All sprinklers 53% 3% 18% 9% 9% 8%
US Department of Energy [31] 1955-2003 Water-based None reported
Powers [33] 1969-1978 High-rise office buildings None reported
Powers [33] 1969-1978 High-rise buildings (excl. office) 100%
Powers [33] 1969-1978 Low rise buildings 39% 12% 15% 18% 16%
Marryatt [37] 1886-1986 All sprinklers 26% 29% 2% 9% 13% 21%
Mean 39% 20% 32% 6% 5% 6% 10% 14% 11% 19%
St. dev. 14% 14% 30% 3% 2% 2% 5% 1% 10% 3%
Table 3.11: Reported reasons for sprinkler systems to operate ineffectively.
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3.3.5 Number of sprinklers activated
Due to the physical evidence available, the number of sprinklers activated is a rel-
atively simple parameter to quantify objectively. However, it is not generally clear
how the number of sprinklers activated relates to the effectiveness of the system.
PD7974-7:2003 [40] discusses this issue, noting that some studies consider system op-
erations with up to 200 sprinklers operating effective, and recommends four acti-
vated sprinklers as a consistent cut-off for effective operation, stating ”no more than
four heads operating is the fire size typically used in a fire engineering study”. The number
of sprinklers activated was reported in a number of the sources that included fire in-
cident data. The available information is summarised in Figure 3.2, which includes
all of the data from the available studies. A boxplot of the accumulated percent-
age of fires where the number of sprinklers or less activated is shown in Figure 3.3.
The boxplot represents the minimum and maximum percentage of sprinklers re-
ported activated with the first and third quartile as the box limits and the median
as the horizontal line in the box. To make the figure easier to read the number of
sprinklers activated is limited to ten. The trend for more activated sprinklers can be
inferred from Figure 3.2. The studies range from 71% to 96% at the PD7974-7:2003
recommended effective cut off point of four sprinklers.
Figure 3.4 plots the reported sprinkler effectiveness percentage versus the per-
cent of fires reported with four or less sprinklers activated. Four sprinklers activated
was used as the cut-off to compare to the PD7974-7:2003 recommendation. Most
studies report a higher frequency of effective sprinkler operation compared with
the frequency of fires where four or less sprinklers were reported activated, with the
exception of the NFPA 2003-2007 study. This may be a reflection of the changing
occupancies protected by sprinklers, as residential sprinkler systems are designed
to support the operation of less sprinklers and more residential buildings are being
equipped with sprinkler systems [26].
To extend the concept put forth in PD7974-7:2003 of using the number of sprin-
klers activated as a measure of sprinkler system effectiveness, a comparison was
made between the cumulative number of sprinklers reported activated required to
reach the effectiveness value quoted each study, where the information was avail-
able. This concept can be most readily explained by an example. NFPA data from
1925-1964 [27] reported “satisfactory” sprinkler operation in 96% of fires, but only
71% of total fires with sprinklers had four or less sprinklers reported activated.
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Figure 3.2: The cumulative percentage of incidents where the number of sprinklers acti-
vated were reported.
Thus, using the PD7974-7:2003 criterion of using four or less sprinklers as a bench-
mark for effective sprinkler system operation, the effectiveness from the 1925-1964
NFPA data would be only 71%, compared to the reported 96%. In order to include
the 96% of fires where sprinklers activated and operation was reported to be satisfac-
tory, fires with up to 36-40 sprinklers activated would need to be included.Figure 3.5
shows the relationship between the frequency of effective sprinkler operation and
the cumulative number of sprinklers reported activated where the frequency equals
the effective sprinkler operation frequency. In general, studies reporting a higher
frequency of effective sprinkler operation required a larger number of activated
sprinklers to achieve the stated effectiveness. This is potentially a reflection of the
subjective criteria used to define effective sprinkler operation: studies that report
high sprinkler effectiveness may have more inclusive criteria for defining effective
sprinkler operation.
Typically sprinkler system water supplies are hydraulically designed to sup-
port a number of sprinklers or sprinklered area which is a function of the expected
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Figure 3.3: Boxplot of cumulative percentage of incidents where the number of sprinklers
activated were reported (up to 10 sprinklers activated.)
Hazard Number of Design number Design number of Controlled
fires reported of sprinklers sprinklers exceeded by sprinklers
Extra low hazard 30 4 23% 90%
Ordinary hazard 1 8 6 17% 88%
Ordinary hazard 2 91 12 9% 93%
Ordinary hazard 3 476 18 6% 95%
Extra high hazard 14 29 3% 79%
Table 3.12: Percentage of fires where the design number of sprinklers was exceeded and
where the fire was controlled by sprinklers, from 1967-1968 UK data reported by
[36].
fire hazard [23,27]. Baldwin discusses the number of instances where the design num-
ber of sprinklers were exceeded for fires in the UK from 1967-1968 [36]. A table of the
results from this study is shown in Table 3.12
3.3.6 Estimates of reduction in fatalities and property damage
Several system-based studies estimate the effect of sprinklers on general life safety
and property protection objectives such as the number of fatalities or amount of
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Figure 3.4: Reported effective sprinkler operation and the frequency of fires reported where
four or less sprinklers operated. Wet and dry represent wet and dry pipe sprin-
kler systems, respectively. The uncertainty in the data from [38] is shown by the
error bars.
property damage reported in fire incident data. Marryatt’s study included eleven
fires where fatalities occurred with an operating sprinkler system, only one of which
occurred in a fire where the performance of the sprinkler system was considered in-
effective, where an explosion occurred and broke the supply main to the system [37].
Of the fires with fatalities in sprinklered buildings, eight were a result of an explo-
sion or flash fire and the remaining three were victims who were intimate with the
point of ignition.
Thomas [3] estimated effects of fire safety systems on four objectives including
the reduction in fire spread, civilian fatalities, and firefighter losses in fires where
various combinations of detectors, sprinklers, and protected construction were present,
from historical US NFIRS data. The effects of the systems were compared to a “Base
Case” where none of the systems were present. Effectiveness of sprinkler systems
was found to vary between -2.46 for the fire spread objective (reported average es-
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Figure 3.5: Reported effective sprinkler operation and the cumulative number of sprinklers
reported operating at an equivalent frequency to the reported effective sprinkler
operation frequency. Wet and dry represent wet and dry pipe sprinkler systems,
respectively. The uncertainty in the data from [38] is shown by the error bars.
timated monetary loss was approximately 2.5 times higher when sprinklers were
present compared to the base case)for Storage occupancy buildings and 1.00 for
civilian fatalities in Hotels and Motels (reported civilian fatalities were reduced to
zero). Negative effectiveness values were also calculated for detectors and protected
construction. He concluded that sprinklers were generally better than detectors
and fire-rated construction combined, while there was a measurable but sometimes
small advantage with all three measures compared with instances where sprinklers
were the only system installed.
Thomas also separated NFIRS data for the four objectives mentioned by oc-
cupancy, including Public Assembly, Institutional, Apartments, Hotels and Motels,
Offices, Manufacturing, Educational, one and two Family Dwellings, Rooming and
Boarding, Dormitories, Retail, and Storage. For sprinklers, he found negative effec-
tiveness (measures of the four objectives were worse when sprinklers were present
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compared to the base case) for civilian injuries in the Public Assembly, Offices, Man-
ufacturing, Educational, Retail, and Storage occupancies; for firefighter injuries in
the Storage occupancy; civilian fatalities in the Educational occupancy; and fire
spread (measured by average monetary loss) in the Storage occupancy.
Thomas indicated that there may be other factors that influence the appar-
ent effectiveness of the systems considered in his study. For example, he noted
that while civilian injuries increased in several occupancies where sprinklers were
present, it was impossible to evaluate the severity of the injuries from the reported
data, so it was possible that while more injuries occurred when sprinklers were
present in some occupancies, many of them may have been less severe. A poten-
tial explanation of the increased fire losses noted in Storage occupancy buildings
offered by Thomas was that storage buildings with sprinklers may be on average
much larger and have much more value associated with the building and contents,
although he conceded that this possibility would require more data to verify.
Melinek [41] estimated the number of casualities in the UK if all fires occurred in
sprinklered buildings, by relating the number of fatalities to the extent of fire spread
in sprinklered and non-sprinklered buildings. It was estimated that the number of
fatalities would be reduced by approximately 50%. Melinek also looked at the effect
of sprinklers on reducing the area affected by fire, and found that sprinklers had lit-
tle effect on fires reaching a size of 3 m2, but reduced the probability of a fire reaching
100 m2 or greater area by 80% when they worked effectively [42]. Melinek also dis-
cussed the potential that less fires may be reported to the fire service in sprinklered
buildings. Based on UK data from 1966 to 1972, it was noted that only 17% of calls
to the fire service from sprinklered buildings were automatic. By assuming that the
number of fire starts in industrial buildings was proportional to the product of the
number of buildings and the square root of the mean building area, Melinek esti-
mated that the fire services responded to 55% of the fires in sprinklered buildings
that would be expected if the buildings were not sprinklered.
NFPA data from 2003-2007 indicated that sprinklers increased the probability
that flame damage was confined to the room of origin to 95% compared with 74%
for fires in buildings with no sprinkler systems. The fatality rate was 83% lower
in fires in properties protected by sprinkler systems, and total property damage
was reduced by 40%-70% depending on occupancy [26]. The 2010 NFPA report also
indicates that the “NFPA has no record of a fire killing three or more people in a com-
pletely sprinklered building where the system was properly operating.” Twenty-five fires
CHAPTER 3. STATISTICS AND OTHER EXISTING MEASURES OF SPRINKLER EFFECTIVENESS 75
are listed where three or more people have been killed in fully sprinklered proper-
ties in the US since 1970. Twenty-two involved an explosion or flash fire and three
were a result of firefighting activities.
3.4 Uncertainty in estimates of sprinkler system effectiveness
The range in both sprinkler component and system data collected in this chapter
shows that there is uncertainty in estimating the effectiveness of sprinkler systems
for risk-informed fire safety design. Three studies have included suggested distri-
butions and methodology for including uncertainty in sprinkler system estimates.
Bukowski et al [6] compiled histograms of system effectiveness estimates from
a number of studies. Caution was given against using single values for estimating
the effectiveness of fire protection systems. Ranges of 88% to 98% for commercial
systems and 94% to 98% for general systems were given by Bukowski.
Siu and Apostolakis [43] discussed the uncertainty involved in using expert
judgement to estimate the reliability (or “demand availability” as termed in the orig-
inal paper) of sprinkler systems in specific installations. A Bayesian approach was
used to combine small sets of directly relevant incident data with partially relevant
data from general populations of sprinklered fire incident data and system test data.
Their work also provides techniques to account for and assess an expert’s expertise
in supplying data estimates. Data from 16 nuclear facility sprinklered fires was sup-
plemented with “expert” data represented by Industrial Risk Insurers’ sprinkler test
data and NFPA sprinklered fire data with associated bias factors to estimate a pos-
terior distribution for the reliability of a sprinkler system in a nuclear facility. The
distribution Sui and Apostolakis arrived at for the base case sprinkler reliability in
a nuclear facility had a mean reliability of 89% with a standard deviation of 6%.
Gravestock [12] recommended uncertainty distributions for sprinkler system com-
ponent reliability estimates, as well as upper and lower bounds for system effective-
ness. Gravestock noted that where information on distribution shape is unknown,
but upper and lower bounds are known, a uniform distribution may be appropriate
which assigns equal probability to all potential values within the bounds. If the up-
per and lower bounds are known and a value of maximum probability is known,
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a triangular or PERT distribution may be more appropriate. Gravestock recom-
mended using a mean effectiveness of 90% for sprinkler systems in apartments and
95% for sprinkler systems in offices, with lower bounds ranging from 46% to 89%
and upper bounds ranging from 97% to 99%.
In Chapter 4, the uncertainty in sprinkler effectiveness reported in New Zealand
Fire Service fire incident reports from 2001 to 2010 is estimated. Probability distri-
butions for sprinkler effectiveness from the reported data were developed using a
decision tree approach.
3.5 Comparing component-based studies with system-based studies
While it is difficult to directly compare component-based studies and system-based
studies, a number of observations can be made. First, the majority of failures re-
ported in real fires are due to the system being shut off, an inappropriate system, and
manual intervention and these failures are not generally captured in component-
based studies, although some component-based studies attempt to. One example
is the study by Moelling et al, which does discuss the probability of inadvertently
closed valves [14]. Second, component-based studies may capture some reasons for
ineffective operation, such as not enough water released in the case of a pump not
operating, but again, the majority of reasons such as partial systems, inappropriate
systems, or manual intervention are not captured in component-based approaches.
However, component-based studies may capture failures for lack of maintenance
or damaged components. While data for the exact components used may not be
available, the use of a component-based approach allows reliability estimates for
the specific set of component types used in an individual sprinkler system to be
combined.
In most cases, studies presenting sprinkler system component data do not elab-
orate on the failure modes considered. Other than a few exceptions, component
reliability is generally considered to be binary, either the component operates suc-
cessfully or it fails completely. Correlations between the failure of components are
not considered: for example, it is possible that multiple components may fail simul-
taneously or in close succession, particularly if poor maintenance practices are em-
ployed. Thus estimating overall system effectiveness from component-based data is
difficult.
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System-based studies, by their nature, provide the best average estimates of
overall sprinkler system effectiveness. However, since fires are relatively rare events,
system-based studies do not provide detailed information on specific types of sprin-
kler systems or specific sprinkler system configurations. Fires occur in all ages of
buildings, so even new fire incident data includes old sprinkler system designs. In
general, the specifications or standard that the incident sprinkler systems were de-
signed to are not available. Maintenance, inspection, and testing data is also not
included, so it is difficult to estimate the effects of these aspects on system effective-
ness. Changes to the building use and hazard between the time of design and the
incident are not likely to be recorded. Thus it is difficult to estimate how system
improvements such as upgraded water supplies or piping networks, or improved
inspection, maintenance, and testing practices, will improve system effectiveness
from system-based studies.
Given the limited information available, the recommended approach to es-
timate effectiveness for a specific system is to take a distribution of effectiveness
for general sprinkler systems from system-based studies, and to modify using data
from component-based studies. The relative contribution of each component to sys-
tem effectiveness can be estimated from the component data, and the effect of mak-
ing a change to the sprinkler system (such as improving the water supply or im-
proving inspection) should then be considered on a comparative basis with the base
system rather than on an absolute basis.
3.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
Given how common sprinklers are and how long they have been in use in building
fire protection it may be surprising how little is known regarding their effective-
ness. This chapter has summarised available sprinkler system component data and
effectiveness estimates for sprinkler systems from fire incident data studies, with
discussion of the relative merits of each approach and the uncertainty involved.
A number of recommendations can be made for estimating the effectiveness of
a sprinkler system for performance-based design. Due to the majority of sprinkler
failures being related to human errors, component-based study data should not be
used exclusively without comparison to system-based study data. Adjusting sprin-
kler system effectiveness due to a system modification such as additional water sup-
plies or valve monitoring should be based on an estimate of the number of failures
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observed in real fire incidents that would be prevented by the proposed change. The
modified effectiveness for the system change can be supported by component-based
data.
The limited data available and subjective nature of fire incident data precludes
the use of a single point value for sprinkler effectiveness in performance-based fire
safety design. A range of values with associated probabilities should be used to
appropriately represent the uncertainty in estimating sprinkler effectiveness from
available data. The sensitivity of the proposed fire safety design to the uncertainty
in the sprinkler system effectiveness should be investigated.
For an estimate of the effectiveness of general fire sprinkler systems, the avail-
able data indicates that a range of sprinkler system effectiveness from a minimum
of 70% to a maximum of 99.5% may be possible, or ineffective sprinkler operation
in a range from three in ten fires to one in 200. The highest probability of sprinkler
system effectiveness appears to be between 90% and 95% or between one in ten and
one in 20 ineffective sprinkler operations in fires. For most design purposes, both
the extreme upper and lower limits of reported effectiveness are not likely appli-
cable due to the definitions used for effective sprinkler operation in these studies
discussed previously. Data pertaining to the applicable jurisdiction should also be
considered with greater weight than data from jurisdictions due to varying practices
of design, installation, maintenance, and inspection. If using a probabilistic model,
a uniform, triangular or PERT distribution shape may be the most appropriate to
use with a peak between 90% and 95% and upper and lower bounds estimated from
the applicable studies for the situation being considered.
For future data collection, the definition of effective sprinkler system operation
should be made clear when it is being reported as such. Discrete system functions
(eg. notification and suppression) should be clearly separated in the data fields. Less
subjective measures such as the number of sprinklers activated as a percentage of
the number of sprinklers for which the system was hydraulically designed to sup-
ply and the number of sprinklers activated inside and outside the compartment of
origin would be useful. Integration with inspection, testing, and maintenance data
would be useful to provide information on how these factors influence effectiveness.
Chapter 4 discusses specific recommendations for improving data collection in New
Zealand, some of which may be suitable in other jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER 4
UNCERTAINTY IN ESTIMATING THE FIRE CONTROL
EFFECTIVENESS OF SPRINKLERS FROM NEW ZEALAND
FIRE INCIDENT REPORTS
4.1 Fire incident data collection in New Zealand
The NZFS is a national fire service and has used a web-based incident data report-
ing system since 2000, which is a integrated with the overall station management
system (SMS). An incident number and report are automatically generated for all
incidents that the NZFS is dispatched to, and includes the radio communications
between the dispatcher and the NZFS operational staff. A task in the web-based
time management system is then created for the officer-in-charge or a delegated
person to complete the data fields in the incident report. Most data fields have
discrete entries, but there is also a field that allows additional written explanatory
comments. There are many advantages to the NZFS incident reporting system; for
instance, since there is one system in use across the country, all incident reports are
completed in the same format. NZFS members are all trained in one system for
filling out incident reports. The system is not voluntary and contains all incidents
that the NZFS responds to. However, this does not guarantee the accuracy of the
information reported, or that all data fields pertinent to a particular incident will
be completed. Also, data field completion is not guaranteed during times of indus-
trial action by the firefighters’ union, since a form of action that has been used is
refusal to complete incident reports [1]. In the incident reports reviewed, a fire in a
sprinklered building was reported in a NZFS incident report on average every three
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days, however during the 2009 industrial action there was a span of 81 days with no
fires in sprinklered buildings reported.
A staff of twenty Fire Safety Officers are available to assist in fire investigations,
as well as specialist Fire Research and Investigation and Fire Engineering groups.
National Commander’s Instruction (NCI) number 56 requires that specialist fire in-
vestigators are involved in “fires in buildings where built-in fire safety features have failed,
or not performed to known or expected standards.” Furthermore, NCI 56 requires a full
investigation report from the specialist fire investigator for every incident “involv-
ing the failure of fire protection systems or fire safety features to contain or control a fire” [2].
SMS and full investigation reports are required within 14 days and one month of
the incident, respectively. The data considered in this report was obtained from the
SMS reports, some of which appeared to have additional comments added by Fire
Safety Officers or other specialist fire investigation staff.
4.2 Review of NZFS data from fires in sprinklered buildings
The population of fires that this study considers includes all of the fires where
sprinkler systems were reported by the NZFS during the period from 2001-2010,
excluding chimney fires and fires in residential buildings with less than 10 house-
hold units. There were a total of 7,283 fires that reported some type of detection
system, of which 1,171 fires reported a sprinkler system present, including 25 fires
where residential sprinklers were reported and 33 fires where domestic sprinklers
were reported. The performance of the sprinkler system was reported as “operated
and effective” in 613 fires, “operated and ineffective” in 27 fires, and “too small to
activate system” in 191 fires. Of the remainder, it was reported that the system op-
erated in 167 fires, did not operate in 124 fires, and operation was not reported in 49
fires. A further breakdown can be seen in Figure 4.1.
Table 4.1 categorises the reported fires by occupancy. The occupancy reported
most frequently was industrial and manufacturing, followed by hospitals or care
facilities, and shops.
An estimate of sprinkler system effectiveness in fires that the NZFS responded
to can be calculated by treating this data objectively “as reported”. Removing the
191 fires reporting that the fire was too small to activate the sprinkler system and the
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Figure 4.1: Sprinkler system performance from 2001-2010 NZFS fire incident data as re-
ported (ROO - Room of origin).
49 fires where the operational status of the sprinkler system was not reported (“not
recorded”, “unable to classify”, or “detector... not classified above”) and dividing
the 613 fires where the sprinkler system was reported as “operating and effective”
by the remaining fires, an effectiveness of 66% is calculated. This value is much
lower than the commonly quoted 99.5% effectiveness value reported by Marryatt
for Australia and New Zealand [3], values from other historical studies reviewed in
the literature [4], and also lower than recent data from the NFPA in the US, which
indicates an overall effectiveness of 91% [5].
The following reported performance categories:
• Did not operate - detector in room of origin
• Did not operate - detector not in room of origin
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Occupancy Number of Fires
Industrial, Manufacturing 360
Hospital, Hospice, Rest home, Rehabilitation centre 166
Shop, Shopping mall, Supermarket, Service station, Car yard, Other sales use 123
Office, Bank, Embassy, Fire/Ambulance/Police station 77
Flat, Apartment, Home unit 73
Prison, Correctional institution 51
Restaurant, Pub, Tavern 51
Boarding/Half-way house, Dormitory, Rooming, Home stay, Backpacker 37
Hotel, Motel, Lodge, Timeshare 36
Storage, Warehousing 28
Commercial - not classified above 23
Recreational use, Theatre, Indoor sports, Pool, Park, Zoo, Aquarium 21
University, Polytech, Teachers college, Other post-secondary 20
School: Pre-school through to Secondary/High 18
Educational, Health, Institutional - not classified above 13
Library, Museum, Art gallery, Court etc 12
Service/Repair use, Dry cleaner, Laundromat, Mechanical workshop 12
Airport 10
Recreational, Assembly - not classified above 6
Residential - not classified above 4
Rubbish tip, Transfer station, Hazardous waste disposal 4
Unable to classify 4
Doctors/Dentists emergency clinic, Medical centre 3
Vacant building, Section 3
Church, Cemetery, Religious use 2
Community hall 2
Farming, Horticulture, Agricultural use 2
Power station 2
Sports club, Health club 2
Sportsfield, Stadium 2
Construction, Renovation, Demolition site 1
Defence, Military use 1
Stormwater, Harbour, Lake, River, Beach, Waterfront area 1
Telephone exchange, Communications use, Control room, Data processing 1
Total 1171
Table 4.1: Number of fires reported in sprinklered buildings from 2001-2010 NZFS data, by
occupancy. Residential buildings with less than 10 household units excluded.
indicated that the sprinkler system did not operate, with a separate data field
(“fire detector failure”) recording the reason why the system did not operate. A total
of 124 fires or approximately 10% of the total were reported in these categories. In
the majority of cases, the fire detector failure field reported “unable to classify”, “un-
known”, or other categories that were not a clear indication of a failure, as shown in
Table 4.2.
Also, the categories:
• Alerted neighbour/passerby - detector in room of origin
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Detector in Detector not in
Room of Origin Room of Origin Total
Defective detector 1 1 2
Defective discharge head or outlet 1 1
Improper installation/Placement of detector 4 1 5
Inadequate maintenance 5 5
No detectors in room or space of fire origin 14 9 23
Not enough agent discharged to control fire 3 1 4
Power supply failed 2 2
System shut down 4 4
Unable to classify 43 6 49
Unknown 15 15
Detector not in room of origin 14 14
Total 92 32 124
Table 4.2: Reasons reported for sprinkler systems not operating from 2001-2010 NZFS data.
• Alerted neighbour/passerby - detector not in room of origin
• Alerted occupants - detector in room of origin
• Alerted occupants - detector not in room of origin
• Detector operated - not classified above
• Detector operated - but occupants failed to respond
• Detector operated - but was not a factor in the
indicated operation but did not provide indication of fire control or suppres-
sion effectiveness. A total of 167 fires were reported in these categories. Including
these fires and the fires where the sprinkler system was reported operating and ef-
fective or ineffective, there were 807 fires where the sprinkler system was reported
as operating (Figure 4.1).
4.2.1 Number of activated sprinklers reported
Of the 807 fire reports where it was indicated that a sprinkler system was present
and did operate, 474 also reported how many sprinklers had operated. Figure 4.2
compares the number of sprinklers reported activated between the 2001-2010 NZFS
data, 2003-2007 NFPA data [5], 1925-1964 NFPA data [6], and 1886-1986 Australian
and New Zealand data from Marryatt’s study [3].
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Figure 4.2: Number of activated sprinklers reported. The 2001-2010 NZFS and 2003-2007
NFPA data are comparable.
It appears that the number of sprinklers activated in fires is trending down-
ward in both the US and New Zealand, which could reflect an improvement in
sprinkler system effectiveness. Other factors that could affect the number of sprin-
klers activated in fires are changes in the occupancies and fuel package configura-
tions that sprinkler systems are installed to protect, such as an increase in residential
occupancy buildings being protected by sprinklers.
4.2.2 Multiple fires in a single sprinklered building
Four sprinklered fires were recorded in a restaurant in Auckland, where the sprin-
kler was activated in a duct. A fifth suspicious fire originated beside the building in
some stacked furniture, eventually breaking the exterior windows and causing two
interior sprinklers to activate.
A wood processing facility on the South Island experienced multiple fires in
storage silos. The sprinkler system was originally installed to wet the shavings, ie.
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not for fire protection. It was subsequently altered but was never built to any fire
sprinkler code.
4.3 Injuries and fatalities in sprinklered buildings in New Zealand
4.3.1 Injuries
There were 15 instances identified in the data set where moderate injuries were re-
ported with no fatalities. In two cases, the fire was reported as too small to activate
the sprinkler system. The sprinkler system responded in the other 13 of the cases,
and was effective in eight of those, although in one case the injuries were exacer-
bated by the sprinkler system activating. A female staff member at a rest home was
removing a burning pot from an electric range when the sprinkler activated. The
water discharged from the sprinkler caused the hot contents of the pot to splash
onto the victim. In three incidents the sprinkler effectiveness could not be deter-
mined from the incident report.
4.3.2 Fatalities
The following information on fatalities in sprinklered buildings in New Zealand
was obtained from Chris Mak of Aon, and verified by accessing the NZFS incident
reports for each. There were eight known fire deaths in sprinklered buildings in
New Zealand since 1996. Four of the fatalities happened in care facilities or rest
homes, two in a prison, one in a “halfway house,” and one in a multi storey ho-
tel. All of the casualties were intimate with the fire. Only one of the fatalities was
included in the SMS data set analysed because the incidents were either before the
period of time considered or in structures not included in the data set.
One of the rest home fires was ruled suicide by fire by the coroner. The 35
year old male casualty doused himself with petrol and ignited it directly below a
sprinkler head. Reports indicate that the fire was extinguished by the sprinkler but
not before the casualty sustained burns which would eventually be fatal. Two of the
fatalities were a result of careless disposal of smoking materials igniting flammable
clothing or furniture and giving the casualties fatal burns. It was reported that the
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sprinkler systems activated in both cases. Both victims were male, aged 76 and 86
years old. The fourth fatality was a 101-year male who received fatal burns when
an electric heater ignited clothing and the fire spread to a chair and bed. The sprin-
kler operated and extinguished the fire. The fire engineering unit of the NZFS con-
ducted an in-depth investigation into the fire and sprinkler system [7] and concluded
that while there were compliance issues with the sprinkler installation, they did not
adversely influence the fire outcome.
Both of the fatalities in prisons involved fires in cells set by inmates. In one
case, an inmate doused another with petrol and ignited it, inflicting fatal burns on
the victim. While the fire service was contacted, the responding appliance was stood
down before it reached the incident so no information on the operation of the sprin-
kler is available. In the second incident, the inmate disabled the sprinkler by wrap-
ping blanket strips around it, and then ignited bedding in his cell. He suffered fatal
burns as a result - the report also lists 12 additional people with injuries from smoke
inhalation.
The fatality that occured in a halfway house was a result of the occupant setting
fire to the room contents. It has been reported that the sprinkler did not operate, but
that it had been part of a voluntary replacement program in the early 2000s due to a
known problem and had not been replaced.
The eighth fatality occured at a fancy dress christmas party in a hotel. A male
and female were in a toilet cubicle on the fifth floor and a third individual ignited
the fancy dress costume of the male in the cubicle, resulting in burns to 95% of his
body [8]. The female also received significant burns. The sprinkler system operated
and extinguished the fire.
4.3.3 Sources of uncertainty
There are many sources of uncertainty when estimating sprinkler system effective-
ness for risk-informed performance-based fire safety design from fire incident re-
ports, yet many sprinkler system studies based on the data, including those previ-
ously cited in this report by Marryatt and the NFPA, do not discuss uncertainty in
their reported numbers.
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The task of determining which factors influenced fire development in a fire
investigation can range from trivial to nearly impossible. Fire investigation can be
a subjective process subject to large uncertainty. An example is given by Carman
where 53 fire investigators with a variety of knowledge and experience were asked
to examine two burn cells and determine which quadrant of the room the fire started
in. For both cells, the success rate was 3 out of the 53 students, or 5.7% [9].
Resources for investigating each fire are limited, particularly if the consequences
are not severe. However in terms of statistics, small fires are as important as large
fires. It is unlikely that fire investigation reports are 100% reliable in terms of pro-
viding accurate information on system effectiveness for performance-based engi-
neering design. The question that arises is then how much value can we get from
fire investigation reports for estimating fire risk? The following section discusses a
number of factors noted in the reviewed NZFS incident reports that contribute to
the uncertainty in estimating sprinkler system effectiveness from them.
Firstly, the occupancy and type of sprinkler system reported were not coher-
ent in several instances where domestic or residential sprinklers were reported. Of
the 33 fires where domestic sprinklers were reported, six were reported as being in
a type of residential occupancy. The remainder were reported in eight rest homes
or institutions, four industrial properties, four shops, two schools or day cares, and
several other commercial occupancies. By definition, domestic sprinkler systems
should not have been included in the population of fires considered by this study,
as residential buildings with less than ten household units were excluded. Of the
25 fires where residential sprinklers were reported, 18 were reported in residential
or other sleeping occupancies, three were reported in industrial occupancies, and
others were reported in a prison, a recreational facility, a police station, and a com-
mercial property.
Secondly, the term “effective” is subjective and there does not appear to be
any consistent definition available for NZFS staff for evaluating sprinkler system ef-
fectiveness. For the purposes of this study, “effective” operation is defined to be the
product of reliability (did the sprinkler operate when a sufficient fire event occurred)
and efficacy (did the sprinkler system suppress or control the fire as expected), as
defined in Chapter 1. Previous studies have used a variety of definitions. For ex-
ample, Hall discusses this issue and states that effectiveness should be measured
relative to the design objectives of the system, which in most cases is to confine the
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fire to the room of origin [5]. The British Standards Institution published document
7974-7:2003 which provides guidance on probabilistic risk assessment for fire safety
design of buildings recommends using 4 activated sprinklers as a cutoff for effective
sprinkler system operation [10]. Marryatt uses 20% destruction of the protected prop-
erty as the cutoff for effective operation in his study [3]. As discussed in Chapter 1,
the proposed New Zealand C/VM2 Verification Method for Fire Safety Design as-
sumes the sprinkler system will be able to control the heat release rate once the first
sprinkler activates [11]. However, it is difficult or impossible to determine whether
the sprinkler system met this criteria after a real fire.
It was apparent that many of the performance data field categories discussed
above did not provide clear information on whether the sprinkler system had in-
deed activated, if it would have been expected to (for example, that the fire was
large enough to activate it), or if it was effective at suppressing or controlling the
fire. By reviewing other related data fields, an attempt was made to reclassify the
ambiguous reports of sprinkler effectiveness. Other data fields that were reviewed
included the arrival condition (condition of the fire when the first NZFS appliance
arrived), equipment used by the NZFS for the incident, fire spread, and comments.
The message logs between dispatch and the operational staff were also reviewed.
Some reports had comments that explicitly stated that the fire was too small, or re-
ported arrival conditions of “out on arrival”, no fire or smoke, or smoke only, and
reported only that the sprinkler system had not activated.
Evidence used for effective sprinkler operation included evidence that the sprin-
kler system had operated and:
• Fire spread limited to room of origin
• Situation report in message log stating that the fire was suppressed with a hose
reel or extinguisher (thus indicating a small fire)
• 4 sprinklers or less reported as activated
• Comments suggesting that the sprinkler operation was effective at suppress-
ing the fire
• Arrival condition indicating small fire, “out on arrival”, no fire or smoke, or
smoke only
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Some instances where the operation of the sprinkler system was reported as in-
effective had notes in the comments section indicating the reason for reporting the
system as ineffective was the water flow gong not sounding or the alarm not acti-
vating. In some cases, other information in the reports such as the written comment
section indicated that the sprinkler system did suppress the fire.
Of the 807 fires where sprinkler operation was reported, 333 or 41% did not re-
port the number of sprinklers operating. The number of sprinklers operating is one
indication of whether the sprinkler system was likely to have been overwhelmed
or not, and as previously discussed is the metric proposed in PD7974-7:2003 for
evaluating effectiveness. However, sprinkler systems are not all hydraulically de-
signed to supply the same number of sprinklers. For example, the New Zealand
sprinkler standard NZS4541:2007 allows the water supply to provide for only the 4
most hydraulically remote sprinklers where residential sprinklers are installed, but
requires 18 sprinklers to be supplied for a system installed to protect a Group III
high ordinary hazard, such as general warehousing and storage [12]. Using a cutoff
of 4 activated sprinklers to indicate effective sprinkler operation does not seem to be
an appropriate measure of effectiveness for a sprinkler system designed to supply
18 sprinklers. However, the NZFS fire incident data does not provide a sufficient
level of information to determine the hydraulic design information.
4.3.4 Reclassification
The 367 fire reports where sprinkler system performance was potentially ambiguous
were manually reviewed. The sprinkler system performance was subjectively re-
classified for reliability and effectiveness where inconsistencies were noted or where
the reported sprinkler system performance code was not informative for suppres-
sion effectiveness, where supported by additional information from the incident re-
ports. Otherwise, the reliability or effectiveness was classified as “uncertain” if there
was minimal information supporting the outcome or “likely” if there were multiple
positive indicators for the outcome. Table 4.3 lists the results of the reclassification
procedure.
The reclassified estimates of sprinkler effectiveness were then used to produce
generalised reliability, efficacy, and overall effectiveness uncertainty distribution es-
timates, based on the inconsistances observed within the reports.
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Reclassification Number of Fires Percent of Total
Effective 669 57%
Likely effective 3 0%
Effectiveness uncertain 55 5%
Likely ineffective 3 0%
Ineffective 26 2%
Likely operated 44 4%
Operation uncertain 21 2%
Likely did not operate 49 4%
Did not operate 12 1%
Too small 268 23%
Likely too small 6 1%
Likely not involved 3 0%
Not involved 12 1%
Total 1171 100%
Table 4.3: Results of reclassification of 2001-2010 NZFS fire incident data where sprinkler
systems were reported.
4.3.4.1 Uncertainty in Type of System Present
The number of domestic and residential sprinkler systems reported was used as an
evidence of the proportion of fire reports where the type of system was reported
in error. Thus, the 95% confidence interval (± two standard deviations assuming a
normally distributed uncertainty) in number of fires in sprinklered buildings was
estimated at 60 fires. The mean number of fires in sprinklered buildings was esti-
mated to be the nominal number reported, or 1171 fires.
4.3.4.2 Uncertainty in Sprinkler Operation
It was uncertain whether the sprinklers had operated or not in 114 fires, based on
the review of the fire incident reports. The reclassified categories that were used for
this estimate are shown in Table 4.4. There were a total of 756 fires where sprinkler
operation was reasonably certain (Table 4.5).
Of the nominally 396 fires where sprinkler operation was estimated to have
not occurred, it was reasonably certain that in 12 instances the sprinkler system
should have activated, and it was uncertain if the sprinklers should have activated
in 58 fires (Table 4.6).
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Reclassification Number of Fires
Likely operated 44
Operation uncertain 21
Likely did not operate 49
Total 114
Table 4.4: Reported fires where sprinkler operation was uncertain.
Reclassification Number of Fires
Effective 669
Likely effective 3
Effectiveness uncertain 55
Likely ineffective 3
Ineffective 26
Total 756
Table 4.5: Reported fires where sprinkler operation was reasonably certain.
Reclassification Number of Fires
Likely did not operate 49
Likely too small 6
Likely not involved 3
Total 58
Table 4.6: Reported fires where the sprinklers did not appear to activate and the reason for
not being activated was uncertain.
4.3.4.3 Uncertainty in effective sprinkler operation
The evidence in the reports from 669 fires was reasonably consistent with effective
sprinkler operation. The number of fires where effective operation was uncertain
was estimated to be 126, shown in Table 4.7.
4.3.4.4 Decision tree analysis
Estimated normal distributions for the above quantities were combined in a decision
tree to estimate the sprinkler reliability, efficacy, and effectiveness in New Zealand
from 2001-2010. A binomial distribution approach was also taken in parallel. The
binomial probability density function is given as follows:
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Reclassification Number of Fires
Likely effective 3
Effectiveness uncertain 55
Likely ineffective 3
Likely operated 44
Operation uncertain 21
Total 126
Table 4.7: Reported fires where sprinkler effectiveness was uncertain.
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k (4.1)
where n is the total number of trials (for example, number of fires where a
sprinkler system is present), k is the number of successes (for example, the num-
ber of fires where a sprinkler system operated), and p is the observed probability of
achieving a success (for example, a sprinkler system operating). By using the bino-
mial distribution, the probability that the observed events match the true popula-
tion can be observed. The binomial distribution assumes that all events have equal
probability, which is not accurate for sprinkler system activations in fires because
every fire scenario and sprinkler system is different. It does provide a minimum
level of uncertainty in the ability of the sample set (fires reported in sprinklered
buildings) to represent the overall population (expected effectiveness of sprinklers
in New Zealand).
The decision tree can be seen with normal and binomial distributions in Fig-
ures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. The decision tree was split into four decisions relevant
to determining sprinkler system effectiveness:
1. Was a sprinkler system present?
2. Did it operate in the fire?
3. Should it have operated?
4. If it operated, was it effective?
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Figure 4.3: Decision tree for estimating uncertainty in sprinkler effectiveness from 2001-2010
NZFS fire incident reports. Estimated normal distributions are shown.
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Figure 4.4: Decision tree for estimating uncertainty in sprinkler effectiveness from 2001-2010
NZFS fire incident reports. Estimated binomial distributions are shown.
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Distributions were estimated for the number of fires where sprinklers were
present, the sprinklers operated, and the sprinklers were effective. The number of
fires where sprinklers did not operate was calculated by subtracting the number of
fires with operating sprinkler systems from the total number of fires in sprinklered
buildings. The number of ineffective sprinkler activations in fires was similarly cal-
culated by subtracting the number of effective sprinkler activations from the total
number of sprinkler activations.
An additional distribution was estimated for the number of fires where sprin-
klers did not operate but would have been expected to. The number of fires where
the fire was not large enough to activate the sprinkler system was calculated by sub-
tracting the number of fires where the sprinkler system did not operate but would
have been expected to from the total number of fires where the sprinkler system did
not operate. Distributions were truncated where the extent of the tails would have
caused impossible outcomes: for example, more effective sprinkler activations than
total activations.
4.3.4.5 Normal distribution parameter definition
For the distribution representing the number of incidents where sprinkler systems
were present, the recorded number of fires (1171) was used as the mean, with the
number of fires where a domestic sprinkler system was reported or a residential
sprinkler system was reported in a non-residential occupancy (40 fires) used to esti-
mate a 95% confidence interval (+/- two standard deviations).
The 95% confidence interval for sprinkler operation was estimated as the sum
of fires classified as likely operated, operation uncertain, and likely did not operate
(114 fires). The mean for the number of fires where the sprinkler system operated
was calculated by adding fires classified as operated (756 fires) and half of the 95%
confidence interval (57 fires) for a mean of 813 fires.
The effective sprinkler operation 95% confidence interval was estimated as the
sum of the fires classifed as likely effective, effectiveness uncertain, likely ineffective,
likely operated, and operation uncertain ( 126 fires). The mean was estimated to
consist of the fires classified as effective (669 fires) plus half of the 95% confidence
interval (63 fires) for a total of 732 fires.
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The 95% confidence interval for the number of fires where the sprinkler sys-
tem failed to operate when it would be expected to was estimated to be the sum
of the fires classified as likely did not operate, likely too small, and likely not in-
volved (58 fires). The mean was estimated to be the fires where the sprinkler system
was classified as did not operate (12 fires) plus half of the 95% confidence interval
(33 fires) or 41 fires.
4.3.4.6 Binomial distributions
Binomial distributions were defined by using the total number of fires where the
outcome was possible and the mean number of outcomes calculated for the normal
distributions. For example, the number of possible fires n where sprinkler systems
could be present was defined as 1171 and the probability p was defined as 813/1171.
The total population of fires where some type of detection system (including smoke
detection and other systems) was used as the number of possible events (7283 fires)
for defining the binomial distribution for sprinkler system presence.
4.3.4.7 Monte Carlo simulation
A Monte Carlo simulation of the decision tree was run with the commercial software
@Risk [13] using both the normal and binomial distributions. Results for sprinkler re-
liability, efficacy, and effectiveness are shown in Figures 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 respectively,
with comparisons to previously mentioned sprinkler effectiveness studies.
A summary of best fit distributions to the Monte Carlo output as determined
by @Risk is given in Table 4.8. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used as the mea-
sure of goodness-of-fit for the fitted distributions. The mean estimate for sprinkler
reliability was approximately 2% greater than the nominal value obtained by the
NFPA for 2003-2007 US sprinklered-building fires. The mean efficacy estimate was
lower at 90% compared to the 2003-2007 NFPA nominal value of 97%. The combined
mean effectiveness estimate was 86% compared with the 2003-2007 NFPA value of
91%, and much lower than Marryatt’s reported value of 99.5%. This could be a
result of Marryatt’s definition of effective operation and the fact that Marryatt did
not include any fires in sprinklered buildings where the sprinkler system did not
operate, other than cases where the sprinkler system was shut off.
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Figure 4.5: Estimated reliability uncertainty distribution, with comparison to 2003-2007
NFPA data [5].
A comparsion between the PD7974-7:2003 guidelines for sprinkler effective-
ness in probabilistic risk analysis is given in Figure 4.7. The uncertainty range in
sprinkler effectiveness estimated from the NZFS data was consistent with the rec-
ommended range given in PD7974-7:2003, considering that the NZFS fire incident
data contained all the categories of systems for which PD7974-7:2003 gives explicit
guidance.
4.3.5 Suggested improvements for data collection
4.3.5.1 Linking to other information sources
It is clear that there is uncertainty in statistics from fire incident reports in identifying
the systems that were present in the building at the time of the fire and what their
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Figure 4.6: Estimated efficacy uncertainty distribution, with comparison to 2003-2007 NFPA
data [5].
Input Output Best Fit Distributions
Distributions Type Mean St. Dev. K-S
Normal Reliability Lognormal 95% 1.6% 0.003
Efficacy Normal 90% 4.7% 0.015
Effectiveness Normal 86% 4.6% 0.001
Binomial Reliability Normal 95% 0.7% 0.011
Efficacy Normal 90% 3.2% 0.004
Effectiveness Lognormal 86% 2.9% 0.002
Table 4.8: Table of best fit distributions for Monte Carlo decision tree simulation, with
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic.
pre-fire status was. Rather than relying on the fire investigator to determine this
information post-fire when evidence of the systems may be partially destroyed, it is
proposed that this information be provided at the design or inspection of the sys-
tems in the building and automatically populated in a fire incident report by sharing
information between data sources if a fire should occur. This will reduce the work-
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Figure 4.7: Estimated effectiveness uncertainty distribution, with comparison to 2003-2007
NFPA data [5], Pd7974:2003 guidance [10], and Marryatt’s study [3].
load required of the fire investigator and reduce the uncertainty in the information.
Some examples of potentially useful information for sprinkler systems that could be
automatically populated in fire incident reports from design documentation:
• the standard that the system was designed to
• number of sprinklers or sprinklered area that the water supply for the system
was hydraulically designed to support
• the type of water supply for the system
• if the valves were monitored or not
Some examples of potentially useful information for sprinkler systems that
could be automatically populated in fire incident reports from inspection reports:
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• design information for existing buildings
• any faults or issues with the system
• the date of last inspection
• a link to the previous inspection report
• the flow characteristics of the water supply at the time of inspection
In New Zealand, fire sprinkler systems that meet New Zealand standards must
be approved by a Sprinkler System Certifier (SSC) and tested, inspected, and main-
tained by an approved contractor [12]. These organisations maintain databases on
sprinkler system initial installation inspections and periodically required re-inspections,
which could be a source for this information.
4.3.5.2 Changes to the data fields
The current set up of the NZFS fire incident report data fields has been shown
to be ambiguous for determining sprinkler system effectiveness for risk-informed
performance-based fire safety design. A single field for fire detector performance
is used for all types of detectors, and no other field for sprinkler performance is
available. Not only does this not allow the performance of sprinklers and other de-
tectors to be both reported for fires in buildings that contain both, but field options
for both detection and suppression performance get mixed with no way to separate
effectiveness for these two distinct functions. Thus, the detection and suppression
functions should be split into separate data fields for greater clarity. The NFIRS 5.0
system [14] could be used as a template.
A known problem occurs with the location of fire origin being associated with
a particular room in the building when the location was in fact in a wall space, duct,
or roof cavity within the structural members adjacent to the room. The sprinkler
system is then presumed to have failed when the fire was in fact beyond the reach
of a sprinkler system. This reflects a failure to appreciate the intention of reporting
on fire protection system performance. Ideally, reporting of fire protection system
performance needs to distinguish failures of design from failures to operate as in-
tended.
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Additional fields could be added that would provide less subjective informa-
tion on sprinkler system effectiveness. For example:
• percent of sprinklers activated in the compartment of origin
• number of sprinklers activated outside the compartment of origin
fields would provide information on whether all of the sprinkler in the com-
partment where the fire was ignited were required, and if the fire was able to reach
the size where sprinklers outside that compartment were activated. This would
be particularly useful in evaluating the effectiveness of residential systems, as ap-
proval tests of residential systems used by FM and UL use activation of a sprinkler
mounted in the doorway of the room of fire origin as a criteria of passing or fail-
ing [15].
4.3.5.3 Guidelines for assigning additional investigational resources
The observation of inconsistent data for fires in sprinklered buildings indicates that
there may be a lack of expertise or other resources required for providing accurate
reports on many fires. It is unlikely that the resources will be available for inves-
tigators with specialised knowledge of fire safety systems to attend every incident
where the systems are present. However, by analysing the data initially collected
by the incident reporter, the use of specialised investigation resources can be opti-
mised. Potential data inconsistencies observed in the 2001-2010 NZFS data on fires
in sprinklered buildings that could be flagged automatically for further review by
specialised personnel include:
• sprinkler system operation reported and number of sprinklers activated not
reported
• occupancy and system type incompatibility
• successful sprinkler operation and substantial suppression equipment reported
used by the brigade (eg. multiple low pressure deliveries, multiple alarms)
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• successful sprinkler operation and arrival conditions of large fire or totally
involved
• sprinkler system reported as not effective or not operating and non-fire arrival
condition (out on arrival, smoke only, no fire or smoke)
• sprinkler system reported as not operating (without reporting a fire that is too
small to activate the system) and limited suppression equipment used by the
brigade (eg. one hose reel only, one extinguisher)
• sprinkler system reported as effective with flame or smoke damage reported
extending past room of fire origin
• sprinkler system reported as not operating (without reporting a fire that is too
small to activate the system) with flame or smoke damage reported confined
to room of fire origin
• operation not indicated: not reported or unable to classify
in addition to any reports of ineffective operation. An initial consultation with
a specialist investigator could consist of reviewing photos or video of the fire scene
and telephone interviews with the initial investigator. If the issues are not resolved
in this process, a site visit by the specialist may provide more information. If the
inconsistent data can not be resolved, a written note in the comment could be a
required input for further explanation.
4.4 Conclusions
While a lack of data on system effectiveness has been identified as a key barrier for
successful performance-based fire safety design, the usefulness of data on fires in
sprinklered buildings collected by the NZFS from 2001 to 2010 appears to be limited
for this purpose. A review of ambiguous reports indicates that the reliability of
sprinkler systems (ability to respond to a fire event and provide water) in fires that
the NZFS responded to was approximately 95% and efficacy was 90%, for a total
effectiveness of 86% with a standard deviation of uncertainty of 4.6%. This can be
compared with the historical study completed by Marryatt from which a sprinkler
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effectiveness of 99.5% is commonly cited for sprinkler systems in Australia and New
Zealand [3].
The current data coding setup is not ideal for reporting the effectiveness of
sprinkler systems. The categories for reporting fire detector performance do not
provide sufficient capacity to report on the ability of the sprinkler system to meet its
primary objectives; namely, fire control and notification. There appears to be large
differences in the subjective interpretation of “effective” operation. Improvements
could be made by linking the reports to design and inspection data, changing the
coding scheme, and identifying instances where additional expertise may provide
insight.
REFERENCES 108
References
[1] New Zealand Professional Firefighters’ Union (2009). Newsletter to Members.
No. 35, September 24, 2009.
[2] New Zealand Fire Service (2010). National Commander’s Instructions 56: Fire
Investigation and Reporting. Wellington, NZ, 8 p.
[3] Marryatt, H. W. (1988). Fire: A Century of Automatic Sprinkler Protection - Revised.
Australian Fire Protection Association, Melbourne, Aus.
[4] Bukowski, R. W., Budnick, E. K., and Schemel, C. F. (1999). Estimates of the
Operational Reliability of Fire Protection Systems. In: Proceedings of the Third
International Conference on Fire Research and Engineering, October 4-8, Bethesda,
MD, USA, 87–98.
[5] Hall, Jr., J. R. (2010). U.S. Experience with Sprinklers and Other Automatic
Fire Extinguishing Equipment. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA,
USA, 102 p.
[6] Tryon, G. H. and McKinnon, G. P., (eds.) (1969). Fire Protection Handbook. Na-
tional Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 13th edition.
[7] O’Brien, T. (2010). Death from Fire in a Sprinkler Protected Building, Going
Beyond Cause and Origin. In: Fire-NZ Conference. Christchurch, NZ, November
3-4.
[8] TVNZ (2001). Details of Grass Skirt Death. TVNZ. URL http://tvnz.co.
nz/content/35312/423466/article.html.
[9] Carman, S. W. (2008). Improving the Understanding of Post-Flashover Fire
Behaviour. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Fire Investigations
Science and Technology. Cincinnati, OH, USA.
[10] British Standards Institution (2003). PD 7974-7:2003 - The application of fire safety
engineering principles to fire safety design of buildings, Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
London, UK.
[11] Department of Building and Housing (2012). C/VM2 Verification Method: Frame-
work for Fire Safety Design For New Zealand Building Code Clauses C1-C6 Protection
from Fire). Department of Building and Housing, Wellington, NZ.
REFERENCES 109
[12] Standards New Zealand (2007). NZS 4541:2007 - Automatic Fire Sprinkler Sys-
tems. Wellington, NZ.
[13] Palisade Corporation (2008). @Risk - Risk Analysis add-in for Microsoft Excel
(version 5.7.0, Industrial Edition). Newfield, NY, USA, Palisade Corporation.
[14] Hall Jr., J. R. (2006). An Analysis of Automatic Sprinkler System Reliability
Using Current Data. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, USA, 19
p.
[15] Bill Jr., R. G., Kung, H.-C., Anderson, S. K., and Ferron, R. (2002). A New Test
to Evaluate the Fire Performance of Residential Sprinklers. Fire Technology, 38,
101–124. doi:10.1023/A:1014407200101.
CHAPTER 5
UNCERTAINTY IN CALCULATING FIRST SPRINKLER
ACTIVATION
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter sources of aleatoric uncertainty are compared with the epistemic un-
certainty when modelling the first sprinkler to activate with a two-zone computer
fire model. Two scenarios are considered: the first models a set of experiments con-
ducted at the University of Canterbury, and the second considers the same room
geometry but as a design scenario where the item ignited is a polyurethane foam
upholstered chair or sofa and where the spatial location of the fire in the room is
uncertain. The relative importance of the epistemic model uncertainty is compared
between scenarios. Two output parameters are considered; the time of sprinkler
activation and the heat release rate (HRR) at the time of sprinkler activation. The
relative sensitivity of the model to each of the uncertain parameters is discussed.
5.2 Model description
An early version of B-RISK was used for the simulations discussed in this chapter.
The structure of the model can be seen in Figure 5.1.
5.2.1 Deterministic model
The BRANZFire [1] two zone model was used as the deterministic model to calculate
the sprinkler activation time. Details of how BRANZFire calculates the layer proper-
ties can be found elsewhere [1,2]. In BRANZFire, plume air entrainment can either be
110
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Create base BRANZFire input file
Define uncertainty distributions
Create input files by sampling distributions and 
write to input file
Run batch of BRANZFire input files, produce 
individual output files
Assemble output, fit output distributions, 
perform sensitivity analysis
Figure 5.1: Probabilistic-deterministic model structure.
calculated with Delichatios’ or McCaffrey’s correlations. McCaffrey’s correlations
are chosen for this study because they were used in the BRANZFire verification re-
port [3]. BRANZFire predicts the ceiling jet temperature and velocity based on either
Alpert’s correlations [4] or the JET model [5], which includes the effects of the upper
layer under a confined ceiling. The JET model is considered here because a previous
study has indicated that it provides more accurate results in small rooms when com-
pared with Alpert’s correlations [2]. The LAVENT method from NFPA 204 [6] resolves
the variation of the ceiling jet temperature and velocity with distance below the ceil-
ing. The detector thermal response is modelled by Heskestad and Bill’s differential
equation [7]. The choices in submodels represent decision uncertainty.
5.2.2 Probabilistic model
At the time this section of the research was completed, sprinkler uncertainty capa-
bility had not been entirely implemented in B-RISK. Thus, the commercially avail-
able software program @Risk [8] was used to sample input parameter probability
distributions for use in the deterministic model. The Latin Hypercube sampling
approach was used to ensure that the extreme values in the distributions are sam-
pled adequately. The sampled values are written to BRANZFire input files, which
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Figure 5.2: Values and distributions for sprinkler response model parameters are entered
into B-RISK in the form shown here.
are then run as a batch producing individual output files. The output data is then
collected for analysis in Excel. The output from 5000 iterations was compared to
1000 iterations; the mean and variance was similar for the output distributions but
the distributions were smoother with 5000 iterations. The maximum standard sam-
ple mean error is 0.9% for both sprinkler activation time and HRR at the time of
sprinkler activation with 5000 iterations. Pearson’s correlation coefficient is used to
compare sensitivity of the sprinkler activation time and HRR at the time of sprinkler
activation to the sources of uncertainty, because of its ubiquity and ability to mea-
sure the degree of relation between the input and output as a standardised slope [9].
In the new B-RISK model, sprinkler response model parameter values and dis-
tributions are entered into the form shown in Figure 5.2.
5.3 Scenarios
Two separate scenarios are considered to evaluate the relative uncertainty contribu-
tion of the parameters. The first scenario is based on specific sprinkler activation
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tests conducted at the University of Canterbury [10]. The second scenario uses the
same room geometry as the first scenario but the uncertainty in the fire parameters
is expanded.
5.3.1 Scenario 1
The first scenario is based on three tests out of a series of ten where a single chair was
burned in the centre of a room with the door open. The three tests are considered
because they were repeat tests with the same ignition scenario, type of sprinkler,
and ventilation conditions. The experimental room was 8 m long, 4 m wide, and
2.4 m high, based on the dimensions of the UL 1626 room [11]. The walls and ceiling
were light timber frame with 10 mm painted gypsum plasterboard. No uncertainty
is considered in the room geometry or the material properties of the room lining.
Two Tyco TY3251 standard response, pendant, spray sprinklers with a nominal ac-
tivation temperature of 68 oC were installed and located 2 m from the centre of the
room. The sprinklers were oriented so the yoke arms were perpendicular to the ra-
dial direction of the fire. The sprinklers were pressurised with water to measure the
activation time with pressure switches but no water supply was connected. A plan
view of the experimental layout is shown in Figure 5.3. The chair was comprised
of cushion grade non-fire retarded polyurethane foam blocks (approximately 0.56
kg each), covered with acrylic fabric and backed by 10 mm plasterboard as seen in
Figure 5.4. The chair was placed on a load cell to measure the mass loss during the
fire, and the heat release was calculated based on the mass loss measured by the
load cell and an effective heat of combustion obtained from cone calorimeter tests.
The interior temperature varied from 23 oC to 27 oC. A summary of the experimental
results is shown in Table 5.1.
5.3.2 Scenario 2
The second scenario considers the same room geometry as Scenario 1, but the fire
parameters have much more variability, as could be expected under real-world de-
sign conditions. The room geometry is considered to be known with no uncertainty,
and the door is considered open. The location of the fire is uncertain. The fuel item
is a piece of furniture with polyurethane foam cushioning, but it is uncertain if it is
a single-seat chair, two-seater or three-seater sofa.
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Sprinkler # 1 Sprinkler # 2
8.00
4
.0
0
2.00 2.002.00
2
.0
0
0.8 m x 2.1 m door
10 mm gypsum 
plasterboard
Figure 5.3: The layout of the experimental room (extracted from Bittern [10]). Dimensions in
metres unless otherwise stated.
Experiment Sprinkler Sprinkler HRR at sprinkler HRR Growth rate
activation time (s) activation (kW) α (kW/s2)
4 1 226 125 0.0024
2 226 125 0.0024
5 1 216 129 0.0028
2 211 126 0.0028
6 1 266 116 0.0016
2 272 125 0.0017
Mean 236 124 0.0023
Standard deviation 26 4.4 0.0005
Table 5.1: Experimental results for Scenario 1 [10].
5.4 Sources of uncertainty considered
The sources of uncertainty that are quantified are summarised in Figure 5.5. The
ambient temperature is modelled as a normal distribution with mean 25oC and
standard deviation 1oC to match the range in the experiments. The maximum and
minimum sampled values for all the distributions that are not truncated have been
checked to make sure that no unrealistic extremely improbable values were included
in individual simulations.
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Figure 5.4: Upholstered chair configuration considered for Scenario 1 (extracted from Bit-
tern [10]).
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Uncertainty
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[3]
Upper Layer 
Temperature [3]
Plume 
Temperature [20]
RTI [16]
Conduction 
Factor [16]
Actuation 
Temperature [17]
Sprinkler 
Parameters
Geometry
HRR
Growth (α) 
[10][14]
Radiative 
Fraction [5][15]
Fire Height
Fire Plume 
Location
Sprinkler Distance 
from Ceiling
Ambient 
Temperature [10]
Figure 5.5: Quantified sources of uncertainty categorised as epistemic or aleatoric uncer-
tainty.
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5.4.1 Fire location and sprinkler geometry
For Scenario 1, the fire location is considered to be in the centre of the room as per the
experiments. In the experimental tests, a firelighter was ignited with a propane torch
in the centre of the interface between the seat and the back. However, air movement,
uneven flame spread, and turbulence could have shifted the centreline of the plume
over the duration of the fire, so the radial distance of the plume from the sprinkler
is assumed to be normally distributed over the 400 mm width of the chair. In the
experiments, the top of the seat cushion is located 0.75 m vertically from the floor.
Due to the geometry of the chair, the base of the fire for modelling purposes could
move as the fire progressed, spreading upward or progressing downward as the
chair burned. Therefore a normal distribution with a mean of 0.75 m and a standard
deviation of 0.05 m is used for the fire height parameter.
In the experiments, the sprinklers were located so that the centre of the glass
bulbs were located 20 mm below the ceiling. Since the sprinkler bulbs have a length
of approximately 20 mm, but the sprinkler response parameters are modelled at a
point location, a normal distribution with a mean of 20 mm and a standard deviation
of 5 mm is used for the bulb depth from the ceiling and truncated at 0 mm to pre-
vent negative distances. For Scenario 2, the fire location is unknown. As an initial
approximation, the plume centerline is allowed to be located anywhere within the
floor area with equal probability. Realistically, this is an over simplifying assump-
tion because room contents are not randomly located. For example, the probability
of a large piece of furniture blocking a single doorway into a room is lower than
it being placed in a corner or along a wall, but it provided a reasonable amount of
uncertainty for the analysis here using the preliminary version of the B-RISK tool
that did not have the design fire generator capabilities.
As upholstered furniture fires are only considered for Scenario 2, the fire height
from the floor is taken to be a discrete distribution with probabilities of 0.3 at a height
of 0 m representing floor level, 0.4 at a height of 0.5 m representing seat level, and 0.3
at a height of 1 m representing the top of the seat back. The probability that the fire
would start on the seat level was estimated to be slightly higher than at the floor or
top of the seat back. A summary of the distributions used to model the fire location
and sprinkler geometry uncertainty is shown in Table 5.2.
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Scenario 1
Parameter Distribution type Distribution parameters
Radial distance Normal µ = 2 m σ = 0.1 m
Fire height Normal µ = 0.75 m σ = 0.05 m
Sprinkler distance below ceiling Normal µ = 20 mm σ = 5 mm
Scenario 2
Parameter Distribution type Distribution parameters
X and Y fire plume location Uniform Min = -2 m Max = 2 m
(dist. from centre =
√
X2 + Y 2)
Fire height Discrete P(H = 0 m) = 0.3,
P(H = 0.5 m) = 0.4,
P(H = 1 m) = 0.3
Sprinkler distance below ceiling Normal µ = 20 mm σ = 5 mm
Table 5.2: Distributions used to model fire location and sprinkler geometry uncertainty for
the two scenarios considered (µ - mean, σ - standard deviation).
5.4.2 Fire heat release parameters
The BRANZFire model predicts the upper layer development and plume and ceil-
ing jet conditions as a function of the fire heat release rate. The heat release history
of a fire can be characterised as having five states: incipient, growth, flashover, fully
developed burning, and decay. There is a large amount of uncertainty in the incip-
ient time; depending on the ignition scenario it can vary from fractions of seconds
to several days. During the incipient time, the heat release and fire products are
minimal and there is very little risk to occupants, other than perhaps sleeping or
otherwise incapable of self preservation occupants in the compartment of fire ori-
gin. For the purposes of this study, the incipient phase of the fire is ignored due to
the relatively large ignition source used. Sprinklers are designed to activate during
the growth period of the fire so the flashover, fully developed burning, and decay
phases of the fire are not considered in this study.
A common and generally accepted design method of describing the increase
in heat release rate during the growth period of the fire as a function of time for
fuel controlled room contents fires is the αt2 model. In this study, the fire intensity
coefficient was used to characterise the growth rate rather than the growth time tg
which represents the time required for the HRR to reach 1055 kW (both approaches
are described in NFPA 72 [12]). Small fuel packages such as those used in the exper-
iments modelled in this research will not reach 1055 kW so the fire intensity coef-
ficient method was chosen, although the growth time can be calculated if desired.
For Scenario 1, the range of growth rates is relatively easy to quantify because the
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Figure 5.6: Heat release curves from Bittern’s experiments [10].
model is representing a set of experiments where the HRR was calculated from the
mass loss rate and effective heat of combustion. In the set of experiments, uncer-
tainty in the mass measurement and heat of combustion contribute to uncertainty
in the HRR. The load cell used in the experiments had a resolution of 5 g (error was
not reported) and the cone calorimeter effective heat of combustion measurements
ranged from 20.3 MJ/kg to 22.3 MJ/kg. Figure 5.6 shows the heat release curves
for the experiments, as well as αt2 heat release rate growth curves selected to ap-
proximate the mean and 95% confidence limits. A log normal distribution was used
for the αt2 growth parameter for Scenario 1. This choice of distribution corresponds
with a previous study by Frantzich [13] who also used a log normal distribution for
the fire growth rate, designed to account for fast and slow fires with a mean of 0.02
kW/s2 and standard deviation of 0.01 kW/s2.
When considering the range of fires that a room may experience over a life-
time of use for design purposes, the fire growth rate uncertainty increases. Sce-
nario 2 considers a design scenario where the item ignited is a piece of living room
upholstered furniture containing polyurethane foam. The data for the variation
in fire growth rate for polyurethane furniture was obtained from a meta-study by
Young [14]. The fire growth data in Young’s study was obtained from a range of ex-
perimental furniture fires in furniture calorimeters. Ignition sources ranged from
cigarettes to gas burners, and the frequency for each ignition source was not based
on statistics from real fires. Because the data analysed by Young was from the furni-
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Parameter Distribution Type Distribution Parameters Source
Scenario 1 α Log-normal µ=0.002 kW/s2 σ=.0005 kW/s2
Scenario 2 α Log-normal µ=.087 kW/s2 σ=1.0895 kW/s2
χrad Normal µ=0.3 σ=0.025
Table 5.3: Probability distributions for heat release rate parameters for both scenarios con-
sidered.
ture calorimeter, compartment effects were not included, which may influence the
growth rate although the effects are expected to be small in the early fire growth
stages of interest here. Therefore this distribution may not be ideal for real-world
design scenarios. However, the range of fire growth rates is more realistic than se-
lecting a single value and is useful for illustrative purposes.
The distribution of the fire growth rate constant from Young’s study is shown
in Figure 5.7. A log normal distribution fit the growth rate from the study data
reasonably well.
The radiative fraction of the heat release is another source of uncertainty, since
the heat convected to the fire plume and ceiling jet is dependent on the amount
of heat radiated from the fire. There are a range of values in the literature but no
definitive study is available for upholstered furniture. Davis [5,15] has estimated the
uncertainty in radiative fraction to be± 15%, so a normal distribution is used with a
mean of 0.3 and a standard deviation of 0.025. A summary of the distributions used
for the fire heat release parameters can be seen in Table 5.3.
5.4.3 Sprinkler parameters
The sprinklers used for the experimental data were also used in a study to charac-
terise the uncertainty in the response time index (RTI) and conduction (C) sprinkler
parameters [16]. The sprinkler parameter study used the plunge test method under
a range of wind tunnel temperature and velocity conditions in both parallel and
perpendicular flow orientations.
Data on uncertainty in the sprinkler activation temperature was obtained from
the study conducted by Khan [17]. A thermal liquid bath was used to slowly raise the
temperature of glass bulb sprinklers until they activated. Standard response (5 mm
diameter) glass bulbs of nominal 68 oC activation temperature were found to acti-
vate at a mean temperature of 72 oC with a standard deviation of 0.66 oC. A normal
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of the logarithm of the heat release growth rate α, based on data
from Young [14].
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Parameter Distribution Type Distribution Parameters Source
RTI Weibull α=27.2 β=96.6 [16]
C Factor Normal µ=0.44 (m/s)1/2 σ=0.01 (m/s)1/2 [16]
Tact Normal µ=72oC σ=0.655oC [17]
Table 5.4: Distributions for the uncertainty in sprinkler parameters, used for both scenarios.
distribution with these parameters was used to model the activation temperature
uncertainty. A summary of the sprinkler parameter distributions is shown in Ta-
ble 5.4.
5.4.4 Model uncertainty
Uncertainty in model predictions for the plume temperature, upper layer tempera-
ture, and layer height were considered because the JET model calculation for sprin-
kler activation time depends on these quantities. Estimates of the model uncertainty
in calculating the layer height and upper layer temperature were made from the
BRANZFire verification data [11]. The BRANZFire verification data includes com-
parisons to 62 kW to 158 kW fires in a 2.8 m by 2.8 m by 2.13 m tall room with various
vent configurations using experiments reported by Steckler [18]. Figure 5.8 compares
the BRANZFire model output to the experimental results cited in the verification
report.
From this data, distributions for the model uncertainty in layer height and up-
per layer temperature were produced. A multiplicative error likelihood model was
used [19] because any error in layer height or temperature was assumed to accumu-
late as time progressed. The model calculations for layer height and upper layer
temperature are multiplied by an uncertainty factor, which is sampled from the dis-
tributions and added as an input parameter to the input file.
An uncertainty distribution for the plume temperature submodel output was
estimated from the study by Sheppard and Meacham [20]. They found a 95% con-
fidence interval of 41.6 oC with a model similar to the JET model. As per Shep-
pard and Meacham’s findings, an additive error likelihood model [19,21] was used,
where an uncertainty factor sampled from the distribution is added to the BRANZ-
Fire plume temperature calculation. Table 5.5 summarises the model uncertainty
distributions used in this study.
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Figure 5.8: Comparisons of BRANZFire model predictions to experiment data from Wade’s
verification report [3].
Parameter Distribution Type Distribution Parameters Source
Layer Height Normal µ=111% σ=28%
Upper Layer T Normal µ=111% σ=8%
Plume T Normal µ=0oC σ=20.8oC
Table 5.5: Distributions used for model uncertainty
5.5 Results and discussion
The modelled sprinkler activation time had a mean time of 276 s with a standard
deviation of 35 s in Scenario 1. Compared to the experimentally measured sprinkler
activation times [18], the mean time was 40 s longer and the standard deviation
was 9 s greater in the model. The mean HRR at the time of activation from the
model was 146 kW (compared to 124 kW experimentally) with a standard deviation
of 29 kW (compared to 28 kW experimentally). The experimental statistics had a
large margin of error due to the small sprinkler activation sample size of six, but the
results matched reasonably well as shown in Figure 5.9. The model tended to over-
predict both sprinkler activation time and HRR at the time of sprinkler activation.
The uncertainty in sprinkler activation time for the two scenarios can be seen
in Figure 5.10. Best-fit log-normal distributions are also plotted. There was signifi-
cantly more uncertainty in Scenario 2 as expected.
A tornado chart ranking the sensitivity of the modelled sprinkler activation
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of Scenario 1 experimental and model results.
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Figure 5.10: Sprinkler activation time distributions for Scenarios 1 and 2.
time to the sources of uncertainty is shown in Figure 5.11. For both scenarios, the
heat release growth rate parameter α was the largest contributor to the uncertainty
in the sprinkler activation time. A negative value for the Pearson’s correlation co-
efficient indicates a negative relationship between the input and output parameter.
As expected, if the fire grows faster (an increase in α), the sprinkler activation time
decreased.
The sprinkler activation time was also sensitive to the distance of the sprinkler
from the ceiling, due to the vertical distribution of ceiling jet temperature and ve-
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Figure 5.11: Tornado charts comparing sprinkler activation time sensitivity to sources of un-
certainty for Scenarios 1 and 2.
locity. The relative importance of the model uncertainty sources decreased as the
uncertainty in α and the fire location increased from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2. The
uncertainty in sprinkler parameters and the ambient temperature had little influ-
ence on the sprinkler activation time.
Figure 5.12 shows the uncertainty in the HRR at the time of sprinkler activation
time for the two scenarios. Scenario 2 has much more uncertainty than Scenario 1.
Figure 5.13, which is a tornado chart ranking the sensitivity of the heat release rate
at sprinkler activation to the quantified sources of uncertainty, shows that the ma-
jor source of uncertainty for Scenario 1 is the sprinkler distance from the ceiling,
due to the variation in temperature and velocity in the ceiling jet with height. The
model uncertainty has a relatively large impact for Scenario 1, as the layer height
uncertainty and the plume temperature uncertainty are ranked second and third,
respectively. An increase in α causes the HRR to grow faster so as expected it has a
positive effect on the HRR at the time of sprinkler activation, but the effect is offset
by the tendency for the sprinkler to activate sooner. For Scenario 2, the uncertainty
in α and fire location takes precedence, while the model uncertainties are of less con-
sequence. For both scenarios, the uncertainty in sprinkler parameters and ambient
temperature are the least influential on the HRR outcome.
For both output parameters considered in this study, the increase in uncer-
tainty in the fire growth and location reduced the relative importance of the model
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Figure 5.12: Heat release rate distributions at the time of sprinkler activation for Scenarios 1
and 2.
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Figure 5.13: Tornado charts comparing the sensitivity of the heat release rate at sprinkler
activation time to sources of uncertainty for Scenarios 1 and 2.
certainty or accuracy. A more accurate but more complex and computationally ex-
pensive model will not provide more useful information for the model user if the
model uncertainty is significantly less than the aleatoric uncertainty. An efficient
model will provide a ”consistent level of crudeness,” balancing model uncertainty
with aleatoric uncertainty. On the other hand, if the model inputs are well known
for a specific situation, a complex model may well be justified.
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5.5.1 Sources of uncertainty not considered
There are many sources of uncertainty that are difficult to quantify. For instance, a
number of assumptions are made in the BRANZFire zone model and associated sub-
models. As a zone model does not solve the momentum equation the combustion
product transport time is assumed to be negligible. BRANZFire uses the LAVENT
model for the vertical temperature and velocity distribution of the ceiling jet, and
there is no data to indicate the level of uncertainty for these parameters. BRANZFire
also makes the assumption of homogeneous temperature and combustion products
in the layers, the effect of which is difficult to quantify. An advantage of using a
field model is the ability to model these aspects, although other sources of uncer-
tainty will come into play with field models, such as uncertainty in the turbulence
models.
By using model verification data to create uncertainty distributions for the
model, the uncertainty in many of these assumptions is included implicitly. It is
expected that as a model is pushed beyond the situations for which it has been ver-
ified, the uncertainty in the model will grow and become impossible to quantify.
Therefore, models should only be used within their limits where the uncertainty
can be quantified and compared to the aleatoric uncertainty.
Other model input parameters, such as the thermal properties of the wall, ceil-
ing, and floor linings, were modelled as single values and uncertainty was not con-
sidered because it was not expected to have a significant impact on the uncertainty
of the outputs. Ventilation conditions could also be modelled as an uncertain pa-
rameter for the design scenario. In this case the door was modelled as being open
all the time.
For the purposes of this study, all sources of uncertainty have been assumed to
be independent. No correlations between parameters have been considered, due to
a lack of data to support them. The uncertainty in the output variables would likely
increase if correlations were included.
5.5.2 Conclusions
The importance of sources of uncertainty depends on the situation being considered.
The accuracy of the model becomes less important as the fire and geometry parame-
ters become less well defined. For the output and scenarios considered, uncertainty
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in the sprinkler response parameters provided little influence on the outcome. The
BRANZFire zone model uncertainty was not the most influential source of uncer-
tainty for the scenarios modelled, and became less important for Scenario 2 where
the uncertainty in the fire growth and location was greater.
Model uncertainty should be considered when using computer fire models.
While the increase in available computing resources allows more complex models
to be used in probabilistic Monte Carlo simulations [22], a more complex model can
introduce additional sources of uncertainty; particularly user decision uncertainty.
In order to quantify the model uncertainty, the model must be used within rea-
sonable parameters. If the model is used beyond its limits, the uncertainty in the
output becomes unknown and should not be trusted. The model complexity should
be matched to the level of certainty in the situation being modelled.
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CHAPTER 6
TEMPERATURE RESPONSE OF MODIFIED SPRINKLERS
6.1 Introduction
Fire sprinklers operate as heat detectors, but they only provide one data point in
their response to heating: the time of activation, when they have been heated to
their activation temperature and either the glass bulb element breaks or a solder
link melts. A nominal value for activation temperature is available from the manu-
facturer, but there has been shown to be uncertainty in the actual activation temper-
ature of glass bulb sprinklers when heated slowly in a stirred liquid bath [1]. In order
to measure the temperature response of a sprinkler during the time leading up to
activation, a method to insert a thermocouple into a modified glass bulb mounted in
a sprinkler frame was developed. This chapter describes the characterisation of the
thermal response of the modified thermocouple-equipped sprinklers. The response
was evaluated experimentally using both wind tunnel plunge tests and fires in an
ISO 9705 compartment, and compared to the thermal detector response correlation
by Heskestad and Bill Jr. [2] and B-RISK and BRANZFire simulations of one of the
ISO 9705 compartment fires.
6.2 Literature review
Two other studies attempted to represent the thermal response of a sprinkler head
using brass or aluminum cylinders with thermocouples inserted [3,4]. Ingason [5] at-
tempted to measure the temperature change of a glass bulb when it was removed
130
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from a furnace, but the bulb was not mounted in a sprinkler frame. The SFPE eval-
uation of the DETACT-QS fire model for estimating sprinkler activation times de-
scribes the use of brass disc thermocouples to approximate thermal detector ele-
ments in a ceiling jet [6]. The plunge test method used was described in a previous
University of Canterbury study [7,8] and is briefly described in Section 6.4.2.
The primary source of heat transfer to sprinklers in fires is usually considered
to be convective heat transfer from the ceiling jet flow, and can be affected by the
orientation of the yoke arms. A numerical simulation on heat transfer to sprinkler
glass bulbs conducted by Ingason and Persson [9] estimated that heat transfer to a
sprinkler bulb was decreased by a factor of two when the sprinkler frame arms were
oriented parallel to the flow, relative to the opposite case where the sprinkler frame
arms were oriented perpendicular to the flow.
6.3 Theory
Heskestad and Bill Jr. [2] developed a two parameter model for heat detector temper-
ature response, which accounts for convective heat transfer from a hot gas stream
to the heat detector and conductive losses through the detector fixture. Heskestad’s
model is as follows:
d∆Td
dt
=
√
u
RTI
[
∆Tgas −
(
1 +
C√
u
)
∆Td
]
(6.1)
where ∆Td is Td − Tamb and ∆Tgas is Tgas − Tamb, respectively. For a plunge
test, where the gas velocity and temperature are constant, this equation can be rear-
ranged as follows:
∆Td =
∆Tgas
1 + C√
u
[
1− e
−t√u
(
1+ C√
u
)
RTI
]
(6.2)
to obtain the detector temperature as a function of time. To compare with stan-
dard sprinkler plunge test results where the information on the detector tempera-
ture response is the time of activation and the activation temperature the equation
can be rearranged to solve for the RTI given activation time:
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RTI =
−t√u(
1 + C√
u
)−1
· ln
[
1− ∆Td
∆Tgas
(
1+ C√
u
)−1
] (6.3)
Heskestad’s equation was suitable for the wind tunnel tests because there was
no large radiant heat source available. Sako and Hasemi [10] indicated that radiant
heating may be a factor for a sprinkler in close proximity to a fire and added a
corresponding term to the energy balance:
d∆Td
dt
=
√
u
RTI
[
∆Tgas −
(
1 +
C√
u
)
∆Td
]
+ Cr
(
q˙
′′
e − σT 4s
)
(6.4)
where Cr is a radiation responsiveness parameter, q˙
′′
e is the external radiation
flux, and σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant. Sako and Hasemi estimated the Cr
value to be 0.21 Km
2
kJ
for the nominally 120 m1/2s1/2 RTI fused-link sprinklers they
tested.
6.4 Apparatus setup
6.4.1 Sprinkler modifications
Modified 5 mm diameter glass bulbs were constructed by the University of Can-
terbury glass shop. Figure 6.1 shows the modified sprinkler head, along with the
components of a Viking VK102 sprinkler head. In a frangible bulb sprinkler such
as the one pictured, the glass bulb is held against a brass seal by a set screw. The
modified sprinkler bulbs had one open end which was placed towards the seal.
Attempts were made to use both Viking and Tyco sprinkler frames. The Tyco
frames did not work because the set screws were adhered in place too tightly and
could not be removed without damage. The set screws were also glued in the Viking
frames using some sort of thread compound, but the screws could still be removed
with some heat application from a butane torch without damaging the frame, screw,
or bulb. Viking VK102 and VK302 frames were used because they were available
at the university. They are standard response, pendent, 1/2” national pipe thread
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Figure 6.1: Sprinkler head components, including standard components from a Viking
VK102 sprinkler head and the modified glass sprinkler bulb.
(NPT) spray sprinklers with a nominal K-factor of 5.6 l/min√
kPa
[11]. The brass sprinkler
seal was drilled to allow the thermocouple to pass through.
The thermocouple was extended approximately half way into the glass bulb
as shown in Figure 6.2. The glass bulb was filled with glycerine, which is the fluid
indicated by one manufacturer’s Materials Safety Data Sheet for a 5 mm standard
response bulb [12].
6.4.2 Plunge test and wind tunnel setup
The University of Canterbury wind tunnel shown in Figure 6.3 was used to provide
a stream of heated air at approximately constant temperature and velocity. A more
detailed description of the wind tunnel and its performance characteristics can be
found in Tsui’s thesis [8]. The wind tunnel used a frequency drive variable speed fan
to provide a range of air velocities. The wind tunnel was run at nominally 120oC
for all of the tests discussed in this research. The velocity of the air at the height of
the sprinkler frame was measured with a pitot static tube, and was approximately
2.7 m/s at the fan drive frequency of 45 Hz that was used for all of the tests con-
ducted for this work.
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Figure 6.2: The modified sprinkler head, showing the thermocouple inserted in the glass
bulb.
The University of Canterbury wind tunnel was set up to test sprinklers in the
pendant orientation. The method of construction of the glass bulb may make testing
in an upright orientation more difficult because attaining a seal between the cut end
of the glass bulb and the sprinkler seal would be challenging and thus it would be
difficult to prevent the sprinkler bulb fluid from leaking out.
For the wind tunnel tests, the sprinkler was mounted to a fixture to allow it to
be plunged into the wind tunnel, shown in Figure 6.4. The fixture was constructed
of 19 mm plywood with a brass pipe installed. The sprinkler was mounted approx-
imately 10 mm from the bottom surface of the plywood, which was marked in 5o
increments for changing the orientation angle of the sprinkler to the air flow in the
wind tunnel, as shown in Figure 6.5.
The thermocouple wire had to be sealed where it passed through the seal be-
cause some of the tests were run with water in the sprinkler to include as much of
the heat conduction loss experienced by a normal sprinkler as possible. Attempts to
seal the thermocouple wire with RTV type silicone sealant proved fruitless so a sec-
tion of copper tubing long enough to surpass the water level was brazed to the brass
seal, as shown in Figure 6.4. Water was then added to the annular space around the
copper tubing to include conduction losses to the water above the sprinkler. The
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Figure 6.3: The University of Canterbury wind tunnel was used to provide the plunge test
conditions for testing the modified sprinkler thermal response characteristics.
water temperature was measured prior to and after each test and the water was
replaced for each test.
The thermocouple output was logged using the University of Canterbury’s
Universal Data Logger (UDL) setup which was set for a sample rate of approxi-
mately 2 samples/s and a resolution of 0.5oC for the thermocouple output. The ac-
tual sample rate was found to be 1 sample/0.55 s from the datalogger’s time stamp.
6.4.3 Compartment fire test setup
Four sprinklers containing the modified and standard response bulbs were installed
in compartment fire tests conducted as part of the project to evaluate the item-to-
item design fire generator [13]. As the sprinkler objectives were supplementary to
the primary design fire generator validation goals, the room geometry, item loca-
tion, and fire decisions were driven by the design fire generator requirements rather
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Copper tube
Figure 6.4: The sprinkler plunge fixture was constructed of 19 mm plywood with a brass
pipe fixture to thread the sprinkler into and contain water.
than tailored for the sprinkler tests. An ISO 9705 room fire compartment with a
calorimeter hood was used for the tests. The rooms contained three types of items
representing residential furniture including a polyurethane armchair, a MDF table,
and an ABS flat panel television. The items were arranged in four different config-
urations. Five scenarios were tested: the first four used a steady 100 kW propane
burner as the first item ignited with the different item configurations, and the fi-
nal scenario used the fourth configuration (D) with an ethanol pool as the first item
ignited.
The configuration of the ceiling jet thermocouple and bi-directional velocity
probe and standard and modified sprinklers in the ISO 9705 room is shown in Fig-
ure 6.7. The height of the room was 2.4 m as per the ISO 9705 standard. The sprin-
klers were named as per the following convention:
• SPA - standard sprinkler, yoke arms parallel to the room axis
• MPA - modified sprinkler, yoke arms parallel to the room axis
• MPE - modified sprinkler, yoke arms perpendicular to the room axis
• SPE - standard sprinkler, yoke arms perpendicular to the room axis
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Figure 6.5: The sprinkler was mounted approximately 10 mm from the bottom of the plunge
fixture plywood which was marked in 5o increments.
The sprinklers were mounted 800 mm from the doorway with the deflectors
115 mm from the room ceiling. A photo of the sprinkler installation is shown in
Figure 6.6.
Sprinklers SPA and SPE were standard response Tyco 3251 pendant sprinklers
with nominal activation temperatures of 68oC. These sprinklers were connected to
piping that was gravity filled with water to simulate typical thermal conduction
conditions that would be present in a wet sprinkler system. The piping was then
charged with compressed air to approximately 350 kPa. Automotive oil pressure
switches that opened at approximately 35 kPa were connected to the data acquisi-
tion system and used to record the activation time. The change in resistance across
the switch from the open to closed position was used as the indication of activa-
tion. The activation time was also verified visually and recorded with a stopwatch.
The standard sprinklers were replaced, recharged, and pressure tested after each
experiment.
Sprinklers MPA and MPE had the modified sprinkler bulbs with thermocou-
ples installed. The modified sprinkler bulbs were cleaned and refilled with glycerine
before each test. A thermocouple was also installed 880 mm from the doorway on
the centreline of the room and 80 mm down from the ceiling to measure the ceil-
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Figure 6.6: Sprinklers installed for a ISO 9705 compartment fire test. The sprinklers on the
outside were as manufactured, while the centre sprinklers had modified glass
bulbs with thermocouples installed.
ing jet temperature. A bi-directional velocity probe was installed 1080 mm from the
doorway on the centreline of the room and 105 mm from the ceiling to measure the
ceiling jet velocity. It was orientated horizontally in the direction of the centreline of
the room. The measured values were recorded at 3 s intervals by the data acquisition
system. The sprinkler and instrumentation layout is shown in Figure 6.7.
The four configurations of the items in the room and the burner are shown in
Figure 6.8. The 100 kW propane burner was located near the centre of the room for
scenario A, and was located in the corner for scenario B. A photo of the burner flame
in scenario A is shown in Figure 6.9. The flame height was nearly at the ceiling. The
exact locations of the burner and items were driven by the main objective of the
experiments which was to evaluate the item-to-item fire spread capabilities of the
model, and were not chosen for optimal sprinkler thermal response. Due to the
lack of other items igniting in scenario B, the burner was moved closer to armchair
3 for scenario C. This resulted in armchair 3 igniting, but no further fire spread, so
armchairs 1 and 2 and MDF cube 1 were moved closer to the other items for scenario
CHAPTER 6. TEMPERATURE RESPONSE OF MODIFIED SPRINKLERS 139
SPE
3.60
2
.4
0
0.8 m x 2.0 m doorway
Lightweight concrete
0
.1
0
Burner
MPE
MPA
SPA
0.80
0.88
1.08
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Ceiling jet thermocouple
Figure 6.7: Layout of the sprinklers and ceiling jet instrumentation in the ISO 9705 room.
The propane burner is shown for reference. All dimensions are in m.
D. The propane burner used was the standard ISO 9705 burner. For scenario E, a
10 cm square pan containing 120 mL of ethanol was placed on the propane burner
adjacent to the edge of armchair 3.
6.5 Plunge test results
6.5.1 Comparison between Heskestad’s model and the plunge test experiments
The RTI for the sprinkler response for each plunge test was calculated using Equa-
tion 6.3. To compare the results to Tsui’s study, the RTI was calculated when the
thermocouple reached 68oC. The RTI was then used in equation 6.2 to calculate pre-
dicted temperature response as a function of time, as shown in Figure 6.10. The
shape of the measured temperature response matched the model predictions well.
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Figure 6.8: Item layout for the five compartment fire scenarios. The item names are shown.
All dimensions in m.
6.5.2 Sprinkler orientation
Plunge tests were conducted with orientations from 90o (sprinkler yoke arms per-
pendicular to the flow) to 0o (sprinkler yoke arms parallel to the flow). From Tsui’s
results, the detector response was expected to not change between 90◦ and 45◦, and
then start increasing somewhere between 45◦ and 0◦. Therefore, plunge tests were
conducted at 90◦ and in 5◦ increments from 45◦ to 0◦.
A plot of the effect of orientation on the RTI parameter can be seen in Fig-
ure 6.11. The RTI increased from approximately 90 m s1/2 to approximately 100 m s1/2
from perpendicular orientation to parallel. It was observed that the thermal re-
sponse for the sprinkler near 45◦ was not repeatable and fluctuated more than for
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Figure 6.9: Propane burner in scenario A location for the ISO 9705 compartment fire test.
The top of the flame was nearly at the compartment ceiling.
the parallel or perpendicular orientations.
6.5.3 Effects of water on modified sprinkler thermal response
A total of 11 tests were run in the parallel orientation, including three with no wa-
ter above the sprinkler and eight with water. The RTI for each run was calculated
as previously described. Histograms for the wet and dry cases are shown in Fig-
ure 6.12. The uncertainty in RTI was similar to what Ruffino calculated for cylinders
representing sprinklers, with a 95% confidence interval of ±22 (m s)1/2. The mean
RTI was 108 (m s)1/2.
Even with water added, the RTI in the parallel orientation was less than the
value reported by Tsui, which was nominally 160 (m s)1/2 for a similar sprinkler
head. It appeared that the effect of the deflector arms in the path of the flow around
the sprinkler bulb did not only slow down the convective heat transfer to the bulb,
but also caused other effects such as potentially delaying the bulb rupture to higher
temperatures.
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Figure 6.10: Comparison between experimental and modelled thermal response for a mod-
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kler pipe.
6.6 Compartment fire test results
6.6.1 Modified sprinkler response
The sprinkler activation times for the standard sprinklers and the temperatures of
the modified sprinklers at the time of activation for the standard response sprinkler
with the same orientation are shown in Table 6.1.
As discussed in Chapter 5, Khan et al [1] found that sprinklers with standard
response 5 mm bulbs and nominal activation temperatures of 68oC activated at a
mean temperature of 72oC with a standard deviation of 0.655oC when immersed in
a uniformly heated water bath. Histograms of the modified sprinkler temperature
at the time of standard sprinkler activation are shown in Figure 6.13.
The temperature measured at activation for the parallel sprinklers was on av-
erage 5oC greater than the temperature measured at activation for the perpendicular
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Experiment SPE MPE T (oC) SPA MPA T (oC)
act. time (s) @ SPE act. time act. time (s) @ SPA act. time
A1 81 80.2 90 70.1
A2 48 72.4 96 83.3
A3 39 70.0 60 86.4
B1 54 71.2 66 77.5
B2 54 76.8 72 82.8
C1 57 71.9 60 70.7
D1 44 73.2 62 76.1
D2 50 76.1 65 82.1
D3 60 70.6 66 76.8
E1 209 73.7 239 79.9
E2 180 71.1 216 78.5
Mean 73.4 78.6
St. dev. 3.1 5.1
Table 6.1: Activation times for standard sprinklers in the ISO 9705 compartment fire tests
and the temperature of the modified sprinklers at the time of activation for the
standard sprinkler with the same orientation.
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Figure 6.14: Heat release rate from the ISO 9705 compartment fire tests. Data is smoothed
using a 30 s moving average filter.
sprinklers. The standard deviation was also greater, which matches the findings of
Tsui et al [7].
The 3 s data acquisition time resolution added uncertainty to the temperature
measurement at the time of activation, since the average sprinkler temperature in-
crease ranged from 0.6oC per 3 s sample to 24.1oC per 3 s sample.
The variation between the activation times in different scenarios was primarily
a result of the change in fire location between scenarios and the variation in HRR
and ambient temperature between tests. The HRR for first 10 minutes of each ex-
periment is shown in Figure 6.14.
The HRR for scenario A was quite variable due to the uncertainty in ignition
times for the items. For scenario B, none of the items ignited so the HRR was just
the burner output of approximately 100 kW. For scenario C, the burner ignited the
closest armchair but no other items ignited. The three repetitions for scenario D
were quite similar due to similar ignition times. Scenario E, which did not use the
burner as the ignition source, showed more variation in ignition time than scenario
D. Tests A1, D1, E1, and E2 were extinguished early using a manually controlled
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sprinkler. For the tests where additional items ignited, the major contribution in
the first 10 minutes came from the armchairs and television items. The MDF cubes
continued to smoulder in some cases and ignited into flaming ignition much later
once the geometry changed enough to allow it to occur.
Since scenario B only included the burner heat release rate, it will be used for
further analysis of the sprinkler response. Tests B1 and B2 were different from a
sprinkler operation standpoint due to the difference in ambient temperature as the
room was not allowed to cool completely between tests. The ambient temperature
was approximately 21oC for test B1 and 27oC for test B2. Test B1 will be used for the
further analysis presented here.
The experimental sprinkler-related data, including the sprinkler activation times,
the modified sprinkler temperature response, measured ceiling jet temperature and
velocity, and HRR from test B1 is shown in Figure 6.15. All of these parameters
with the exception of the HRR are shown for the other tests in Appendix B. As ex-
pected, the parallel orientated sprinklers had a slower thermal response compared
to the perpendicular oriented sprinklers, and also appeared to activate at a higher
temperature.
6.6.2 Heskestad’s model
The thermal response of the sprinklers was estimated by applying the measured
ceiling jet temperature and velocity to Heskestad’s model (Equation 6.1) with and
without a conduction factor applied, shown in Figure 6.16. The conduction factor
used was 0.44 (m/s)1/2, which was the nominal value measured by Tsui et al [7] for a
similar sprinkler. Nominal RTI values of 95 (m s)1/2 and 108 (m s)1/2 were used for
the perpendicular and parallel orientations, respectively, as measured in the plunge
test for the modified sprinklers and discussed in Section 6.5.3. While the calculated
thermal response was slower than the experiment when the conduction factor was
not used, it was even slower when conduction losses were added, as expected.
Using the measured ceiling jet temperature and velocity, a nominal activation
temperature of 68oC and the above mentioned RTI and conduction response factors,
Heskestad’s model predicted activation times of 111 s and 117 s for the perpendic-
ular and parallel orientations respectively (with conduction) and 96 s and 105 s for
the perpendicular and parallel orientations respectively (without conduction).
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Figure 6.15: Sprinkler related data from test B1. The sprinkler activation times are shown as
vertical lines with the same style as the modified sprinkler response.
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Figure 6.16: Comparison of actual sprinkler response in test B1 to Heskestad’s thermal re-
sponse correlation (Equation 6.1) using the measured ceiling jet temperature
and velocity, with and without conduction. The experimental activation times
are shown as vertical lines.
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Description Activation time (s)
Measured (SPE) 54
Eq. 6.1: C = 0 (m/s)1/2 96
Eq. 6.1: C = 0.44 (m/s)1/2 111
BRANZFire 2011.2 103
B-RISK 23 111
B-RISK 48 165
Table 6.2: Comparison of activation times between the perpendicular sprinkler in test B1
and thermal response models.
6.6.3 Comparison to B-RISK and BRANZFire
Comparisons of the measured ceiling jet temperature and velocity to B-RISK and
BRANZFire 2011.2 model results are shown in Figures 6.17 and 6.18. For the ceiling
jet temperature, two versions of B-RISK are compared; one (build 23) that used the
same McCaffrey plume entrainment model as BRANZFire 2011.2 and a later version
(build 48) that used Heskestad’s plume entrainment model. The NIST JET model
for calculating the ceiling jet temperature and velocity was used for all three zone
models. Models that did not include an option to extract the output parameters were
excluded in the comparison. Ceiling jet velocity measurements were not possible
for the entire test duration, as the tubing connecting the bi-directional tubes to the
pressure transducers failed once they melted due to the fire.
The simulated velocity was lower than the measured velocity. A contribut-
ing factor was that the bi-directional probe was located closer to the fire than the
sprinkler location in the model where the ceiling jet velocity was calculated.
A comparison of the thermal response of the perpendicular sprinkler to Hes-
kestad’s model using the measured ceiling jet conditions and also B-RISK and BRANZ-
Fire output are shown in Figure 6.19. The measured HRR, nominal RTI value of
95 (m s)1/2, and conduction factor of 0.44 (m/s)1/2 were used for the B-RISK and
BRANZFire simulations.
Table 6.2 compares the estimated activation times to the actual activation time.
The nominal 68oC activation temperature was used for all of the modelled activation
times. If the measured activation temperature of approximately 72oC had been used,
the modelled activation times would have been slightly longer.
Most of the simulated sprinkler activation times were similar, with the excep-
tion of the B-RISK 48 value. The difference in the B-RISK 48 value was likely due
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Figure 6.17: Comparison of the BRANZFire, B-RISK 23 (McCaffrey plume entrainment
model), and B-RISK 48 (Heskestad plume entrainment model) estimated ceiling
jet temperature with the measured value from test B1.
to the difference in the predicted upper layer temperature and layer height, which
are used in the NIST JET model to predict the ceiling jet properties. Plots of the pre-
dicted layer heights and upper layer temperature for the three models are shown in
Figure 6.20.
The layer properties in the B-RISK 48 simulation started to diverge from the
BRANZFire and B-RISK 23 values at approximately 45 s, prior to the ceiling jet tem-
perature divergence.
6.6.4 Radiation factor
To try to account for the difference between the observed and simulated sprinkler
thermal response, the radiation factor proposed by Sako and Hasemi was added.
The contribution of the upper layer was neglected. The external radiation flux q˙′′e
was estimated as the radiation from the flame added to the radiation from the com-
partment surfaces:
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Figure 6.18: Comparison of the B-RISK 48 (Heskestad plume entrainment model) ceiling jet
velocity prediction with the measured value from test B1.
q˙
′′
e = χradQFflame−d + σT
4
surroundings (6.5)
where χrad is the radiative loss fraction, Q is the total HRR of the fire, and
Fflame−d is the view factor from the flame to the detector element. The σT 4surroundings
term represented the radiation incident on the detector from the compartment, as-
suming a view factor of approximately unity. It was assumed that the compartment
temperature was approximately equal to ambient for the initial stages of the fire
before the sprinklers activated.
The flame was assumed to be a cylindrical surface from the top of the burner to
the ceiling. The view factor Fflame−d was calculated to be 0.014 for the compartment
geometry using the relation for a cylinder to a parallel surface (Figure 6.21) found
in the SFPE handbook [14]:
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The results of adding the radiation term to Heskestad’s thermal response model
are shown in Figure 6.22. Using the Cr obtained by Sako and Hasemi [10] of 0.21 Km
2
kJ
was not sufficient to increase the temperature response to the level measured by the
modified sprinklers. A closer match was obtained by increasing the Cr value by an
order of magnitude to 2 Km
2
kJ
; however, more testing is required to determine if this
is a reasonable value for glass bulb type sprinklers. This could be done with a cone
type heater to subject a glass bulb sprinkler to radiation as described by Sako and
Hasemi [10].
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2
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vertical line represents the activation time of the standard sprinkler.
6.7 Conclusions
The ability of modified sprinklers with thermocouples inserted in custom sprinkler
bulbs to provide a representation of the response of a glass bulb sprinkler was in-
vestigated. While parallel orientations did increase the RTI measured in the plunge
test, it did not increase enough to completely explain the increased activation times
for standard sprinklers measured by Tsui et al [7]. The side-by-side comparison of
the temperature of the modified sprinklers at activation of standard sprinklers in
the compartment tests indicates that the parallel orientation also increases the acti-
vation temperature of the sprinkler bulbs.
The addition of water in the plunge tests did not seem to significantly affect
the thermal response under the conditions tested, although it may become more of
a factor for lower gas temperatures or velocities.
The Heskestad plume entrainment model used in the latest version of B-RISK
appears to predict slower thermal response than the models using the McCaffrey
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plume entrainment model. Sprinkler response times calculated with the computer
models using the McCaffrey plume entrainment model were closer to the activa-
tion times calculated using measured ceiling jet properties in Heskestad’s thermal
response model.
Radiation in the ISO 9705 compartment fire test conditions appears to be a sig-
nificant source of heating relative to convection from the ceiling jet for the sprinkler
thermal response. Further testing of the sprinkler temperature response with a ra-
diative source such as a cone heater would be useful to characterise the Cr parameter
for a standard response glass bulb sprinkler. Preferably, a modified sprinkler would
be compared side-by-side with a standard response bulb for the radiative heating
tests in a similar fashion to that used for the ISO compartment fire tests.
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CHAPTER 7
UNCERTAINTY IN SPRINKLER SYSTEM EFFECTS ON THE
FIRE AFTER ACTIVATION
7.1 Introduction
An NFPA sprinkler effectiveness study [1] of actual sprinkler performance in fire in-
cidents has indicated that effectiveness decreases as the number of sprinklers acti-
vated increases. Deterministic design approaches do not allow a comparison be-
tween the number of sprinklers expected to operate in a design and what has been
observed in statistical analysis of actual fire incidents. The trend of water supply
authorities to reduce reticulation system water pressure has been noted as a poten-
tial to decrease effectiveness of sprinkler systems and increase fire risk, but current
design methods do not allow for the quantitative consideration of these effects.
Water is a finite resource and while it is extremely effective as an agent for
both manual and automatic fire suppression activities, it has many other important
uses; many arguably more important than fire protection. Clean, potable water is
essential for modern public health and large quantities of water are also necessary
to support the modern agricultural practices required to feed the population of the
world. Pollution, climate change, and increases in societal usage put pressure on the
water cycle. Ageing municipal water distribution systems contribute to the prob-
lem as they deteriorate and start to leak and rupture at greater rates. All of these
factors add up to greater costs for municipalities to provide clean water, which are
of course ultimately borne by the taxpayer. In New Zealand and elsewhere in the
world, municipal water suppliers have been searching for methods to reduce their
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water losses and also to increase the reliability of their reticulation systems in a cost
effective manner. One of the methods that is starting to see widespread use in New
Zealand is pressure reduction.
It has been estimated that 90% or more of the approximately 7000 sprinkler
systems installed in New Zealand are reliant on towns’ mains water supplies [2]. The
New Zealand fire protection industry has voiced concerns that reduced pressure in
the water distribution system will cause sprinkler systems that were designed to be
compliant with national and international standards to fall out of compliance and
create unforeseen property and life safety fire risks that these sprinkler systems were
designed to mitigate.
An example of mains pressure reduction was planned in Christchurch, late
2012. The council intended to rezone the water reticulation system from seven zones
to fourteen to allow more effective pressure management. A result of the change
was that 400 kPa would be the maximum street main pressure available for sprin-
kler systems [3]. A local fire safety contractor indicated that existing buildings in the
city centre were designed for a street main pressure of 750 kPa [4]. The contractor
estimated that many existing buildings would require an additional booster pump,
with a capital cost of approximately $75,000, annual maintenance of $3,000, and us-
ing 10 m2 of ground floor area.
The foreword to sprinkler standard NZS 4541:2007 [5] acknowledges these is-
sues. It is unclear who is responsible to remedy this potential problem and who
could be liable for excess damage during fires due to ineffective sprinkler systems
because of low water supply pressure. This chapter examines the basis for these
concerns and discusses the potential effects that town’s mains water reticulation
pressure reduction could have on sprinkler systems in New Zealand. Extra light
hazard (ELH) and ordinary hazard (OH) wet pipe sprinkler systems designed un-
der the NZS4541:2007 standard using standard spray sprinklers as described in
NZS4541:2007 section 402.2.1 (b) will be considered.
A new risk-informed fire engineering design tool that allows the explicit con-
sideration of uncertainty is currently under development in New Zealand. This
chapter describes how the new model considers the effects of sprinkler systems on
fire development, and the ability of the model to predict multiple sprinkler activa-
tions.
CHAPTER 7. UNCERTAINTY IN SPRINKLER SYSTEM EFFECTS ON THE FIRE AFTER ACTIVATION 159
7.2 Sprinkler modelling in B-RISK
Due to the design fire generator’s probabilistic placement and selection of the first
item ignited, all of the sprinklers in the compartment of fire origin are modelled
and the activation of multiple sprinklers can be estimated. Currently, there are no
limitations on the number of sprinklers that can be placed in the model.
7.2.1 Modelling sprinkler effects on heat release rate in B-RISK
Four options can be selected to incorporate the effect of the sprinklers on the heat
release rate of the fire, as shown in Figure 7.1. The sprinklers can be assumed to
have no effect on the heat release rate, as would be the case if there was no water
supplied to the sprinklers. The second option assumes that the sprinklers control
the fire; i.e. the heat release rate remains constant after the first sprinkler is acti-
vated for the remainder of the simulation. This is the approach taken in the newly
proposed Verification Method for fire safety C/VM2 in New Zealand [6]. The fire
risk model FIERAsystem developed in Canada uses a similar approach, but also in-
cludes a sprinkler effectiveness parameter that allows the fire to continue to grow
after the activation of the first sprinkler is predicted [7]. The C/VM2 style control
option is used if the design fire generator is not active. A second control option
allows for the ignited items to burn out once the combined heat release rate curve
is calculated to have dropped below the control threshold, and is used in conjunc-
tion with the design fire generator. The fourth option uses a modified version of the
suppression algorithm introduced by Evans [8] for unshielded furnishing fires. The
original version was developed for experiments with constant water spray density
where the sprinklers are assumed to cause the heat release to decay exponentially
as described by the following formula:
Qt−tact = Qtacte
− t−tact
3.0w”−1.85 (7.1)
where t is the time, tact is the time of the first sprinkler activation, Q is the heat
release rate in kW, and w” is the nominal water spray density in mm/s. This is an
exponential decay model that assumes that the effect of the sprinklers on the fire is
proportional to the heat release rate of the fire:
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Figure 7.1: Options for the sprinkler effect on fire heat release rate in B-RISK.
∂Q
∂t
= λQ (7.2)
Rearranging Equation 7.2 to separate the variables of Q and t results in the
following form:
∂Q
Q
= λ∂t (7.3)
Integrating both sides from tact to t
Q∫
Qtact
dQ
Q
=
t∫
tact
λdt (7.4)
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ln(Q) =
t∫
tact
λdt+ ln(Qtact) (7.5)
and raising the equation to the exponent yields
Q = Qtacte
t∫
tact
λdt
(7.6)
If λ is constant with time then
Q = Qtacte
λ(t−tact) (7.7)
which is the form used by Evans with
λ =
1
2.0x10−5(w”/Hc)−1.85
(7.8)
as the time constant, fit as an upper bound to experimental sprinkler suppres-
sion data from wood crib fires, where Hc was the height of the crib. It should be
noted that the data considered included 305 mm and 610 mm tall wood cribs and
should be used with caution for fuel packages that are significantly different in con-
figuration, such as high challenge fuel packages. Using 610 mm as a nominal height
for most furnishing fires results in the form used in B-RISK:
λ =
1
3.0w”−1.85
(7.9)
When considering successive sprinkler activation, the water spray density typ-
ically does not remain constant throughout sprinkler operation. As additional sprin-
klers activate, the total flow increases but the flow from each sprinkler decreases due
to the increased friction losses in the hydraulic system, and therefore the minimum
spray density also decreases, as shown in Figure 7.2.
Substituting the above function into the time integral in Equation 7.6 gives
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Q = Qtact,1e
− 1
3.0
∑n
i=1
(ti+1−tact,i)
wi”
−1.85 (7.10)
where n is the number of activated sprinklers, tact,i is the activation time of
the ith sprinkler, w”i is the minimum water spray density after the ith sprinkler
activates, and ti+1 is equal to the activation time of the (i+ 1)th sprinkler if i+ 1 ≤ n
and t if i + 1 > n. An increase in spray density due to overlapping spray from
adjacent operating sprinklers is not considered.
7.2.2 Probabilistic inputs for sprinkler system effectiveness
A probabilistic input is included in the model representing the probability that the
sprinkler system has an effect on the fire growth. This outcome would be expected
if water is available for the system; for example, as long as the water supply was not
compromised or an isolation valve was not shut off. This parameter corresponds
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Figure 7.3: B-RISK forms for entering sprinkler system effectiveness distributions. Multiple
sprinklers can be entered, with distributions for suppression, control, and no
effect probabilities.
to the probability that the sprinkler system is reliable. If the sprinkler system is as-
sumed to have an effect on fire growth, a second distribution can be used to select
how many sprinklers are activated before the fire growth is modified, creating an ef-
fect similar to the FIERAsystem approach. The effect is also similar to the approach
discussed in the IFEG [9] of increasing the radial distance input into the model if
a more conservative estimate of sprinkler activation is required. A third distribu-
tion can then be used to estimate the probability whether the system controls or
suppresses the fire if the system activates and sufficient water is available. This pa-
rameter is representative of the probability of sprinkler system efficacy. The B-RISK
input windows for these distributions are shown in Figure 7.3.
7.2.3 Modelling the activation of subsequent sprinklers in B-RISK
B-RISK makes a number of assumptions in estimating the activation of subsequent
sprinklers. It has been observed that sprinkler sprays interact with the fire plume [10],
and there have been models developed to consider these effects [11], Sprinklers also
interact with the upper smoke layer [12], and it has been noted that water from acti-
vated sprinklers can prevent other sprinklers from activating [13,14]. An equation has
been developed for thermal detector response that includes evaporative cooling [15],
but there is insufficient data to predict how much water from activated sprinklers
reaches sprinklers not yet activated. There is also evidence that water spray from
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sprinklers affects fire-driven vent flows [16]. The present risk-informed model does
not account for any of these effects; however, they are all expected to reduce the
temperature of gases reaching other sprinklers or to otherwise cool them. Thus, the
assumption made to exclude these effects is expected to result in over predicting the
number of sprinklers activated, creating an ”upper bound” estimation which may
be useful for evaluating the hydraulic adequacy of water supplies for risk purposes.
It should be noted that the model is unable to predict the activation of sprinklers
outside the room of fire origin and this may cause the model prediction to not be
conservative depending on the situation being modelled. A major contributing fac-
tor to estimating when subsequent sprinklers activate is accurately estimating the
effect of activated sprinklers on the heat release rate, for which data is very limited.
To evaluate the contribution of these effects, a comparison is made in Section 7.4
between one set of data and the model prediction.
7.3 Modelling sprinkler water supplies in B-RISK
To estimate the effects of water supply pressure and flow fluctuations on the fire
risk in a sprinklered building, the sprinkler system hydraulic characteristics are re-
quired. A hydraulic model that calculates the flow and pressure at activated sprin-
klers was developed and integrated with the B-RISK multiple sprinkler activation
and sprinkler heat release rate submodels. A description of the hydraulic model
development and capabilities is included in Appendix A. The hydraulic model in
B-RISK assumes steady state water flow in the piping, neglecting transient flow
phenomena.
Sprinkler water spray density is calculated in the hydraulic model by dividing
the sprinkler flow by the coverage area specified for the sprinkler. Individual cov-
erage areas can be specified for each sprinkler. The minimum water spray density
and sprinkler pressure at a single sprinkler is calculated after each sprinkler activa-
tion. The minimum water spray density after each sprinkler activation is used in
the suppression model to modify the heat release rate.
Below a critical sprinkler spray density or pressure, the sprinkler system will
cease to effectively control or suppress the fire as the full spray pattern degrades to
a drizzle. The critical density and pressure can be entered in the model. Depending
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on the level of conservatism required, the heat release rate can either be specified to
be held constant after the minimum flow drops below the critical quantities or can
be specified to resume growing. Estimates of the critical values can be obtained from
sprinkler standards. These values may be conservative but no data has been found
to support the decrease in sprinkler system efficacy at flow characteristics below
standard specified values. New Zealand sprinkler standard flow requirements are
discussed below.
7.3.1 NZS4541:2007 water supply requirements
The NZS4541:2007 sprinkler standard provides minimum design flow and pressure
requirements for sprinkler systems. These minimum criteria may be used as the
critical cutoff for effective sprinkler operation in the hydraulic model.
7.3.1.1 NZS4541:2007 minimum sprinkler flow requirements
Minimum sprinkler flow rates can be calculated by multiplying the coverage area
for an individual sprinkler by the minimum design water spray density for the
occupancy and hazard. Design densities specified in NZS4541:2007 range from
4.1 mm/min for the extra light hazard classification to 12.5 mm/min or more for
process occupancies.
7.3.1.2 NZS4541:2007 minimum sprinkler pressure requirements
NZS4541:2007 specifies in Section 1002.3.1 that the minimum orifice “pressure at any
sprinkler, with all sprinklers within the assumed maximum area of operation simultaneously
operating, shall not be less than:
• In extra light hazard occupancy class:
– using 10 mm sprinklers - 100 kPa
– using 15 mm sprinklers - 50 kPa
– using residential sprinklers - as per the listing
CHAPTER 7. UNCERTAINTY IN SPRINKLER SYSTEM EFFECTS ON THE FIRE AFTER ACTIVATION 166
• In ordinary hazard occupancy class - 50 kPa
• In extra high hazard occupancy class - 50 kPa”
Other criteria are also given for control mode specific application and supres-
sion mode sprinklers, but these sprinkler types will not be considered in this study.
The effect of the sprinkler system on the fire once the flow no longer meets the min-
imum critical requirement can be set to either no effect or control.
7.4 Comparison to Ghent sprinkler tests
Experimental data in the literature where multiple sprinkler activation times and
heat release rate histories before and after sprinkler activation have occurred is lim-
ited. One set of experiments that included sprinkler activation times and a quan-
tifiable heat release rate with activated sprinklers was conducted by the UK Build-
ing Research Establishment at the Multifunctioneel Trainingcentrum in Ghent, Bel-
gium [17]. While these experiments were focused on the interactions of sprinklers
and smoke vents, two tests were conducted with no vents open, which were used
for comparison to B-RISK simulations.
7.4.1 Description of experiments
The building space where the sprinklers were tested was approximately 50 m long,
20 m wide, and 10 m tall. A 3.2 m smoke curtain created a 27 m long by 18 m wide
smoke reservoir with a flat ceiling. The experiments used for this comparison had
55 sprinklers in a grid as shown in Figure 7.4. A 1.8 m radius dodecagonal pan filled
with water and hexane piped into the centre was used as a growing fire source. A
relation between the amount of hexane pumped into the pan and the surface area
of the hexane as it spread across the water was developed so a controlled growing
fire source could be created. A steel upstand 20 cm high around the pan was used
to prevent splashing by the sprinkler water discharge.
Wormald Type A 15 mm upright spray sprinklers were used for these experi-
ments, with a nominal operating temperature of 68oC, and mounted 150 mm below
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the ceiling. However, the experimental report indicated that the best match between
a zone model developed by Hinkley (which used Alpert’s correlation for the ceiling
jet temperature and velocity [18]) and the experimentally measured activation time
was obtained by using an operating temperature of 80oC. The time constant for these
sprinklers was measured at 1 m/s and was 200 s for perpendicular flow to the yoke
arms and 370 s for parallel flow to the yoke arms. The report stated that the yoke
arms of the installed sprinklers were oriented to be perpendicular to the central fire
location. The response time index (RTI) required by the model was calculated by
multiplying the time constant by the square root of the test velocity, as described by
Heskestad and Bill [19], to get RTI values of 200 (m s)1/2 and 370 (m s)1/2.
The hexane was added to the pan at an exponentially increasing rate to pro-
duce the heat release curve comparable to an ultra-fast t2 fire shown in Figure 7.5.
At the time of ignition the amount of hexane added corresponded to a heat release
rate of 830 kW, and the size of the pan allowed for a maximum of 14 MW. For the
two experiments (experiments 25 and 26) where no vents were used, the heat re-
lease rate was modified using two approaches. For experiment 25, the heat release
rate was held constant after the first sprinkler activated. In this experiment, all 55
sprinklers activated.
For experiment 26, the heat release rate was held constant after the first sprin-
kler activated and then reduced by 20% after 30 s. In this experiment, 36 sprin-
klers activated. A comparison of the modelled and experimental sprinkler activa-
tion times are shown in Figures 7.6 and 7.7. Sprinkler activation times greater than
400 s were not reported from the experiments.
7.4.2 Model inputs
Since sprinkler activation times greater than 400 s were not reported from the ex-
periments, 400 s was used as the simulation run time. Based on guidance from
the experimental report, a heat release radiative fraction of 0.39 was used. The JET
model was used to model the ceiling jet temperature and velocity based on the rec-
ommendations of Wade et al [20]. Due to the recommendations in the experimental
report, two RTI and activation temperature combinations were modelled, discussed
in the results below. A typical conduction factor of 0.4 (m/s)1/2 was used. The dis-
tance of the sprinkler heads from the ceiling was modelled as 150 mm, equivalent
to the experiments. B-RISK release version 17 was used for this analysis.
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Figure 7.4: Ghent experimental layout [17]. Ceiling height was 10 m. Original sprinkler num-
bering scheme shown. Dimensions are in metres unless otherwise stated.
7.4.3 Model results
The activation time of the first sprinkler can be used to evaluate the ability of the
model to predict the sprinkler bulb response when there are no effects of the sprin-
kler spray on the fire plume, upper layer, and unactivated sprinkler bulbs. The
model predicted the first sprinkler activation time to be 146 s using a RTI of 350
(m s)1/2 and an activation temperature of 80oC, compared to the experimental value
of 146 s (0% difference) for experiment 25 and 150 s for experiment 26 (3% differ-
ence). Since a growing fire was used as the source, and the heat release rate was
controlled when the first sprinkler activated, the modelled time of sprinkler activa-
tion affected the heat release rate history.
When the activation temperature was changed to the nominal value of 68oC
reported for the actual sprinklers installed, and the RTI was changed to 200 (m s)1/2
as measured with the yoke arms perpendicular to the flow (as they were installed),
the first sprinkler was predicted to activate at 102 s (32% earlier) with a correspond-
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Figure 7.5: Heat release rate curves for the Ghent growing fires [17].
ing lower heat release rate. Since the predicted activation time was much closer
with the RTI of 350 (m s)1/2 and activation temperature of 80oC, these values were
considered to be the ”apparent” values, contrasted with the ”nominal” values for
RTI of 200 (m s)1/2 and activation temperature of 68oC.
For the model based on experiment 25, using a RTI of 200 (m s)1/2 and an ac-
tivation temperature of 68oC for all of the sprinklers resulted in the modelled times
of sprinkler activation varying from -60% to 14%, as shown in Figure 7.6. Using a
RTI of 350 (m s)1/2 and an activation temperature of 80oC for all of the sprinklers,
the time of activation for the subsequent sprinklers predicted by the model varied
from the experimental times by -47% to 30%.
For experiment 26, the times predicted for subsequent sprinkler activations
varied from -60% to 12% when a RTI of 200 (m s)1/2 and activation temperature
of 68oC were used, as shown in Figure 7.7, and from -45% to 38% when a RTI of
350 (m s)1/2 and activation temperature of 80oC were used.
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Figure 7.6: Comparison between experimental and modelled activation times for experi-
ment 25.
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 directly compare the model error for the two cases of RTI
and activation temperature modelled for experiments 25 and 26, respectively. For
both experiments, a RTI of 200 (m s)1/2 and activation temperature of 68oC tended
to result in an early model prediction (negative error).
Comparisons between the order of sprinkler operation can be seen in Fig-
ures 7.10 and 7.11. The concentric circles for each sprinkler can be used to visually
compare the modelled activation order (centre circles) with the experimental order
(outer circles). A darker shade indicates earlier activation. No shading indicates a
sprinkler that does not activate. For experiment 25, the model predicted that all 55
sprinklers would activate, as happened in the experiment. For experiment 26, the
model predicted that 41 sprinklers would activate compared to the 36 that activated
in the experiment. This over prediction is likely due to the inability of the model
to account for evaporative cooling, which in the experiment caused sprinklers 12,
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Figure 7.7: Comparison between experimental and modelled activation times for experi-
ment 26.
32, 36, 44, and 46 to experience residual skipping (as defined by Croce et al [13] to be
sprinklers that do not operate during the fire) or otherwise not activate. Sprinkler
number 10 activated in the experiment, although the model predicted that it would
not. It can also be seen that sprinklers 16, 37, and 38 experienced temporary skip-
ping (as defined by Croce et al [13] to be sprinklers that operate after neighbouring
sprinklers that are more distant from the plume) in the experiment, which was not
predicted by the model.
Table 7.1 summarises the number of sprinklers predicted by the model to ac-
tivate within 50%, 25%, and 10% of the experimental activation times for the two
parameter sets tested. More sprinklers were predicted to activate within the spec-
ified uncertainty bounds for Experiment 25 compared with Experiment 26. This
may be caused by the greater relative importance of the sprinkler spray effects on
the plume compared with the weaker plume in Experiment 26 due to the lower
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Figure 7.8: Histogram of model error for experiment 25.
Deviation From Experiment 25 Experiment 26
Exp. Activation Time Parameter Set #1 Parameter Set #2 Parameter Set #1 Parameter Set #2
50% 96% 100% 89% 100%
25% 71% 91% 46% 54%
10% 33% 49% 23% 20%
Table 7.1: Percent of sprinkler activations calculated by the model within the stated devi-
ation limits from the experimental sprinkler activation times. (Parameter set #1:
RTI = 200 (m s)1/2, Tact = 68oC; Parameter set #2: RTI = 350 (m s)1/2, Tact = 80oC)
heat release rate. For both experiments, using a RTI of 350 (m s)1/2 and an activa-
tion temperature of 80oC resulted in more sprinklers predicted to activate within the
specified uncertainty bounds in Table 7.1 compared with a RTI of 200 (m s)1/2 and
an activation temperature of 68oC.
However, the number of sprinklers reported activated by the model remained
the same, with all sprinklers predicted activated for experiment 25 and with the total
number of 41 sprinklers predicted activated for experiment 26.
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Figure 7.9: Histogram of model error for experiment 26.
7.5 Modelling water supply effects on sprinkler system effectiveness
A generic compartment representing a typical commercial occupancy protected by
an extra light hazard sprinkler system was simulated to demonstrate the capability
of the B-RISK hydraulic model to include the effects of changes in water supply,
and to compare the output of the model to sprinkler system statistics. This section
describes the setup and results from this simulation.
7.5.1 Compartment geometry
The size of the compartment was chosen to allow 16 sprinklers which ensured the
sprinkler system water supply could be overrun without excessive simulation times.
Figure 7.12 shows 3-D and sprinkler layout views of the space, which was 16 m
square and 2.4 m high with a single open door. A 4 x 4 grid of sprinklers were spaced
4 m apart, with 2 m separation from the walls, which met the spacing (less than
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Figure 7.10: Comparison of modelled and experimental sprinkler activation order for Ex-
periment 25. The modelled and experimental orders of activation are shown
at the centre and top of each circle, respectively. The bottom number is the
experimental activation time.
4.6 m) and coverage (less than 21 m2 per sprinkler) requirements of NZS4541:2007 [5]
for an ELH commercial system.
The compartment boundary material was specified to be the B-RISK default
concrete material, 100 mm thick. A single 0.8 m wide by 2.0 m tall vent was open
for the duration of the simulations, representing a door.
7.5.2 Modelled sprinkler parameters
The sprinklers were modelled as standard response pendant sprinklers with a K fac-
tor of 8 L/min√
kPa
and nominal 68oC activation temperature. Distributions for the sprin-
kler thermal response parameters are shown in Table 7.2. The sprinkler distance
below the ceiling was fixed at 0.1 m, typical for a pendant sprinkler installation and
meeting the requirements of NZS4541:2007 [5] which required the sprinklers to be
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Parameter Distribution Type Distribution Parameters Source
RTI Normal µ=93.4 (m s)1/2 σ=4.44 (m s)1/2 [21]
C Factor Normal µ=0.44 (m/s)1/2 σ=0.01 (m/s)1/2 [21]
Tact Normal µ=72oC σ=0.655oC [22]
Table 7.2: Distributions for the uncertainty in sprinkler thermal response parameters for the
water supply model.
less than 150 mm below the ceiling. B-RISK release version 28 was used for this
analysis.
7.5.3 Hydraulic design
The sprinkler water supply was sized to meet the ELH classification in NZS4541:2007.
The required number of sprinklers to be supplied for the NZS4541:2007 hazard
classes are shown in Table 7.3. 50 mm diameter pipe was specified up to the first
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Figure 7.12: Generic compartment used for the water supply model. The left view is the 3-D
view and the right is the room population view from B-RISK, showing sprinkler
locations as squares.
Occupancy hazard class Sprinklers
ELH (residential) 4
ELH (other) 6
OH1 6
OH2 18
OH3 18
Sprinklered area (density)
EHH 260 m2 (7.5-12 mm/min)
Table 7.3: NZS4541:2007 [5] minimum number of sprinklers supplied
sprinkler on the branch piping, with the remainder of the piping specified as 38 mm,
to meet the hydraulic requirements for an ELH hazard classification system. A three
end-side with end supply arrangement was used, and the node numbering scheme
for the hydraulic model is shown in Figure 7.13.
7.5.4 Water supply
Typical water supply characteristic quadratic pressure-flow curves were chosen to
provide the required pressure and flow. To compensate for water supply fluctu-
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Figure 7.13: ELH hydraulic design. The 6 hydraulically most remote sprinklers are shown.
ations, NZS4541:2007 requires that the measured available water supply must ex-
ceed or equal the required minimum water supply depending on how the pressure
and flow capabilities of the water supply are measured, and allows two alternative
methods for calculating the required minimum water supply. For Method 1, Section
C2.6 of NZS4541:2007 states that:
The pressure available to meet the design requirements shall be taken as 80%
of the pressure indicated by line C of the graph (the adjusted pressure-flow
curve) at the design flow required.
Section C2.7 also allows 100% of the pressure indicated by line C to be used
if the water supply authority has proposed upgrades to the reticulation system that
will improve the pressure and flow characteristics of the system, subject to the ap-
proval of the Sprinkler System Certifier (SSC).
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Method 2 uses the same methodology as Method 1 to measure flow and pres-
sure, but the pressure-flow curve for the water supply is adjusted further to account
for the lowest static pressure as measured over a period of 14 consecutive days (ne-
glecting low pressure spikes due to system hydraulic shocks), or “if the water supply
is liable to seasonal fluctuation, the record shall be taken for at least 21 days during the sea-
son when the pressure is at its lowest” (Section C3.2). It is also left to the contractor to
find out if the seasonal low pressure changes from year to year, subject to potential
further derating by the SSC. Method 2 allows the design pressure for the sprinkler
system to be 90% of the water supply pressure as adjusted for the lowest measured
static pressure.
Five water supply scenarios were simulated by adjusting the static head of the
supply, shown in Figure 7.14. The water supply supplied the 6 most hydraulically
remote sprinklers with the minimum water density of 4.1 mm/min as required by
NZS4541:2007 for a commercial occupancy with an ELH hazard classification using
a static head of 35 m. For the second water supply scenario, the static head was
adjusted up to 44 m to include the requirements of Method 1 of measuring the water
supply characteristics in NZS4541:2007. The static head was also adjusted down
to 28 m and 22 m to reflect a compromised water supply. Incidentally, the water
supply with a static head of 22 m was able to supply the four hydraulically most
remote sprinklers with 4.1 mm/min, meeting the minimum requirements for a ELH
residential system. A fifth water supply characteristic with a static head of 55 m was
used to evaluate the model results for a superior water supply, which also met the
minimum requirement of 5 mm/min density for the six hydraulically most remote
sprinklers, typically required for OH1 hazard classifications. The sprinkler layout
was not adjusted to meet the NZS4541:2007 OH1 requirements (maximum 3.5 m),
so this was for a sensitivity check only.
In addition to the five water supply scenarios, the effect of changing the criti-
cal sprinkler pressure was also evaluated using both the constant and growing heat
release rate options to observe the effects on the number of sprinklers predicted to
activate. While NZS4541:2007 specifies a critical minimum sprinkler supply pres-
sure and spray density, there is no justification for the value and it is unclear if
sprinkler system efficacy is compromised at these conditions. Two critical sprinkler
threshold states were used: NZS4541:2007 pressure and density criteria of 50 kPa
and 4.1 mm/min for a 15 mm standard spray sprinkler and an arbitrary reduced
critical pressure of 35 kPa and no limit on the minimum spray density. The water
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Figure 7.14: Water supply characteristic curves for the water supply model.
supply curve with a static head of 35 m was used. The purpose of this analysis was
primarily a sensitivity check on the effect of the critical minimum sprinkler supply
pressure and spray density on the number of sprinklers that the B-RISK hydraulic
model predicted to activate.
7.5.5 Fire scenario
The αt2 option of the B-RISK design fire generator was used to create the fire scenar-
ios for the water supply model. For the base scenario, the fire HRR growth distri-
bution from Young [23] previously discussed in Chapter 5 was used. The radiant loss
fraction was specified to be constant at 0.35, and the fire height was 0.4 m, meeting
the specifications of C/VM2 [6]. Total simulated time was limited to ten minutes.
Two additional growth rate distributions developed by Holburn et al [24] from
London Fire Brigade data were used to determine the effect of the fire growth rate
distribution on the number of sprinklers activated. The distributions used can be
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Figure 7.15: Fire growth rate distributions for water supply model from Young [23], Deguchi
et al [25], and Holburn et al [24]. The cumulative percentages of fires below the
NFPA 72 growth rate classifications are shown for Young’s data. The distribu-
tions used for the analysis in this chapter are shown as thicker lines.
seen in Figure 7.15, along with additional distributions from Holburn et al and
Deguchi et al [25] for comparison. Of the eleven distributions for various occupancies
described by Holburn, the hotel and public buildings distributions were selected
as representative of the range of occupancy distributions. In addition, an artificial
distribution representing a higher probability of rapid fire growth rates which was
slightly faster than Holburn’s warehouse fire distribution was used as a sensitivity
check. The probability percentages for fires to have growth rates between each of the
NFPA 72 classifications for the four distributions modelled are shown in Table 7.4.
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Hotels Public bldgs Calorimeter More rapid
(Holburn et al) (Holburn et al) (Young) fires
<Slow 81% 58% 33% 11%
Slow - Medium 13% 25% 26% 20%
Medium - Fast 5% 13% 22% 28%
Fast - Ultrafast 1% 4% 13% 24%
>Ultrafast 0% 1% 6% 17%
Table 7.4: Cumulative probability (percentages) for fires to have growth rates in the NFPA
72 classification intervals.
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Figure 7.16: Effect of increasing iterations on percentage of cumulative sprinkler activations.
The cumulative distribution converged near 500 runs.
7.5.6 Minimum number of iterations for convergence
The base scenario was run with increasing number of iterations to determine the
minimum required for convergence of the cumulative probability density output.
Convergence was obtained at 500 runs, as shown in Figure 7.16.
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Figure 7.17: Effect of critical water supply threshold on the number of sprinklers activated.
Decreasing the critical threshold allowed more sprinklers to activate before the
sprinkler system was overrun.
7.5.7 Results
7.5.7.1 Effects of critical sprinkler flow parameters
Once the minimum sprinkler flow decreased below the critical value all sixteen
of the sprinklers in the room activated as shown in Figure 7.17. For the commer-
cial ELH minimum supply static pressure of 35 m the critical state was surpassed
at six sprinklers as expected with the NZS4541:2007 threshold of 50 kPa and 4.1
mm/min. When the critical sprinkler pressure threshold was decreased to 35 kPa,
up to nine sprinklers activated before the threshold was surpassed and the sprinkler
system was overrun by the fire.
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7.5.7.2 Effects of available water supply
The results of the water supply characteristic scenarios using Young’s HRR growth
distribution are shown in Figure 7.18, compared to the stem and leaf plot of the
reported number of sprinklers activated from Figure 3.3. The number of fires pre-
dicted to activate one sprinkler with a commercial minimum ELH water supply
(35 m static head supply) is near the bottom of the range reported in fire incident
reports, and near the lower quartile for four sprinklers activated and above. The
number of sprinklers predicted to activate with the commercial ELH Method 1 de-
sign water supply (44 m static head supply) is near the mean of reported sprinklered
fires. A compromised water supply with half the static head of the commercial ELH
system design requirement (22 m static head supply) is predicted to reduce the num-
ber of fires where four sprinklers are sufficient from 91% to 75% (an 18% decrease),
for the given scenario geometry and probabilistic design fire input. The decrease in
static head to 22 m also caused the sprinkler system to be overrun (when the mini-
mum sprinkler supply flow dropped below the critical value) 25% of the time with
more than four sprinklers activated, compared to 2.5% with more than seven sprin-
klers activated at 44 m static head. The incremental benefit achieved by increasing
the static head to 55 m was small with 1.7% of fires overrunning the sprinkler system
when more than eight sprinklers were required.
7.5.7.3 Effects of fire growth rate distribution
The results from changing the fire growth rate are shown in Figure 7.19. As ex-
pected, more rapid fires resulted in more sprinklers operating. Using the hotel
growth rate distribution resulted in 45% of the fires not activating the sprinkler sys-
tem within the ten minutes of simulated time, which is reflective of the number of
smouldering fires that may occur and grow before occupant intervention in sleep-
ing occupancy buildings. As these fires were all idealized t2 fires, a longer simulated
time would have resulted in more fires activating sprinklers. Realistically, the smoke
detection system may be set off or an occupant may notice a slow growing fire be-
fore the sprinklers activate which would mean that intervention from occupants or
the fire service may occur before activation, but these effects were not considered in
this analysis.
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Figure 7.18: Cumulative distribution of active sprinklers for five water supply characteristic
curves.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter describes the methods used to estimate the effects of a sprinkler sys-
tem on fire development in a new fire design tool being developed in New Zealand.
Sprinklers can be modelled as having no effect on the fire, controlling the heat re-
lease rate, or suppressing the fire, with associated probabilities. The activation of
multiple sprinklers can be estimated; and while such phenomenon as skipping can-
not be predicted, an upper bound of activated sprinklers for risk-informed fire safety
design is available.
When compared to the Ghent experimental results, using an apparent RTI and
activation temperature that gave a predicted activation time for the first sprinkler
within 3% resulted in subsequent sprinkler activation predictions closer to the ex-
perimental results than using the nominal values for the RTI and activation tem-
perature. More experimental data in a greater range of geometries and with a wider
range of fire heat release rate histories would be useful to further validate the model.
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Figure 7.19: Cumulative distribution of active sprinklers for four fire growth rate distribu-
tions.
The ability of the model to predict such behaviour could be improved by adding
Ruffino’s model of evaporative cooling and models for the interaction of the sprin-
kler spray with the plume and upper layer, but more experimental data is needed
for the inputs required for these model refinements.
The ability to estimate the number of sprinklers activated was shown to be use-
ful to estimate the effects of a reduced water supply on fire risk. While the model
output using the suppression option appears to match statistical data on the number
of activated sprinklers reasonably well, it does not capture the range or complexity
of scenarios included in real fire incident studies. Real sprinklered fires include fires
in occupancies with high challenge fuel packages, fires that start in concealed spaces
or the exterior of the building, and widely varying geometry. In its current state,
the hydraulic model might be used as a comparative tool to estimate the change in
fire risk from an altered water supply rather than as an absolute tool. Ideally, the
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data collection improvements suggested in Chapter 4 such as linking water sup-
ply characteristic data to fire incident data would be useful in future validation of
the capability of the model to include the effects of compromised water supplies
on sprinkler effectiveness. The assumption of constant heat release after sprinkler
operation seems to be overly conservative as it consistently resulted in the sprinkler
system being overrun in both the Ghent experiments and the B-RISK model output.
For the water supply generic commercial scenario modelled, a 50% decrease in
static water supply head from the design requirement caused a tenfold increase in
fires where the sprinkler system was overrun from 2.5% to 25%, while a 25% increase
in static water supply head reduced the number of fires where the sprinkler system
was overrun by less than half from 2.5% to 1.7%. This result is specific to the simple
room scenario considered and should not be used for actual design scenarios.
The expected sprinkler system behaviour of not operating in smouldering fires
was observed in the model when a slow fire growth distribution from hotel data was
used. Faster fire growths caused the sprinkler system to be overrun more frequently,
so changes in building fuel package statistics should be monitored to evaluate the
ability of sprinkler systems to reduce fire risk.
The potential for a sprinkler system to be overrun was shown to be sensitive to
the critical minimum sprinkler flow characteristics. More research would be useful
to quantify the reduction in sprinkler effectiveness with low pressures.
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CHAPTER 8
PASSIVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY
8.1 Introduction
While effectiveness and reliability are commonly associated with active systems
such as sprinkler or smoke management systems, passive compartmentalisation
components are also subject to failure due to a number of factors. A few of the
most common are propped-open doors (Figure 8.1), improperly fire stopped holes
cut through walls, ceilings, or floors for building services, and open windows. Com-
partmentalisation is critical for fire safety because it determines how much oxygen is
available for the fire through ventilation and the available paths for fire products to
spread out of the compartment of fire origin. An open door, window, or other pen-
etration in a compartment boundary can adversely affect the operation of a smoke
control system, as will be discussed in Chapter 10. [1]
Much work has been done on “structural” fire engineering that focusses on
how long a particular passive element such as a wall, ceiling, floor, door, or window
will stand up to a severe thermal insult typically associated with post-flashover or
free burning fires [2]. As this research is focussed on the pre-flashover stages of the
fire, the primary concern is the status and integrity of the passive compartmentali-
sation prior to the fire, and specifically on doors. In addition, the uncertainty in the
vent flow calculated by B-RISK is estimated from verification data.
8.1.1 Types of doors
Doors can be categorised by motion:
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• swinging (hinged)
• sliding or rolling
method of operation:
• fully manual (both open and closed)
• automatic door closer (spring operated, motorised, gravity system)
• automatic hold open device (magnetic)
and ability to prevent fire and smoke spread:
• no rating
• smoke stop
• fire rated
Even doors that are not “fire rated” can make a significant difference in the
spread of smoke and flame through a building, as observed in a residential fire in
Papakura, New Zealand [3], where a house was gutted by fire except for the one oc-
cupied bedroom. As the fire breached the top of the door, a smoke alarm in the
room alerted the occupant who had enough time to escape safely through the win-
dow. Palmer [4] compared the fire risk between sleeping in a typical house bedroom
with the bedroom door open and closed and found that fire risk was reduced with a
closed bedroom door. In most cases for the purpose of modelling fire, doors that are
not expected to perform as smoke stop or fire doors will be considered to be open at
all times, as specified in C/VM2 [5].
Based on observations in New Zealand buildings during this research, the
most common type of smoke stop or fire door in residential and commercial oc-
cupancies is the swinging door, in either single leaf or double leaf configurations,
with self closers, with or without automatic hold open devices.
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Figure 8.1: A typical fire door failure.
8.2 Existing data sources
Bukowski et al [6] noted that there was very little data regarding performance of
individual passive elements, although there are two sets of expert surveys cited that
indicate probabilities that an opening will be fixed open; the Warrington Delphi UK
study estimated the probability that an opening will be fixed open is 29%, and the
Australian Fire Engineering Guidelines estimated that the reliability of a passive
element (such as a wall) should be reduced from 95% to 90% if an opening with an
automatic closer is present. Quoting other unknown data sources, PD7974-7:2003 [7]
indicates that up to 23% of fire doors are held open by some means that will not
release in case of a fire, and of the hinged fire doors that are not blocked open, 20%
may fail to close correctly.
Yashiro et al [8] reported estimates of the reliability of fire doors with automatic
closers and inter-lock devices, as well as fire shutters, from Tokyo Fire Department
data. Fire doors with automatic closers were estimated to be 97% reliable, 91% reli-
able when inter-lock devices were used, and fire shutters were also estimated to be
91% reliable.
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There is little data on the number of inadequately sealed penetrations in com-
partment walls, ceilings, and floors other than doors and windows, such as those
for building services. A survey of 11 buildings conducted by the Fire Protection
Association of New Zealand (FPANZ) found a variety of inadequately fire-stopped
penetrations, including large open cable trays, oversize holes for pipes and improp-
erly stopped fire shafts [9].
Beyler and Iwankiw [10] discussed compartmentalisation for record storage oc-
cupancies and discussed passive reliability, including improperly fire stopped pen-
etrations and fire door failures. No specific data on penetration or door reliability
was presented. Fernandez [11] noted that nuclear facility inspectors found fire doors
propped open, however no quantitative data was reported. Testing conducted by
Factory Mutual in the early 1990s indicated that the failure rate of fire doors in-
cluding horizontal sliding doors on inclined tracks, horizontal sliding doors with
counterweight closures, horizontal sliding doors with spring closures, vertical slid-
ing doors, and swinging doors in Maximum Foreseeable Loss walls was 15% [12].
Lustig [13] examined the status of doors and windows in 250 fires in dwellings
in the UK over a period of five years in the 1950s. It was indicated that while
there was not enough information gathered to statistically determine the effects of
open windows and doors on fire development, but specific case histories indicated
that closed doors and windows had a significant effect on fire development. In
three cases, a fire ignited but either burned out or was undetected in a closed room
and did not damage other areas of the residence. In two cases, it was noted that
open doors allowed fire to spread rapidly. In one case, a fire on the first floor of a
dwelling spread upstairs through open doors to two bedrooms, where four people
died. There were two people rescued from a room on the first floor where the door
was closed. Lustig also noted two examples where a closed door prevented early
discovery of the fire.
Ramachandran [14] discussed the status of fire doors in 28 buildings reported to
be equipped with fire doors where large fires occurred during 1965 and 1966 in the
UK. While door position data at the time of fire was only available for 19 of the fires,
it was found that fire doors were open in 5 fires, or 26% of the fires with known door
positions.
A 1970 study by Langdon Thomas and Ramachandran [15] looked at data on
CHAPTER 8. PASSIVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY 194
Occupancy Number of doors observed % propped open
Dwellings 9,887 17
Office buildings 7,055 18
Institutional buildings 15,558 39
Schools 14,102 23
Shops and department stores 3,371 26
Assembly buildings 18,435 5
Factory buildings 22,491 15
Storage buildings 1,010 37
Total 91,909 19
Table 8.1: Frequency of doors observed to be propped open from 1970 UK study [15].
fire doors propped open provided from fire brigade inspection visits in the UK. A
summary of the results of their study is shown in Table 8.1.
8.2.1 Construction leakage
Walls and floors in most occupancies are not sealed air-tight. Klote and Milke [16]
provide typical leakage areas for a variety of commercial building elements includ-
ing doors, walls, and floors. Leakage area ratio values for walls and floors are given
for a range of building construction from loose to tight, which may be used to esti-
mate a distribution for the leakage area.
8.2.2 Door leakage
Doors that are closed are usually not tightly sealed and will allow some passage of
fire gases and fresh air in and out of a fire compartment. Edwards and Wade in-
dicated that leakage rates through doors depend on temperature, time and compo-
nents of the door assembly [17]. AS/NZS 1530.7:1998, does not specify a maximum
leakage rate for smoke control door assemblies, but provides a guideline of 20 to
25 m3/hr maximum leakage rate per door leaf where life safety is the main fire risk
concern, based on information from other countries [18]. Klote and Milke [16] give flow
areas for doors based on gaps and construction. [19]
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Figure 8.2: Estimate of vent flow uncertainty from reported verification data [20]. The mean
and two standard deviation confidence interval of the uncertainty are shown.
8.3 Vent mass flow model uncertainty
As mentioned in Chapter 1, B-RISK includes routines for estimating the flow of fire
products and fresh air through vents. The epistemic uncertainty in the flow through
a vertical vent was estimated from the Steckler verification data [20] previously de-
scribed in Section 5.4.4. In these tests, vent flow through a variable size vertical vent
was measured with a steady state fire of varying size from 32 kW to 158 kW in a
2.8 m x 2.8 m x 2.13 m tall compartment. BRANZFire simulations varied from the
experimentally measured vent flows with a mean of -15% and a standard deviation
of 11%. The estimated model uncertainty in predicting the vent mass flow using the
BRANZFire deterministic two-zone fire physics engine is shown in Figure 8.2.
8.4 Conclusions
This chapter has summarised available data on the probability that vents, specif-
ically doors, are open at the start of a fire. This data can be used as a basis for
estimating the vent openings in B-RISK models. A brief discussion of the uncer-
tainty in the vent mass flow model for B-RISK based on comparison to one set of
experimental data is also included. Chapter 9 discusses a new method for collecting
fire door reliability data.
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CHAPTER 9
DOOR RELIABILITY DATA COLLECTION
9.1 Introduction
As existing data on fire door reliability was sparse, a new method of collecting data
on fire door operation was developed, consisting of a low cost, unobtrusive logging
device capable of collecting several months of door position data. A major disad-
vantage of the existing data on door reliability is that it is typically compiled from
inspection data. This approach provides a “snapshot” of the position of the door in
time but does not provide information on how the position of the door has changed
over time. For example, a door might be propped open at certain times of the day
when it is heavily used. The propensity of occupants to prop open a door might be
seasonally dependent or day-of-week dependent, if the usage of the building varies
over these time periods.
The devices were tested for two conditions: to identify the length of time that
a door might be open during an evacuation, and the probability that a door might
be open at the time a fire occurs. Data for the first condition was collected during
trial evacuations from two university buildings and data for the second condition
was collected over a longer time period of six months in 13 sleeping occupancy
buildings.
Data from the devices may be useful for a variety of stakeholders. Persons de-
veloping building regulations or fire safety practitioners using performance-based
design might use the reliability data to determine the contribution of fire and smoke
doors for reducing the spread of fire and smoke through buildings. Fire door and
198
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door closer manufacturers might be interested in collecting data on their devices to
determine usage patterns. Building managers may be interested in knowing the us-
age patterns of doors in their buildings. Fire safety researchers who examine human
factors in fire may also be interested in data on the use of doors during evacuation
or fire fighting.
9.2 Door position data logger design
The hardware and low-level software design of the door reliability data logging de-
vice went through two major iterations and a third minor update. The first iteration
was developed with the assistance of Mr. Tim Crow for his undergraduate electrical
engineering design project, and subsequent versions were developed with the assis-
tance of Mr. Forrest McKarcher for his electrical engineering professional practical
work requirement. The following sections describe the development of the device.
The schematic for the final version of the devices can be seen in Figure 9.1, and the
layout of the major components in the devices can be seen in Figure 9.2.
9.2.1 Microcontroller
The Texas Instruments MSP430 family of microcontrollers was selected based on
power consumption, price, and ease of programming. The first version of the device
used the Texas Instruments MSP430F2132, which did not have onboard wireless
communications capabilities. Thus, a USB connection was used to download data
directly from the device mounted on the door. This had the disadvantage that a
cable would have to be connected directly to the device on the door, both for initial
setup and calibration and for downloading data at the completion of the test period,
as well as any interim checks to identify if the battery and memory still had sufficient
capacity to continue logging data. Wireless solutions were researched to solve this
problem.
The CC430 was identified as a suitable System on a Chip (SoC) with wireless
communication capabilities while still meeting the cost and power consumption re-
quirements [1]. Subsequent versions used the Texas Instruments CC430F5137 which
has an onboard radio for wireless interfacing. The CC430 has a low power mode
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Figure 9.1: The schematic for the final version of the door position logging device. Note:
The 100kΩ resistors were replaced with 10MΩ resistors to reduce current con-
sumption.
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Button
LED
Battery holder
Header (for programming, 
power supply, and UART)
Expansion header
Compass 
Flash memory
Accelerometer
Microcontroller
Wireless antenna
Figure 9.2: Major components in the final design of the door data logging devices.
that keeps the real time clock active, retains the contents of RAM, and allows inter-
rupts to be monitored, with a power consumption of 2 mA. The allowable supply
voltage ranges from 1.8 V to 3.6 V.
9.2.2 Interface
The logging device mounted directly on the door was set up to communicate wire-
lessly with an RF bridge device at 915 MHz at 250 kbps (kbaud). This RF bridge,
which also utilises the CC430F5137 microcontroller, then communicates to a PC via
the CC430 Universal Asychronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) peripheral and a
FTDI UART to USB converter, as shown in Figure 9.3. The RF bridge to PC con-
nection operates at 460.8 kbps (kbaud). Communication is initiated by pressing a
button on the data logging device which signals the microcontroller to switch from
“normal” mode (or the data logging configuration) to “debug” mode (the communi-
cation configuration. The data logging device is returned to normal mode by either
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USB « UART
915 MHz
Wireless
RF Bridge
Laptop running custom 
terminal application 
over virtual COM port 
(USB)
Figure 9.3: The interface between the fire door position data logging devices and a PC.
Wireless 915 MHz communication is used for communication between the door
mounted devices and an RF bridge device, and a UART to USB connection is
then used to interface with a PC.
a timeout or a command from the PC to disconnect the device. Figure 9.4 shows
how the data logging device software was configured to switch between the normal
and debug mode.
A custom terminal program was written using VB.NET to send and receive in-
formation from the PC to the data logging devices. A screenshot of the program can
be seen in Figure 9.5. The use of a custom terminal program reduced the amount of
time required to setup and download data from the devices. A particular advantage
was the ability to syncronise the real time clock on the devices with a laptop clock
using a single click rather than manually entering the time.
9.2.3 Sensors
Several different types of sensors were considered. The first option was a rotary po-
tentiometer, measuring the door angular rotation using the potentiometer’s variable
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Main
Initialise 
application
Initialise:
  -LED
  -Button
  -Accelerometer
  -Compass
  -Flash
  -RTC
  -USART
Record initial
 date/battery 
condition
Stop watchdog 
timer
Infinite loop Normal mode
Debug mode
Check for 
transmissions 
(8 ms receive 
mode / 592 
ms delay)
On rx request:
-send 
confirmation
Process 
command from 
RF bridge
Command options:
a – check battery voltage
b- get flash usage
c – set RTC time
d – get current RTC time
e – erase flash
f – calibrate accelerometer
g – set compass shut position
h – set compass axes offset 
constant
i – set compass 90° position
j – set mode (normal or debug)
k – get current mode
l – return flash page
m – return multiple flash pages 
n – return compass output (raw 
output and discrete angle)
o – set radio listen interval (ms)
p – disconnect from device
q – connect to device
r – set accelerometer interrupt
s – set accelerometer high g 
interrupt duration
t – return multiple compass 
readings
u – return accelerometer output
v – check battery internal 
resistance
w – reset RAM pointer
x – compass self test
Go to sleep 
(Low Power Mode 3)
Process interrupt:
1. 15 min RTC timer (records 
15 min time stamp)
2. RTC count (gets compass 
measurement at specified 
interval, records if position has 
changed
3. Accelerometer trigger 
(starts fast compass sample 
timer)
4. Fast sample timer (gets 
compass measurement at fast 
interval, records if position has 
changed
5. Fast sample timer repeat
Button interrupt: 
sets mode to 
debug
Timeout: sets 
mode to normal
Once values 
recorded to RAM 
reach the size of 1 
flash page, write to 
flash
Figure 9.4: Software flow for the fire door data logging devices. After the watchdog timer is
switched off and the pins, peripherals, sensors, and memory are initialised, the
device enters normal mode. Debug mode is entered by a button press, and the
device returns to normal mode after a timeout or command from the user.
resistance in a voltage divider. This would have required a fixture to be designed
for the potentiometer at the pivot point of the door, perhaps mounted on one of the
door hinges. A second option was a capacitive distance measuring sensor, which
would have required two plates mounted on the door and frame to measure the
change in capacitance as the plates moved away from each other. Other proximity
sensors such as optical sensors or ultrasonic sensors could be used but the signal
could get blocked by interfering objects. Gyrometers, which measure rate of rota-
tion, could have been used by integrating the rate of rotation over time. This option
was discarded due to the potential for cumulative integration errors over time. Mag-
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Figure 9.5: Custom terminal program written to send commands to and receive data from
the door position logging devices.
netometers used as a compass to measure the door’s angular position relative to the
geomagnetic field were the option selected. The advantage of the magnetometer
approach was that the sensor could be mounted anywhere on the door, and did not
require an additional fixture on the door frame or adjacent wall. Also the orienta-
tion measured by the magnetometer or compass was independent of time, although
a potential disadvantage was erroneous readings due to nearby objects influencing
the magnetic field.
Investigation into the cost of the sensors found that the price of surface mount
electronic magnetometers was reasonable, likely due to their widespread use in
smart phones, tablets, and navigational devices. The magnetometer or compass
selected was the Honeywell HMC5883L, a 3 axis magnetometer with I2C interface
capabilities, low power consumption, and low cost [2]. The HMC5883L has a reso-
lution of one to two degrees of rotation, depending on the strength and orientation
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of the geomagnetic field at the location where measurement is taking place. It takes
200 ms to turn on and be ready for I2C commands, and a further 6 ms to be able to
send data. A data ready interrupt pin can be monitored to ensure that data is sent as
soon as the device is ready. The device draws approximately 100 mA in measurement
mode, and operates with a supply voltage down to a minimum of 2.16 V.
To optimize memory and power requirements, the BMA250 3 axis accelerome-
ter from Bosch was selected, which could be used in a motion sensing configuration
to allow the rest of the circuitry to remain at idle while the door was stationary [3].
The resolution of the BMA250 on the minimium scale setting of 2g (2 times the accel-
eration due to gravity) is 256 bits/g, or 0.038 m/s2. The accelerometer can operate
on a wide voltage range from 1.62 V to 3.6 V, and uses 7 mA in low-power mode with
a sleep duration of 25 ms (time between samples) using unfiltered data. It can be
operated in a dedicated mode that does not require any microcontroller interaction
while still maintaining the interrupt engine.
The accelerometer has a variety of interrupt-trigger modes; the slope detect
and high g-force two were evaluated for indicating door motion. The threshold,
duration, and axes utilized for both modes could be be set by the user. The slope
detection method triggered the interrupt when the change in acceleration exceeded
a user-defined threshold for a user-defined duration. The high g-force method trig-
gered the interrupt when the magnitude of the acceleration exceeded a user-defined
threshold for a user-defined duration. Both methods were used on the z axis of the
accelerometer.
Unfortunately, it was found that the accelerometer interrupt provided exces-
sive spurious signals unless the low pass filter was set to 8 Hz. To acquire enough
signals to filter the data to 8 Hz required the accelerometer to be on for 64 ms for each
slope calculation, which caused the current consumption to increase above 100 mA,
which meant that the accelerometer was using more power than the compass for
measurement. However, the accelerometer is still useful when using the devices for
evacuation position logging where increased time resolution is desired.
The accelerometer and magnetometer were oriented to produce x, y, and z
output as shown in Figure 9.6. The ground plane was removed from the back side of
the board in the magnetometer location as recommended in the compass datasheet.
The magnetometer was also located on a corner of the board as far away from other
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Compass 
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Figure 9.6: Orientation of the compass and accelerometer axes.
components (particularly the battery) as possible to reduce circuit electromagnetic
and component ferromagnetic effects on the measured magnetic field.
9.2.4 Memory
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM) and flash mem-
ory were evaluated for use in the data logging device. While EEPROM memory
used less current for reading and writing, the flash memory was cheaper and avail-
able in larger capacities. A 4 Mbit flash memory chip (Atmel AT25DF041A) was
chosen based on the expected memory requirements for the project [4]. Of the com-
ponents selected, the flash memory has the greatest supply voltage limitation, with
a range of 2.3 V to 3.6 V. The flash uses a maximum of 10 mA to read data and 18 mA
to write data.
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9.2.5 Power source
To keep the size, weight, and cost of the door logging device down, a CR2032 pri-
mary lithium ion “coin” battery (typically used for watches and other small elec-
tronic devices) was selected. The CR2032 met the requirement of a nominal 3 V
supply required by the electronic components, and could supply approximately
180mAh of current before dropping below the minimum voltage of 2.3 V required
by the flash memory. The device board has additional through-hole connections to
add another CR2032 or CR2450 (620 mAh capacity) battery holder in parallel. The
enclosure is also big enough to fit one of these additional batteries. However, it
should be noted that the presence of the additional battery will offset the compass
measurements because of their proximity to the compass.
9.2.6 Enclosure
A plastic ABS box produced by Hammond Manufacturing was selected for the de-
vice enclosure. The dimensions of the box, 40 mm x 80 mm x 20 mm, were adequate
to house the device while being small enough to be unobtrusive and lightweight
enough to be easily supported by the adhesive poster strips discussed below. Em-
bossments for printed circuit board mounting screws were designed into the box.
The box was also inexpensive since it is mass produced.
9.2.7 Fastening system
A fastening system that would secure the device to doors adequately but not per-
manently damage or alter the doors was required. The fastener had to support the
weight of the device which was 40 g, including battery. 3M CommandBrand poster
strips were tested and found satisfactory.
9.3 Data logger cost breakdown
Table 9.1 includes the purchase cost of the components at the time of purchase in
early 2012 for quantities of 1 and 100. Significant cost savings per unit were realised
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Description NZD (per device) NZD (per device, 100 qty)
Passive Components $ 4.59 $ 2.72
CR2032 coin cell holder $ 0.85 $ 0.74
P-channel mosfet $ 1.20 $ 0.88
26MHz crystal $ 0.91 $ 0.58
32768Hz crystal $ 0.95 $ 0.62
5.6nH +/- 0.3nH inductor 0603 $ 0.18 $ 0.16
12nH inductor 0603 $ 0.09 $ 0.08
896MHz balun $ 1.48 $ 0.99
915MHz chip antenna $ 1.63 $ 1.08
Schottky diode SOD-123 $ 0.97 $ 0.34
Red LED 0805 $ 0.27 $ 0.15
Pushbutton $ 0.55 $ 0.31
Compass $ 5.05 $ 2.72
Microcontroller + radio $ 8.99 $ 7.21
Accelerometer $ 4.72 $ 4.42
4mbit 2.3v SPI flash $ 1.57 $ 1.19
Casing, grey, 80x40x20mm $ 3.46 $ 2.33
Casing screws $ 0.20 $ 0.11
CR2032 cell $ 0.37 $ 0.32
6-pin single row header $ 0.72 $ 0.24
Total $ 38.75 $ 27.19
Table 9.1: Cost breakdown of components used for the door position logging devices. Com-
ponents purchased from Digikey.
by building over 100 units. Further discounts were available for larger quantities
but the scope and budget of the project would not allow expanded production. The
boards were custom manufactured in China at a cost of 174USD for 13 panels of
8 boards (a total of 104 devices) [5]. The boards are shown in Figure 9.7. A solder
stencil was also sourced from China for 165USD, which was used to apply solder
paste to the boards as shown in Figure 9.8. Assembly was completed by the author
and Forrest McKarcher over a period of approximately one week. A pick-n-place
machine was used to place surface mount components which were then soldered
with a reflow oven. Through-hole components were hand soldered.
Other assorted expenditures included approximately 100NZD for solder paste,
20NZD for a FTDI USB to UART converter, and labels. An electrical engineering
undergraduate student (Forrest McKarcher) was employed from November 2011 to
February 2012 to design the hardware layout and the code for the radio and interface
from the microcontroller to the sensors, memory, and PC which cost approximately
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Figure 9.7: Panel of 8 boards as received from the manufacturer in China.
8,000NZD.
9.4 Current testing
Tests were conducted to estimate the amount of power the devices would use during
testing. A resistor was placed in series with a data logging device. By measuring the
voltage across the resistor, the current through the resistor (and therefore the device)
could be calculated by using Ohm’s Law:
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Figure 9.8: Solder stencil used to apply solder paste to boards.
CHAPTER 9. DOOR RELIABILITY DATA COLLECTION 211
V = IR (9.1)
470 Ω and 10 Ω resistors were sufficent to create a measureable voltage drop
across the resistor while maintaining sufficient supply voltage to the device for the
normal and debug modes, respectively. The voltage was measured as a function of
time with an oscilloscope. Figures 9.9 and 9.10 show the oscilloscope trace for the
normal and debug modes, respectively. Excel charts with scales and linear approxi-
mations of the signal are overlaid on these figures. The linear approximations were
used to integrate the current (calculated from Ohm’s Law) over time.
When the device is in low power mode between compass readings in normal
mode and radio intervals in debug mode, the devices use approximately 10 mA. Dur-
ing compass readings, the current spikes to 870 mA and decays over approximately
120 ms. With the compass reading interval set at 2 s, compass readings add approx-
imately 15 mA to the average current. During radio intervals in debug mode, the
current spikes up to 18 mA over 10 ms, adding 180 mA to the average current if the
sleep time between radio polls is 600 ms and the radio polls are 4 ms long, which
is the default setting. Shorter sleep times can be set if a faster response is desirable,
for example when reading multiple flash pages, with a corresponding increase in
power consumption.
At 27 mA average current draw, the devices will last for approximately nine months,
not including flash page writes and wireless connections. If the battery voltage is
too low to support radio operation when data is collected, a 3 V power supply such
as an external battery pack can be connected to the programming/UART header to
boost the power supply without losing data stored to RAM.
9.5 Internal resistance measurement
Batteries have an internal resistance comprised of electronic and ionic components [6].
The electronic component is used to describe the resistivity of all of the physical bat-
tery components; the ionic component describes the resistance for electrons to flow
from one electrode to the other through the electrolyte. For a given battery con-
figuration, the ionic component is a function of load, temperature, and remaining
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Figure 9.9: Voltage trace during normal mode operation.
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Figure 9.10: Voltage trace during debug mode operation.
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capacity. The internal resistance decreases the voltage available to run connected
circuit loads such as the door position logging devices. As the internal resistance
is a function of remaining capacity, it was useful to calculate it to determine if the
batteries running the door position logging devices exceeded their useful life. The
devices were run at approximately constant temperature in indoor environments,
so the change in internal resistance due to temperature changes was neglected.
Internal resistance can be approximated by measuring the voltage with a base
load, applying an additional known current load, and measuring the change in volt-
age. The LED on the door position logging devices provided a convenient load on
the devices which could be switched on and off and estimated. The battery internal
resistance was estimated by dividing the change in voltage ∆VLED when switching
the LED on by the calculated current across the LED ILED.
Current through the LED was calculated using the forward current character-
istic obtained from the datasheet [7]. A fourth order polynomial shown in Figure 9.11
was used to interpolate the forward current as a function of forward voltage Vf . The
supply Vs voltage for a given LED current was calculated by adding the voltage
across the 150 Ω resistor in series with the LED to the LED forward voltage for that
current.
Typically, the internal resistance of CR2032 coin cells slowly increases from
approximately 10 Ω to 15 Ω over the first 100 mAh of capacity used, and then begins
rising rapidly [8]. The 18 mA pulse during debug mode will cause a reduction in
supply voltage of approximately .5 V once the battery internal resistance reaches
30 Ω, at which point the supply voltage may drop below the minimum of 2.3 V
required for accessing the flash. The trend in calculated battery internal resistance
and LED off voltage for four devices over a period of approximately nine months is
shown in Figure 9.13.
As expected, the battery internal resistance was still below the 30 Ω after nine
months of operation, although it had begun rising rapidly. Also, the battery internal
resistance was a better measure of remaining battery capacity than battery voltage
because internal resistance gradually increased as the battery was being consumed,
unlike the voltage which remained essentially constant until the battery reached the
end of its life.
The devices may run in normal mode up to much higher battery internal re-
sistance because the maximum current is approximately 0.9 mA for a shorter time.
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Figure 9.11: Forward current as a function of forward voltage for the LED, obtained from
the datasheet [7].
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Figure 9.13: The battery voltage and internal resistance characteristics for four devices over
an operational period of approximately nine months.
A 3 V regulated USB power supply was used to boost the supply voltage to transfer
data if the battery was too weak to access the flash with the radio active, which was
the scenario with maximum current draw.
9.6 Magnetometer testing
As previously stated, magnetometer output can be influenced by nearby objects
such as ferromagnetic material or electronic equipment. Typical effects have been
described as “hard iron” where a constant magnetic field is added to the geomag-
netic field by a proximal ferromagnetic material and “soft iron” where a nearby
magnetic material distorts the geomagnetic field [9]. Hard and soft iron effects are ob-
served in magnetometer output by a shift or distortion, respectively. Seven of the de-
vices were randomly selected and tested on the E329 door of the Civil/Mechanical
Engineering Building at the University of Canterbury in the positions shown in Fig-
ure 9.14. Device 60 was tested with single and dual battery configurations to char-
acterise the effect of a battery adjacent to the compass, shown in Figure 9.16. The
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battery was noted to shift the magnetic field measured in both the x and z directions.
A function to offset individual magnetometer axis output by a constant amount for
the angle calculation was added to compensate for this behaviour.
The magnetic field measured at each device location on the door was stable
with time but it varied between locations on the door. As a result, a calibration pro-
cedure was developed where ten compass samples were taken from the door fully
closed position to the fully open position before and after data collection. Mounting
positions near the hinge were observed to provide a more consistent magnetic field,
represented by a monotonically changing elliptical output from the magnetometers
over the door travel path, likely due to the reduced travel of the magnetometer
relative to magnetic field affecting objects nearby. As the optimal position for ac-
celerometer output was as far from the hinge as possible to amplify the acceleration
of the device, balancing the location to provide acceptable output from the two sen-
sors was difficult.
9.7 Magnetometer angle calculation
The measured x, y, and z components of the magnetic field are shown graphically in
Figure 9.17. Assuming the magnetic field remains constant as the compass rotates in
the x-z plane, the y component remains constant and the measured x and z values
reflect the angle of the door to the magnetic field. As directly recording the raw data
was memory intensive, 16 discrete door opening angles were calculated to reduce
the memory requirement for each door position to four bits. Three options were
evaluated for measuring the change in door angle ∆θ which is equal to the differ-
ence of the door angle to the magnetic field at an open position θm,2 and the closed
position θm,1. An approach described in a Honeywell application note [10] calculates
the angle Θ at each position as follows:
∆θ = tan−1
mx,2
mz,2
− tan−1mx,1
mz,1
(9.2)
However this method provides negative output for clockwise door motion,
and some logic would be required to handle angles passing 360o. This method
would not be able to handle the complex magnetic field behaviour noted when the
devices were mounted away from the hinge on the E329 door.
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Figure 9.14: Magnetometer output testing on E329 door; device numbers are shown.
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Figure 9.15: Magnetometer raw output for devices 4, 8, 44, 57, 65, and 68 when mounted on
door E329.
A method that would be able to handle complex magnetic field behaviour
would be to use a lookup table calibrated for specific door positions. However, this
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Figure 9.16: Magnetometer raw output for device 60, mounted on E329 with single and dual
battery configurations. The close proximity of the second battery to the mag-
netometer shifted the output of the x and z axes (an example of a hard iron
effect).
approach would require a more accurate calibration procedure which would not be
time efficient.
The third method considered was to use the dot product of the measured mag-
netic field vectors to calculate the angle as follows:
∆Θ = cos−1
m1 •m2
|m1| |m2| (9.3)
which had the advantage over the tangent method of always providing a pos-
itive angle from the reference vector (in this case, corresponding to the door shut
position). A discrete door angle data point was obtained by dividing the calcu-
lated angle by the angle calculated for a fully open door (90o), resulting in 16 data
points from 0o (door shut, position 0) to 90o (door fully open, position 15). Any door
opening angle past 90o was recorded as 90o. This method was selected for the final
design.
When the devices were initially installed on a door, positive and negative
magnetometer self tests were run. The self test imposed an internally generated
magnetic field on each axis and recorded the change in output which indicated
if the magnetometer was operating properly, as described in the magnetometer
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Figure 9.17: Conversion of compass raw output to angle. The compass provides x, y, and
z magnetic field magnitude output, which can be converted into an angle by a
variety of means.
datasheet [2]. An initial test sequence was subsequently conducted by recording 10
data points through the range of motion of the door. To improve the accuracy of
the angle calculation by compensating for hard iron effects, a circle was fit to this
data using the least squares method described by Bullock [11]. The output was then
shifted so the output was centered at zero for both x and z axes, as shown in Fig-
ure 9.18. A second set of 10 data points was then taken to establish the calibrated
output of the magnetometer. Soft iron effects were evaluated by considering the fit
of the circle and the shifted output compared to radial lines drawn in 10o increments
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to 90o in both directions. After data collection, a final set of data points was taken
over the full door motion to determine if the magnetometer output had remained
stable over the data collection period.
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Figure 9.18: Magnetometer field calibration procedure. A circle was fit to raw magnetome-
ter output with the least squares method described by Bullock [11]. The center of
the circle is marked on the figure with an X. The magnetometer output was then
shifted to center the circle on the origin. Lines incremented by 10o radially from
the door closed measurement to 90o in both directions were plotted to identify
if soft iron effects were significant. Note: the calibration performed after data
collection did not start at 0 as the door was kept slightly ajar to prevent locking
the author in the stairwell.
To conserve memory, door position data was only recorded if the measured po-
sition of the door changed. It was observed that if the door was in a position where
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the measured magnetic field was near the transition between two calculated discrete
angles additional “noise” data points were recorded, as shown in Figure 9.19. To ad-
dress this issue, the door position was calculated in 32 increments and only recorded
if it changed by an absolute increment of greater than 1. The value recorded was
then the calculated position divided by 2.
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Figure 9.19: Noise observed in door position recorded data. For this data, angles of 4 and 5
represented a fully open door for devices 1 and 2, respectively.
9.8 Data storage
In order to compress the data storage requirements for each recorded sample, three
data types were used: position data, 15 minute time recordings, and daily time
recordings. Each data point was limited to a 16 bit word. Two bits were used to
indicate the type of data stored. For the position data, 4 bits were consumed with
the door position. The remaining 10 bits were used for a time stamp with one sec-
ond resolution. If a sample was taken in the preceding 15 minutes, a 15 minute
time stamp was recorded to indicate that the preceeding values had been recorded
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during that 15 minute interval of the day. At midnight the day and month were
recorded, followed by a 12 bit battery voltage reading. The data storage scheme for
all the above types of data except the battery voltage reading are shown graphically
in Figure 9.20.
The 4 Mbit flash memory was split into 2,048 256 byte (128 word) pages. The
first page was reserved for storing the total number of flash pages used and other
calibration data if required, leaving 2,047 pages capable of storing 128 words each,
or 262,016 potential data points. Based on 180 days of testing per device, 360 data
points are consumed with midnight and battery data storage. Assuming 100% of
the 15 minute intervals were recorded, another 17,280 data points were required,
leaving 244,376 points for door position data, or a maximum average of 1,357 door
position data points per day. Assuming that the average door opening event took
6 s or consumed an average of three data points, an average of 450 door movement
events per day could be captured using the devices over the 180 day testing period.
As the flash memory was non-volatile, the maximum amount of data that
could be lost in the event of a power disruption or microcontroller reset was the
contents of the RAM, a maximum of 128 data points if the RAM was completely
full. A microcontroller reset could be identified in the data because the first flash
page recorded after a reset would have the reset date (January 1, 2000) recorded as
the first value.
9.9 Real time clock drift correction
The 32.768 kHz crystal oscillators specified have a frequency tolerance of ±20 ppm
at 25oC, which corresponds to a microcontroller clock accuracy of ±2 s per day, or
±6 minutes over the intended 6 month data acquisition period. The crystal has a
minimum temperature frequency coefficient β of -.04ppm/T2, so a change of 10oC
can cause the frequency to change by approximately 4 ppm [12]. The interior ambi-
ent temperature in the buildings monitored would not be expected to vary by more
than 10oC to 30oC. The laptop clock was synchronised with the NIST Internet Time
Service time.nist.gov, and the device clock was initially synchronised with the lap-
top time at to. The time drift of device 74 was tracked over 45 days while installed
on the E329 door, shown in Figure 9.21.
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Figure 9.20: Data storage scheme for door position, 15 minute, and month/day data types.
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Figure 9.21: The time drift measured for device 74 when mounted on E329 over a period of
45 days.
The temperature in E329 was not tracked during this time, but it was noted to
fluctuate as expected in a typical office environment. The time drift remained es-
sentially linear during the measurement period, so the time drift during field data
collection was assumed to be linear as well as only two points were recorded, prior
and after data collection. When data was collected at tr, the clock error t was esti-
mated by the following equation:
t =
tdevice,r − to
tlaptop,r − to (9.4)
Sample times were then corrected with the following equation:
tsample,corrected =
tsample,recorded − to
1− t + to (9.5)
9.10 Future improvements
As previously noted, the accelerometer does not provide a reduction in power con-
sumption for long term data collection where high time resolution is not required.
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The accelerometer could be removed for a cost savings, or a mechanical low pass
filter mounting system could be designed to get more use out of the accelerometer.
At the time of writing it took approximately 10 minutes to transfer the full flash
memory to a PC when running the RF bridge at 12 MHz, the UART at 460.8 kbps
and with a 100 ms radio poll sleep time. This was improved from approximately
1 hour when running the RF bridge at the standard 1 MHz frequency which limited
the UART transmission rate to 115.2 kbps and a 600 ms radio poll sleep time. The
transmission protocol could be optimised to reduce flash data transfer. Clocking the
door mounted device and flash SPI connection up may also reduce the flash read
time.
When reading over 500 pages of flash memory, pages would occasionally fail
to transit. An improved data transmission protocol with error checking could be
implemented to improve the reliability of data downloading from the devices.
The expansion header installed on the devices allows additional sensors to
be connected. Data on other types of passive compartmentalisation features, such
as position of windows, could be collected by adding a different type of sensor.
Hinged window position could be logged with the devices in their current hardware
configuration; awning (hinged on top) window position could be logged with the
accelerometer and casement (hinged on the side) window position could be logged
with the compass. Logging the position of sliding windows would require a method
of measuring distance such as a linear displacement or ultrasonic distance sensor.
9.11 Door reliability data collection
9.11.1 Trial evacuation data collection
During evacuations, doors will be open while occupants pass through them. While
this dissertation does not focus on human behaviour, the spread of fire products may
be affected by doors opened by egressing occupants. Boyce et al. has collected data
on the time it takes for people to negotiate doors with a door closing force ranging
from 21 N to 70 N at levels of disablement ranging from no aids to walking frames
required, in both push and pull directions [13]. The mean negotiation time ranged
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Door Hold open Width Half Effective Opening force:
description device (mm) width (mm) width (mm) Left (N) Right (N)
Back E11 No 800 N/A 500 22 N/A
Level 3 Yes 900 N/A 600 18 N/A
Comp. lab No 1500 750 1200 67 54
near E11 No 1700 850 1400 45 156
Outside (Civ/Mec) No 1800 900 1500 31 31
EPS Library No 1800 900 1500 45 45
Glade doors to Civ/Mec No No data
Covered Walkway doors No No data
Table 9.2: Doors monitored during Civil/Mechanical and EPS library trial evacuations.
from 3 s for people requiring no aid at a closing force of 21 N for a push door to 9 s
for people with a walking frame and a pull door with a closing force of 60 N. C/VM2
specifies that modelled door opening times shall be 3 s per occupant in low occupant
density conditions and the queuing time in high occupant density conditions when
queuing is expected [14]. Data on door opening times during trial evacuations of the
Civil/Mechanical Engineering and Engineering and Physical Sciences (EPS) Library
buildings was collected by video to evaluate the egress door opening times specified
in C/VM2. During the Civil/Mechanical Engineering building evacuation, the door
position data loggers were used simultaneously with video recordings to verify the
operation of the devices.
The doors selected for monitoring included a range of widths, leaf configura-
tions, hold open devices, and locations. Table 9.2 lists the characteristics of the doors
monitored by video during the evacuation. For two of the doors, no egress traffic
was observed. Door opening forces were measured at the initial point of opening
by a spring scale.
The door position measured by the logging devices successfully corresponded
with the video recorded data. Typical data for single and multiple occupants evac-
uating is shown in Figure 9.22. It was noted during the time that the devices were
mounted on the door that some individuals noticed their presence and some devices
showed evidence that they had been removed and replaced on the door. If the de-
vices were not replaced in the same orientation as originally mounted, the recorded
data was adversely affected. As a result, a “DO NOT REMOVE” label and a sec-
ond label with directions to contact the author and contact information were affixed
to the front and rear of the devices, respectively. Also, magnetometer calibrations
from before and after data collection were compared, and the mounting positions
were photographed to determine if the devices had been moved during the data
collection period.
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Figure 9.22: Typical evacuation door position data, showing the door changing position as
multiple occupants in a single queue and a single occupant exit the University
of Canterbury Civil/Mechanical Engineering Building.
A histogram of the times recorded to the nearest second for door negotiation
by single occupants (the time between the door states of being completely closed) is
shown in Figure 9.23. Door negotiation times ranged from 3 s to 7 s for the 17 in-
stances where a single person passing through a door was observed.
There were 15 instances where more than two people were observed exiting in
a continuous stream. The maximum number of people in one stream was 37. There
were 12 instances of continuous streams of people egressing at locations where dou-
ble door leaves were available, but in only five instances were both leaves used. In
one instance where both leaves were used, one of the egressing persons used an ob-
ject to block one of the leaves open. Building staff were observed holding double
leaves open to facilitate egress, but they were the last occupants leaving so it did not
affect the egress. However, this behaviour did result in open doors for a longer du-
ration. In the computer lab, several occupants were noted entering the room in the
opposite direction of the egress path, presumably to retrieve personal belongings.
The queuing time was calculated using the method described in C/VM2 [14]:
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Figure 9.23: Measured door negotiation time for single persons in a trial evacuation of the
University of Canterbury Civil/Mechanical Engineering Building.
Fc = (1− a ·D)k ·D ·We (9.6)
Where Fc is the specific flow in persons/s, a and k are determined from the ta-
ble listed in C/VM2, D is the occupant density (C/VM2 recommends 1.9 persons/m2
near door restrictions), and We is the effective width of the door (two boundary lay-
ers of 0.15 m subtracted from the width of the door opening, as recommended in
C/VM2). The measured times were compared to the calculated queuing time and
also the three seconds per occupant assumption, shown in Figure 9.24. The actual
times were found to lie between the two methods for the majority of cases; the queu-
ing time calculation was not conservative and estimated times were shorter than
measured and using three seconds per occupant was conservative with times esti-
mated to be longer than measured. The likely cause was that since the occupants
were not truly “queued” and were moving in a steady stream, yet travelling close
enough that the door was not allowed to completely close in between occupants
negotiating the door.
This information may be useful for future versions of BRISK if an evacuation
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Figure 9.24: Comparison of measured door negotiation time for multiple occupants to queu-
ing time calculation and three seconds per occupant in a trial evacuation of the
University of Canterbury Civil/Mechanical Engineering Building.
model is integrated.
9.11.2 Long term door reliability data collection
9.11.2.1 Building and door selection
In New Zealand, building inspections are completed as part of the annual Build-
ing Warrant of Fitness requirements by an Independently Qualified Person (IQP) or
Licensed Building Practitioner (LBP) [15]. The requirements for inspection of speci-
fied systems including those that relate to means of escape from fire are set out in a
document known as a Compliance Schedule. Specified systems for escape from fire
include electromagnetic or automatic doors or windows [16].
Doors were identified for monitoring through the assistance of Fire Fighting
Pacific, a company based in Christchurch that designs, installs, and services fire
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Type of building Number of buildings Number of door leaves
Hotel/backpackers 6 32
Apartment/condo 2 5
Boarding house/dorm 2 7
Rest home 3 8
Total 13 52
Table 9.3: A summary of the building types and number of doors studied.
protection systems, and also provides inspection services for Building Warrant of
Fitness purposes. The scope of the study was limited to buildings with sleeping oc-
cupancy, because open doors are most likely to have an adverse effect on life safety
for sleeping people. Doors were selected in buildings in the Christchurch and North
Canterbury areas. A list of the building types and number of door leaves monitored
in each type of building is shown in Table 9.3.
The selected doors were 0.8 m to 1.0 m wide hinged fire or smoke control doors
that formed part of the shared means of escape for the buildings; single household
unit doors were not included. Of the doors considered, nine had fire door signage,
ten had smoke control door signage, and 33 did not have visible signage indicating
the type of door. With the exception of two doors, doors with self-closers only (no
approved hold-open devices) were selected because the door logging devices could
not differentiate whether the hold-open device was operating properly or not. This
does not mean that hold-open devices do not fail. Anecdotal evidence from Fire
Fighting Pacific indicated that doors with hold-open devices had been observed to
fail due to lifted carpets or objects placed in the path of the door swing. It is also
possible for a hold-open device to fail due to a malfunctioning detection system.
During the door selection process it was noted that the majority of shared means of
escape doors in sleeping occupancies in the Fire Fighting Pacific building population
did have approved hold-open devices, limiting the potential population of doors for
the study. Two doors with hold-open devices were included for comparison.
Door failures were noted during the deployment of the devices; four examples
are shown in Figure 9.25. The majority of the failures were propped open doors;
additionally, a single door was found with a disconnected closer. It was noted anec-
dotally that double sets of doors such as shown in Figure 9.25(b) were propped open
as readily as single doors.
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(a) Propped open (b) Wedged open x 2
(c) Propped open (d) Disconnected closer
Figure 9.25: Door failures noted during door study.
9.11.2.2 Results
To distill the 16 position door output data into a single summary figure for the prob-
ability that a door was open at any time, the time that each door was positioned
at the “2” or greater position was summed and divided by the total data collection
time. The probability distribution for the fraction of time that a door was open is
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shown in Figure 9.26. The best-fit distribution was an Inverse Gaussian with mean
µ = 0.104 and shape factor λ = 0.0117. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov value for this dis-
tribution was 0.118. This distribution was highly skewed to the left, indicating that
the majority of doors were closed most of the time with a few that were propped
open for large periods of time. The probability for each individual door to be at
each position is shown in Appendix C.
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Figure 9.26: The overall probability of a door being open from the 52 door sample, collected
over six months.
Summary statistics for door reliability for each type of building and the total
population are shown in Table 9.4. Doors in the rest homes had the highest reliability
and the least uncertainty, followed by the hotel/backpackers, apartment/condos,
and boarding house/dormitories.
The collected data was split into nominal working hours from 0800 h to 1700 h
and non-working hours from 1701 h to 759 h to determine if there was an effect on
the probability that a door was open or closed, shown in Table 9.5. There was a
higher probability that a door was closed in the hotel/backpackers occupancy dur-
ing non-working hours. A likely cause for this change was the use of the doors by
cleaning staff during working hours. Otherwise, there was very little difference be-
CHAPTER 9. DOOR RELIABILITY DATA COLLECTION 234
Type of building Mean St. dev.
Rest home 0.95 0.05
Hotel/backpackers 0.90 0.16
Apartment/condo 0.86 0.30
Boarding house/dorm 0.85 0.32
Total 0.90 0.19
Table 9.4: Summary statistics for the overall door reliability for the 52 door sample.
tween working and non-working hours. The probability that each individual door
was closed at each hour of day is shown in Appendix C.
0800 to 1700 1701 to 0759
Type of building Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Rest home 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05
Hotel/backpackers 0.88 0.17 0.91 0.15
Apartment/condo 0.86 0.30 0.86 0.30
Boarding house/dorm 0.85 0.32 0.85 0.32
Total 0.89 0.20 0.90 0.19
Table 9.5: Summary statistics comparing working and non-working hours for the 52 door
sample.
The data was also split into weekend days and weekdays, shown in Table 9.6.
Again, there was very little difference other than a slight increase in the probability
that doors were closed for the hotel/backpackers building type during the week,
which likely reflects a lower usage of these types of buildings on weekdays.
Weekend Weekday
Type of building Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Rest home 0.95 0.06 0.95 0.05
Hotel/backpackers 0.89 0.16 0.90 0.16
Apartment/condo 0.86 0.30 0.86 0.30
Boarding house/dorm 0.85 0.33 0.85 0.32
Total 0.89 0.19 0.90 0.19
Table 9.6: Summary statistics comparing weekend and weekday probabilities that doors
were closed for the 52 door sample.
The probability that the 52 doors were closed was found to be higher than the
1970 UK study [17] discussed in Chapter 8, which found 17% of dwelling doors (com-
pare to probability of 0.86 for doors in apartment/condo buildings in this study to be
closed), 23% of school doors (compare to 0.85 probability for boarding house/dorm
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Figure 9.27: The mean number of times that doors were opened by open/close time interval.
doors to be closed in this study), and 39% of institutional doors (compare to 0.95
probability for rest home doors to be closed in this study) to be propped open.
The mean number of times that doors were opened for specified time intervals
and the cumulative amount of time that the door was open when opened for those
specific time intervals are shown in Figs 9.27 and 9.28, respectively. The total num-
ber of times that doors were opened ranged from 74 to 51,760 over the test period.
While doors were opened and closed within short periods of time much more fre-
quently, longer door-open times contributed more to the total amount of time that
the doors were open. This shows that normal use of the doors where they are open
for short periods of time did not have a large impact on the overall performance of
the doors. All of the occupancies had doors that were left open for longer than one
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Figure 9.28: The mean cumulative time that doors were left open when cycled from open to
closed for the specified intervals of time.
day with the exception of the apartment/condo buildings, which may be a result of
the emphasis for overnight security in these buildings.
The influence of a form of the “Hawthorne Effect” can not be ruled out on the
results. The Hawthorne Effect describes the potential for human behaviour to be
influenced by the fact that a certain aspect is given attention, first attributed after
1920s studies on worker productivity under varying lighting conditions conducted
in the Western Electric Hawthorne Plant located in Illinois [18].
In this case, the building owners or managers had to be notified that the door
position logging devices were being placed in their buildings. This could have in-
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fluenced their behaviour in different ways: they may have been made more aware
of the need to keep fire doors closed by the fact that the study was being conducted
and thus adjusted their behaviour based on this change in knowledge, the presence
of the devices may have been a reminder to the building occupants to close the door
if they happened to observe a device when passing through a door, or they may
have wanted to demonstrate that their building was meeting fire safety objectives
by adjusting their behaviour and keeping the doors closed.
This effect could also be present for “snap-shot” inspection type data collection
if any of the building occupants received information that an inspection was taking
place prior to the inspection. A way to avoid this issue for future data collection
would be to embed the devices in fire doors so they are not visible when they are
installed and monitor the position over the lifetime of the doors. It is unknown if
there would be any legal implications of tracking door position without notifying
the building personnel. It might have to be written into the building regulations or
compliance schedule requirements to be successfully implemented.
9.12 Conclusions
A new method of collecting data on passive building elements has been developed
which leverages inexpensive modern microcontroller and sensor technology. Use of
the new method has been demonstrated for short term building evacuation and long
term reliability data collection. The evacuation data showed that door negotiation
times for single occupants ranged from 3 to 7 s. For multiple occupants using a
door, the negotiation times were found to be between the values calculated using
the C/VM2 queuing time method and 3 s per occupant.
Long term door reliability data for hinged doors with self-closers but no mag-
netic hold open devices was reported for 52 doors in four types of buildings includ-
ing rest homes, hotels/backpackers, apartments/condos, and boarding houses/dorms.
Door reliability was found to be skewed, with the majority of doors closed most of
the time and a few doors open for long periods of time. The average door reliability
was found to be higher than observed in a 1970 UK study, discussed in Chapter 8.
Rest home doors were found to be closed most often followed sequentially
by hotel/backpackers, apartment/condo, and boarding house/dorm doors. Other
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than for hotel/backpacker building types, there was negligible difference between
working hours and non-working hours and between weekends and weekdays.
It is not possible to determine if the building occupants’ behaviour was influ-
enced by the study itself. Future data collection would have to be undertaken with-
out the knowledge of the building occupants to eliminate this source of uncertainty
in the validity of the data.
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CHAPTER 10
SMOKE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
10.1 Introduction
Smoke spread in buildings during a fire is a major hazard to life safety. Fatalities
can occur in areas of the building far removed from the actual fire, as observed in
the November 21, 1980 MGM Grand fire [1] in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA and Octo-
ber 17, 2003 Cook County Administration Building fire [2] in Chicago, Illinois, USA.
In the MGM Grand fire, direct fire damage was reported to be limited to the first
2 floors, yet 61 of the 85 fatalities occurred on floors 16 and above. In the Cook
County fire, six people died in a locked stairwell well above the fire on the 12th
floor of the 36 storey building. Smoke management systems take one or both of two
approaches: remove smoke from a space or prevent smoke from entering a space.
Smoke extract systems are an example of the first type; stairwell (safe path) pres-
surisation systems are an example of the second. Zone smoke control systems can
combine both approaches; pressurising uncontaminated areas and extracting smoke
from contaminated areas.
It was noted by the assessment reviewer in the first SME determination (dis-
cussed later in Chapter 11) that “the pressurisation system is the key component in this
building in achieving fire safety”, even though the fire risk in that building was shown
to be more sensitive to the sprinkler system effectiveness.
The systems discussed in this chapter consist of mechanical ventilation, either
pressurising or extracting smoke from a space, and either activated by a smoke de-
tector or manually activated. Uncertainty in system reliability and B-RISK’s tools to
241
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model the operation of smoke management systems are discussed. While a smoke
control system could be activated by any type of smoke or heat detector, discussions
in this chapter will be limited to smoke detectors. For activation by a heat detector,
the methods discussed in Chapter 5 are applicable with appropriate inputs.
10.2 Smoke management system effectiveness data
Relative to sprinkler systems, little data is available on the effectiveness of smoke
management systems. PD7974-7:2003 states that there is little data on smoke control
system effectiveness available, but the data that is available suggests reliability of
85% to 90% [3]. Smoke management systems are not as common as sprinkler sys-
tems. Most fire incident data collection systems, such as the US NFIRS system or
the NZFS Station Management System do not provide explicit data fields for in-
cluding the performance of these systems in fire reports. Unlike activated sprin-
klers, much of the operational equipment of a smoke management system such as
fans and dampers are not intimate with the location of the fire products. It is more
difficult to evaluate if a smoke management system has met its objectives as well,
particularly for extraction systems, since the quantities of produced smoke and re-
moved smoke are difficult to estimate.
It may be easier to estimate system performance for pressurisation systems
by monitoring the air pressure in the relevant compartments (the fire compartment
and the pressurised compartment). Products exist for monitoring and logging com-
partment pressures in critical applications, such as healthcare isolation facilities [4]
and cleanrooms. However, no data on the ability of pressurisation systems to main-
tain their target pressures in fire situations has been identified. While this measure
would not directly evaluate the ability of the system to keep smoke out of the pro-
tected area, it would provide information on the ability of pressurisation systems to
meet their differential pressure targets.
Klote and Milke [5] considered the effects of system complexity on the reliability
of smoke control systems before commissioning and the mean life of a system after
commissioning. A number of assumptions were made which limit the application
of Klote and Milke’s analysis to real systems. Systems were assumed to be series
systems where operation of all components were required for operation; the entire
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system was assumed to fail completely if one component failed and there was no
consideration of partially effective operation. All components were assumed to be
operational after commissioning. The reliability of shared components with other
building systems (eg. HVAC fans) was assumed to be higher than smoke manage-
ment specific components due to ongoing occupant requirements, particularly com-
ponents required for occupant comfort in extreme weather. An arbitrary reliability
of 0.99 was used for shared components since it was expected to be near unity. A re-
liability of 0.94 for smoke management system specific components was used based
on field experience with such systems. System reliability before commissioning was
estimated to range from 0.97 with a mean commissioned life of 116 months for a
system sharing only three HVAC system fans to 0.03 pre-commissioning reliability
and three month mean commissioned life for a system with five shared HVAC fans
and 54 smoke management system-specific components.
Fazio [6] discussed the effectiveness of stairwell pressurisation systems. She
noted that pressurisation effectiveness was sensitive to the commissioning process
which could take years. It was also noted that leakage could develop over time.
Zhao [7] discussed the reliability of zone smoke control systems and stair pres-
surisation systems using fault tree analysis. System components considered in this
analysis were the power supply, fire indicating panel (FIP), detectors, connections,
fans, and dampers. Power supply failure was considered negligible due to daily use
and likely presence of backups. The failure rate of the panel was estimated to be
0.00306 using data from Lees [8]. Detector and connection failure rate was assumed
to be 0.000432. Fans were assumed to be used for normal daily operation and thus
faults were assumed to be promptly fixed, with a one day repair time. A sensitivity
analysis for the effects of maintenance uncertainty on fan reliability was conducted,
resulting in a range of fan reliability from 0.981 to 0.999, although a single value of
0.995 was used for the remainder of the analysis. The probability of a damper fail-
ing to open was estimated to be 0.0857, and the probability for a damper to fail to
close was estimated to be 0.0002. The potential for other vents such as doors and
windows to be open and affect the performance of the system was not discussed.
Zhao estimated the reliability of a single fan stairwell pressurisation system to be
0.90 using the values reported above.
For estimating the reliability of a zone smoke control system, Zhao took an ap-
proach of separating the performance of the system into four categories: complete
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failure, partial failure, likely reliable, and completely reliable. The required compo-
nents to maintain a pressure difference on the fire floor were used as the criteria for
placing the performance of the system in one of these categories. In order to pro-
vide the minimal pressure difference, the supply air damper on the fire floor and
the recycle air damper for the building were required to be closed, and the return
air damper on the fire floor and the exhaust air damper for the building were re-
quired to be open. Partial performance was determined by the number of return air
dampers on other floors that failed to close. Failure of supply air dampers on non-
fire floors was neglected as these were assumed to be open for normal operation.
Moore and Timms [9] looked at smoke control systems in Australian shopping
malls and department stores. These systems split up the building space into smoke
reservoirs or zones with smoke barriers and used exhaust fans in each zone to re-
move smoke. Fans in adjacent zones were used to supply make-up air. Two types
of systems were considered; one which used the return air ducting to remove the
smoke and one which had separate exhaust ducting. The zones were limited to less
than 60 m in length and fans were required to be spaced no more than 40 m apart
by the Building Code of Australia (BCA). The systems were required to be activated
by smoke detectors.
Moore and Timms conducted fault tree analysis on the major components of
the systems, including the detection system, power supply, exhaust and supply air
fans, and return and outside air dampers. The effects of low, medium, and high
quality for maintenance, installation and commissioning were included. The effects
of different components failing on the system efficacy were evaluated by consider-
ing 10 scenarios of efficacy ranging from 0% (for example, if no signal was received
from the detection system) to 100% (if all components operated as designed). Prob-
ability distributions for the estimated effectiveness for the two systems can be seen
in Figure 10.1.
Yashiro et al [10] provided an estimate of 0.974 on the reliability of a smoke ex-
traction system based on annual inspection data from 1989 to 1997.
Gravestock [11] provided a literature review on smoke management system com-
ponent data. Using fault tree analysis, he estimated smoke detection reliability to
range from 0.9 to 0.99 with an expected value of 0.981 for a simple system and from
0.72 to 0.99 with an expected value of 0.88 for a complex system.
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Figure 10.1: Distributions of smoke control system effectiveness from Moore and Timms [9].
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Const. aspects incl. Const. aspects not incl.
System type Lower Expected Upper Lower Expected Upper
Fixed speed fan and
barometric dampers 0.11 0.36 0.77 0.28 0.6 0.84
Variable speed
drive system 0.06 0.28 0.73 0.14 0.47 0.8
Variable speed drive and
motorised damper system 0.07 0.31 0.74 0.16 0.52 0.82
Table 10.1: Gravestock’s [11] estimated stairwell pressurisation reliabilities for three system
configurations. Construction aspects included door hardware and building as-
sembly leakage.
Gravestock also used fault trees to estimate stairwell pressurisation system
reliability, shown in Table 10.1. Gravestock’s fault trees include detection system,
damper, fan, construction aspect, and control panel failures. The construction aspect
included door hardware failure and building element leakage.
None of the studies identified include smoke management system performance
in real fires, but are either based on inspection data, component data, or expert
judgement. The lack of available data on smoke management systems results in
large uncertainty.
10.3 Detection uncertainty
10.3.1 B-RISK smoke detector response model
B-RISK can estimate the activation of a smoke detector using two methods: by ap-
proximating the detector as a heat detector or by estimating optical density, methods
that are also described in the IFEG [12]. The heat detector approach uses the same
detection model as discussed in Chapter 5 with empirically determined input pa-
rameters for activation temperature and RTI that give approximate smoke detector
activation times. In the context of fire modelling, optical density [13] is a measure of
the amount of light absorbed by the fire products in the air. The optical density OD
is predicted from the soot concentration using the specific extinction coefficient km:
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OD =
Csoot,cjkm
2.3
(10.1)
The specific extinction coefficient used by B-RISK was measured for ethene
smoke [14]. The soot concentration at a smoke detector that is located in the ceiling
jet Csoot,cj is estimated using the method developed by Davis [15]. For detectors that
have the sensor positioned in a housing, B-RISK uses Heskestad’s method for esti-
mating the response of smoke detectors based on the optical density (or visual ob-
scuration) inside the detector cavity [16]. Detector response time is calculated using
the following procedure:
∂Di
∂t
=
1
τ
(Do −Di) (10.2)
where Do and Di are the smoke optical densities outside and inside the detec-
tor, respectively, and τ is a detector time constant. The time constant is calculated as
follows:
τ =
l
u
(10.3)
where l is a characteristic length based on the detector geometry and u is the
ceiling jet velocity, calculated using the same approach described in Chapter 5. It
has been noted that this approach does not give good results at low ceiling veloc-
ities [17]. Detector actuation is estimated using sensitivity limits given in AS 1603.2,
which are described as applicable to photoelectric smoke detectors and conserva-
tive for ionisation detectors in flaming fires [16], which are two of the most common
types of smoke detectors in use, along with linear beam detectors and aspirating
detectors [18].
10.3.2 Uncertainty in soot production
The estimated soot concentration is dependent on the modelled soot generation.
The mass of soot generated by the fire m˙s is calculated from the mass of materials
combusted in the fire m˙f by a soot yield ψs
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m˙s = ψsm˙f (10.4)
The mass loss of the combusted materials is calculated from the estimated heat
release rate Q by dividing by the heat of combustion ∆Hc
m˙f =
Q
∆Hc
(10.5)
Distributions for the heat of combustion and soot yield can be entered into B-
RISK. Distributions for these parameters from previous fire test data are available in
the literature [19].
10.3.3 Uncertainty in gas velocity
Ideally, smoke detectors will detect a fire as early as possible when it is small. At
this stage of a fire the ceiling jet is not well established and existing currents in the
room from ventilation equipment can dominate the gas movement at a smoke detec-
tor. Geiman and Gottuk [20] found that smoke detector response could be influenced
significantly by ventilation.
If the potential for ventilation to influence smoke detector response exists in
a scenario, the characteristic length distribution can be adjusted to include these
effects.
10.3.4 Uncertainty in detector activation physics
The four commonly used detector types all use different methods of detecting smoke.
Of the four, only the linear beam type directly measures light obscuration or optical
density OD [21]. Beer first postulated that optical density per unit length l is propor-
tional to the molar concentration of the light absorbing species:
OD
l
∝ Csoot (10.6)
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For soot, Fabian and Gandhi found that the molar concentration was propor-
tional to the sum of the product of the number of particles and the particle diameter
cubed, or [22]:
Csoot ∝
∑
nid
3
i (10.7)
Thus,
OD ∝
∑
nid
3
i (10.8)
Photoelectric smoke detectors measure light scattering s due to the Tyndall ef-
fect and have been shown to have a response proportional to the sum of the product
of the number of particles and the particle diameter squared, or [22]:
s ∝
∑
nid
2
i (10.9)
and which also depends on the colour of the particles [21,22]. Aspirating smoke
detectors are a specialised form of photoelectric detector which use a controlled
method of sampling the environmental gases through tubing and a controlled laser
pulse which increases sensitivity by orders of magnitude relative to conventional
photoelectric detectors [18].
Ionisation detectors measure the rate of ions traversing from a radiation source
to a sensor (∆MIC) [18]. The output of ionisation detectors has been shown to be
proportional to the sum of the product of the number of particles and the particle
diameter, or [22,23]:
∆MIC ∝
∑
nidi (10.10)
Commercial detectors may also use multiple smoke detecting methods and
integrate the signals using proprietary algorithms to reduce false alarms, which also
increases uncertainty in estimating the detection time. Quantifying this uncertainty
is difficult due to the proprietary nature of the detector design, and would require
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Figure 10.2: B-RISK forms for entering smoke detectors. Multiple smoke detectors can be
entered in the fire room, with distributions for optical density at alarm, radial
distance, distance below ceiling, characteristic length, and reliability (one relia-
bility for the entire smoke detection system).
testing of specific detector models in the range of conditions expected for a specific
building design.
Most fire and smoke spread models including B-RISK do not have the capa-
bility to estimate the number and diameter of smoke particles. Soot lost from the
air through deposition on surfaces is not accounted for in B-RISK. In deterministic
models, the optical density or temperature rise approaches discussed previously are
used with conservative threshold values [24]. However, B-RISK allows for a distribu-
tion to be used for the optical density at alarm for smoke detectors, as shown in
Figure 10.2.
Data from previous tests where optical density at alarm was measured can be
used to estimate the distribution of optical density or temperature rise required for
alarm. Several sets of test data are available, including tests conducted by the US
Navy [25] and the Canadian National Research Council [26]. In this work the Navy
test data was used to develop distributions for optical density at smoke detector
response, shown in Figures 10.3 to 10.6. Summary statistics including Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistics for best fit log normal distributions for the US Navy data are
shown in Table 10.2.
There was much more uncertainty in the optical density at alarm for smoulder-
ing fires for both types of detectors, with standard deviations an order of magnitude
larger than for flaming fires. Ionisation detectors were slightly faster on average for
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Detector Fire Mean Standard deviation K-S
type type ln(OD/m at alarm) ln(OD/m at alarm) statistic
Ionisation Flaming -4.65 1.01 0.0803
Ionisation Smouldering -2.98 1.15 0.0660
Photoelectric Flaming -3.55 0.55 0.0828
Photoelectric Smouldering -3.32 1.24 0.0741
Table 10.2: Summary statistics for US Navy smoke detector test data, including
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for best fit log normal distributions.
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Figure 10.3: Distribution of optical density at alarm measured in US Navy tests for ionisa-
tion detectors with flaming fires.
flaming fires and photoelectric detectors were slightly faster on average for smoul-
dering fires.
10.4 Uncertainty in modelling smoke movement
The objective of a smoke management system is to either keep a space free of smoke
or to remove smoke. Therefore, to model the effect of a smoke management system,
the amount of smoke produced by the fire and its movement is required.
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Figure 10.4: Distribution of optical density at alarm measured in US Navy tests for photo-
electric detectors with flaming fires.
As discussed in Section 10.3.2, B-RISK uses the estimated heat release rate, heat
of combustion, and species yields to calculate fire product generation rates. The
volume of smoke produced with the fire products also depends on how much air is
entrained with the products in the fire plume. B-RISK allows several plume entrain-
ment submodels to be used. The zone model assumptions of homogeneous zones
and negligible gas momentum outside of the plume and vent flows add uncertainty.
10.4.1 Uncertainty in modelling smoke filling
Smoke extraction systems are typically designed to keep the smoke layer above the
heads of egressing occupants. Thus, the ability of the model to estimate layer height
is critical. However, it is difficult to evaluate the layer height in experiments because
there is often no clear horizontal interface, which introduces a source of uncertainty
in verification data. In some cases, a clear interface may be visible but the exact
height is dependant on the observer. Less subjective methods such as the N percent
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Figure 10.5: Distribution of optical density at alarm measured in US Navy tests for ionisa-
tion detectors with smouldering fires.
approach [27] may be used to evaluate the smoke layer height experimentally, partic-
ularly in instances where an interface is not clearly visible. However, these methods
also include uncertainty. Uncertainty in the ability of zone models to predict layer
height is a function of the scenario geometry and fire conditions, because the relative
effects of the model assumptions and inputs will change for different scenarios. An
example is smoke transport time, which is neglected in many zone models includ-
ing B-RISK, which will create larger uncertainty with the larger transport distances
associated with larger compartment geometries.
Plume entrainment models assume quiescent conditions and do not account
for the potential for additional air to be entrained in the plume from air movement
from other sources such as wind or mechanical ventilation. B-RISK includes a “dis-
turbed plume” option that doubles the entrainment where such conditions exist,
however actual effects in real fires will vary. Externally forced air movement is a
source of uncertainty for modelling smoke filling that is not generally present in
experimental verification data used to verify plume entrainment models. The un-
certainty from these effects may be more realistically dealt with in a field model
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Figure 10.6: Distribution of optical density at alarm measured in US Navy tests for photo-
electric detectors with smouldering fires.
that includes momentum effects throughout the gas phase simulation, if appropri-
ate probabilistic external drivers are added.
Chapter 5 discussed the uncertainty in BRANZFIRE for the layer height in the
Steckler experiments. For the Steckler experiment geometry, which involved steady
fires from 32 kW to 158 kW in a 2.8 m square by 2.13 m high room with a single
horizontal vent opening, the model was found to overpredict the layer interface
height by a mean of 11% with a standard deviation of 28%.
Vigne et al [28] compared various zone models and correlations including BRANZ-
FIRE with experimental smoke layer heights for a nominally 1.5 MW heptane pool
fire in a 20 m x 20 m x 20 m atrium with mechanical ventilation. The N% method
was used to determine the layer height experimentally, using 30% of the maximum
temperature rise as the cut off. The uncertainty in model correlations was estimated
to be nominally 35% with a maximum of 100% for one correlation.
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10.4.2 Modelling smoke movement in vertical shafts
In B-RISK, there is an option to use a single zone for a compartment which assumes
that the smoke is well-mixed throughout the volume of the compartment. This ap-
proach has been recommended for shafts with a height to width aspect ratio greater
than two due to reduced entrainment as the plume contacts the walls [29]. This option
is another source of decision uncertainty in B-RISK.
Work has been done by Wade [30,31] to benchmark the performance of B-RISK,
including comparison to FDS results for modelling smoke movement in vertical
shafts. It was found that modelling a shaft with a height to width aspect ratio greater
than five as a single zone provided a conservative estimate of the smoke concentra-
tion away from the plume source from B-RISK, compared to FDS. However, B-RISK
tended to under predict the smoke concentration near the plume source. An im-
proved outcome was obtained in B-RISK by modelling the shaft as two separate sin-
gle zone compartments, one encompassing the shaft volume near the plume source
and the other including the remainder of the shaft volume.
10.5 Mechanical vents
B-RISK includes the ability to model mechanical ventilation using either a fan curve
or a set pressure/flow. The input windows for mechanical ventilation are shown in
Figure 10.7.
10.5.1 Pressurisation uncertainty
Klote and Milke [5] noted that there may be a large amount of uncertainty in the
pressure difference produced by a smoke control system, although it was difficult
to quantify the amount of uncertainty due to the large number of factors involved,
including wind, leakage paths, building geometry, and smoke characteristics. Up to
50% deviation was suggested as tolerable for most conditions.
To account for the potential for deviation in pressure difference, a distribution
may be applied to the fan curve pressure differential in BRISK. It is doubtful that
detailed information on the pressure differential fluctuation will be available, so a
±50% uniform distribution based on Klote and Milke’s information may be used to
test the fire risk sensitivity to the potential for pressure differential fluctuation.
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Figure 10.7: B-RISK forms for entering mechanical ventilation (fans). A system reliability
distribution is available as well as individual reliability distributions for each
fan. Distributions can be entered for the fan flow rate, pressure limit, and start
time as well.
10.5.2 Mechanical smoke extract uncertainty
Uncertainty in the extraction flow rate when fans are used will depend on the fan
characteristics, building geometry, and weather conditions. Each design situation
should be evaluated on an individual basis.
10.6 Effects of sprinkler activation on smoke management systems
As mentioned in Chapter 7, sprinkler activation affects the properties of smoke pro-
duced by the fire. The change in smoke properties will produce additional uncer-
tainty in the ability of the smoke management system control smoke movement.
B-RISK does not currently include any capabilities to account for these effects.
10.7 Conclusions
There is much less information available to evaluate the effectiveness of smoke man-
agement systems in risk-informed fire safety design compared to suppression sys-
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tems. This is due to a number of factors including the difficulty in determining if a
smoke management system has met its objectives in a real fire, the smaller popula-
tion of smoke management systems, the greater variety of designs, and interaction
with other systems.
An interesting piece of future work would be to determine if pressurisation
system pressure sensor data is available from any systems operating in real fires,
or to endeavour to make this information available for future collection in new or
retrofitted pressurisation systems. While this data would not specifically address
the performance of the pressurisation system in preventing smoke movement into
designated areas, it would allow objective analysis of the efficacy of pressurisation
systems in meeting their design pressure specifications in real fire events.
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CHAPTER 11
FIRE RISK CASE STUDIES
This chapter describes four fire safety case studies relevant to this research. Two
case studies describe risk-informed fire safety in New Zealand sleeping occupancy
buildings where fire safety system effectiveness was a critical factor in the risk out-
come. A third example discusses a risk-informed fire safety analysis that was con-
ducted for the refitting of a commercial building in Australia. The fourth case study
discusses a fire in a seniors’ complex in Alberta, Canada, where fire safety system
effectiveness was a major factor in the spread of the fire and resulted in changes to
the building regulations.
11.1 New Zealand and Australian probabilistic fire safety design case studies
There are precedents for the use of risk-informed fire safety building design in New
Zealand and Australia. The following sections describe three case studies where a
risk-informed basis has been used.
11.1.1 Report on the impact on life safety of the Type 5 alarm
In the report written for the NZFS entitled “Impact on Life Safety of the Type 5
Alarm”, Enright [1] looked at the increase in risk with the introduction of the Type
5 alarm in the June 2001 revision of C/AS1. A Type 5 alarm allows “part of the
smoke detection component to comprise only a local alarm” [2], alerting only the firecell
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Figure 11.1: Sprinkler reliability distribution from Type 5 alarm report [1].
occupants and building management if available. The Type 5 is an alternative for
Type 4 or Type 7 alarms. A Type 4 alarm is “A detection and fire alarm system which
activates automatically in the presence of smoke, and can be activated manually at any time.”
A Type 7 alarm combines a sprinkler system with smoke detectors and manual call
points.
Enright based his sprinkler system reliability distribution on Marryatt’s [3] study
stating that “Marryatt reports sprinkler reliability at 99.5%... the high value is assumed
suitable rounded down to 99% as NZ has an effective regime of installing, commissioning,
and maintaining systems.” Enright assumed the standard deviation would be equal
to the difference between the mean of .99% and 1.00 and used a normal distribution.
The distribution was truncated at 1.00, since the probability that the system oper-
ated cannot exceed 1.00. The sprinkler reliability distribution used can be seen in
Figure 11.1.
The automatic alarm reliability information was obtained from British Stan-
dard’s Institute DD240, which was superceded by PD7974. In the Type 5 alarm
report, the reliability is used for the event of “unawake occupants receiving an au-
tomatic smoke alarm,” and a mean value of 90% is used. However, PD7974-7:2003
states that “smoke and rate of rise heat detectors are generally expected to detect a fire in
approximately 90% of cases.” [4] It then indicates that the reliability “might be reduced to
approximately 75% or lower in the case of domestic smoke detectors.” This only considers
the activation of the detector, it does not consider the reliability of the connection be-
CHAPTER 11. FIRE RISK CASE STUDIES 263
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Normal(0.9,0.02)
Figure 11.2: Alarm reliability distribution from Type 5 alarm report [1].
tween the detector and alarm mechanism and does not consider the reliability of the
occupant to respond to the alarm. Enright assigned a standard distribution of 0.02
to the automatic alarm reliability, and used a normal distribution, but his rationale
for these choices is not stated in the report.
Enright provides the distributions for total acceptable loss of life (TALL) for
4 scenarios, including both of the Type 4 and 7 alarms and the effect of the Type 5
modification each. He compares the effect on the mean TALL for switching to the
Type 5 alarm (his conclusion was that it increased the risk to life by approximately
20% in both Type 4 and 7 systems) and also the effect of the sprinklers (which re-
duced the risk by approximately two orders of magnitude with and without Type
5 modifications). He also discussed the sensitivity of the TALL output to the input
parameters, and found that the Type 7 scenarios were most affected by uncertainty
in the sprinkler reliability, more so than whether the occupants were awake or not.
None of the scenarios were particularly sensitive to the alarm reliability, which was
consistently ranked in the middle of the input parameters in terms of sensitivity,
generally less than the probability of fire ignition, location (sleeping area or not),
and if the fire was confined to the room or the floor of origin.
In his conclusions, Enright noted that “The use of Monte Carlo methods does not
eliminate the need to define and justify the relevant probability distribution functions and
does not provide a rationale for the default usage of any simple standard distributions (e.g.
uniform, normal)” [1]
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11.1.2 Single means of escape determinations
In 2005 and 2006, the fire safety designs for 6 apartment buildings in Auckland were
brought to the DBH determination process. While each building was unique, the
proposed designs for these buildings all had two fire safety features in common:
only one means of escape, and an escape height greater than 25 m. The acceptable
solution C/AS1 required the following features for multi-unit residential buildings
with an escape height exceeding 25 m [2]:
• Automatic fire sprinkler system with smoke detectors and manual
call points;
• Two separate means of escape separated by fire rated construction;
• Firecell rating to be no less than F30;
• Fire separations of the safe path to be 30/30/30 (reduced from 60/60/60
due to provision of sprinklers);
• Lifts to be within a protected shaft;
• Exit doors from apartments are required to open directly onto a hor-
izontal safe path, a pressurized vertical safe path, or a final exit; and
• A horizontal protected path at each floor level other than the top
floor shall precede the vertical safe path. The protected horizontal
path and vertical safe path shall be separated by fire doors.
Additional features were required with escape heights above 46 m (a Fire Sys-
tem Centre where the NZFS can monitor and control fire safety features) and above
58 m (a pressurisation system). An additional means of escape took up building
space which was valuable especially in high population density areas where build-
ing footprint area was at a premium. Also, if an existing building was modified such
that the escape height increased beyond 25 m, the original single means of escape
no longer met the acceptable solution criteria. Eliminating one means of escape re-
quired an alternative solution to meet the building regulation requirements. Each
building, being unique, had different features proposed to compensate for the single
means of escape.
The analysis for each of the determinations was based on a comparative prob-
abilistic event tree analysis where the alternative solution building with the single
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means of escape was compared to a building design that was compliant with C/AS1
but with similar layout and occupancy characteristics. The alternative solution had
to have a three to one “risk margin” or 75% probability of being safer than the com-
pliant design. The rational for the risk margin being increased from one to one
(which it would be for a comparison between identical compliant buildings) was
given in the Determination 2005/109 summary document, written by the DBH De-
terminations Manager: [5]
• 6.2.4 In this case, I consider that the type of comparative risk analysis used
in the assessment is an appropriate method for deciding whether an al-
ternative solution is effectively equivalent to the corresponding acceptable
solution in terms of fire safety. In particular, I accept the following com-
ment from Expert D: In considering changes to the fire safety system in a
building of the sort proposed (deletion of a stairway, improvements to the
sprinkler system, stair pressurization, etc) it needs to be understood that
each of these changes affects the level of fire safety in the building in dif-
ferent ways. Consequently the only way of comparing these changes is on
a risk basis how much (and in which direction) each of them changes the
level of safety in the building.
• 6.2.5 However, I recognise that there is as yet inadequate data for fire en-
gineering to achieve the accuracy that is expected from, for example, struc-
tural engineering. In particular, the probabilities used for a fire analysis
must be based on fire statistics derived from a comparatively small data
pool of mainly overseas buildings of unknown design. That applies not
only to fire scenarios but also to the proper functioning of critical systems
including the sprinklers, the pressurisation system, the smoke detectors
and fire alarms, the automatic drop windows, and the door closers. There
appears to be no certainty as to the extent to which those statistics and
probabilities are appropriate for use in the New Zealand context.
• 6.2.6 That does not mean that the method cannot be used in New Zealand,
but it does mean, in my view, that the results of such analyses need to
establish a high probability that an alternative solution building would be
safer than the corresponding acceptable solution building in all relevant
fire scenarios and across a realistic range of probabilities.
• 6.2.7 In this case, I do not consider that the 51 to 74% probability men-
tioned in 5.3.6 above is high enough.
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These statements in Determination 2005/109 set the precedent in New Zealand
that quantitative probabilistic comparative risk assessment was an acceptable method
to evaluate trade-offs for a single means of escape in a high-rise residential build-
ing, which was then used for at least five subsequent cases which have been docu-
mented by determinations. In addition, residential buildings with similar SME con-
figurations have been reportedly granted consent in New Zealand since the deter-
minations but have not been subjected to the determination process. The following
sections discuss the features of each building that went through the determination
process. A summary of the building features and fire safety features intended to
compensate for the single means of escape is given in Table 11.1.
11.1.2.1 Determination 2005/109
The first building had 18 storeys, with an entrance lobby, service space, and a load-
ing bay on level one, three apartments, an office, and a plant room on level two,
and six apartments of approximate floor area 27 m3 on levels three through 18. All
of the apartments were either bed sitting rooms or single-bedroom dwellings. The
building had a maximum escape height of 48 m from the top floor. The apartments,
stairway, and the service areas on levels one and two were sprinklered. The atrium
and stairway were pressurized by three fans in the roof and one at ground level.
Consent for this building had been issued on February 10, 2004 by the TA, and the
NZFS applied for determination on June 9, 2004. The building was nearly com-
pleted at this point. At the time that the determination process had been concluded,
the building was complete but no code compliance certificate had been issued.
The fire safety issue driving the determination was the safety of building oc-
cupants outside the compartment of fire origin. As the apartments opened directly
onto the stairwell, there was a concern that if the door to the apartment of fire origin
was left open that occupants on the levels above the fire would be at risk. An exam-
ple of a real fire where a similar circumstance occurred was the 2 Forest Laneway
fire in North York, Ontario, Canada, on January 6, 1995 [6].
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Above Total Max.
Grade Number Escape
Determination/Address Levels Tower Description of Apts. Height (m) Difference from C/AS1
2005/109 - Single tower 18 Level 1 contains entrance lobby, service 51 48 Single escape route,
5 Princess Street space, and loading bay. Level 2 contains 3 sprinkler system enhanced with
apartments + office. Levels 3 - 18 have 6 dual street main supply, FR heads,
apartments each Type 2 FS connection, 60/60/60 FRR
rather than 30/30/30,
staged evac scheme w/
Type 8 voice communication system
2005/134 - Single tower 16 Basement + 3 level podium with 106 43.6 Single escape route,
2-30 Beach Road carparking and retail + 12 level apartment dual pump for spinkler system,
tower. Mirror image with solid concrete safe path pressurisation (stairway only),
staged evac scheme w/
wall in centre, non-intercommunicating Type 8 voice communication system
2005/168 - Single tower 15 Level 1 contains service rooms and 7 226 37.8 Single escape route,
7 Scotia Place apartments, level 2 has an entrance lobby, dual ”Class A” water supply w/ tank,
office space, caf, and 12 apartments, safe path pressurisation(stairway only),
level 3 has 15 apartments, levels 4 - 15 Type 8 voice communication system
have 16 apartments each
2005/169 - Two towers 12 6 apartments per level 72 31.9 Single escape route,
above 4 levels of basement 4 Level 1 includes entrance and reception, 20 8.4 dual ”Class B”water supply with a tank,
carparking, connected on offices and services, plus 2 apartments, safe path pressurisation (stairway only),
all adjacent levels levels 2-4 have 6 apartments voice communication system
10-14 Upper Queen Street
2006/34 - Single tower 10 Original 8 storey building converted to 6 new 29.3 Single escape route,
47 Wakefield Street 10 storey 2 level smoke alarm systemsto NZS4514:2002
apts. on (less than required in C/AS1),
lvls. 9-10 no pressurisation of safe paths,
fire hose reels provided,
emergency lighting in exitways,
fire hydrant system
2006/52 - Two towers 14 14 stories above 3 levels of basement car 97 41 Single escape route,
connected through lower parking, 6 apartments on ground floor dual ”Class B” water supply,
carparking levels and 7 on all above 1200 mm egress width of stairs
18 Turner Street 13 Ground level has managers office, rubbish 59 38.4 Type 8 voice communication system
17-19 Waverley Street area, and 2 apartments. Levels 1B-10B have
5 apartments, level 11B has 7 apartments
Table 11.1: Summary of the single means of escape building configurations which went through determinations in New Zealand in
2005 and 2006. (FR - fast response, FS - fire service)
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In the 2 Forest Laneway fire, an occupant on the fifth floor of a 30 floor apart-
ment building noticed a smouldering fire on the couch in his apartment living room
at 5:00 am. After an attempt at extinguishing the fire, he opened the balcony door
in his apartment and left his apartment, also leaving his front apartment door open.
There were six victims found in the upper staircases of the building, along with
seven occupants who were treated for smoke inhalation. In this fire there was an
additional fire door between the hallway on each floor and the stair shaft.
Fire safety system enhancements in the building to compensate for the single
means of escape included upgrading the sprinkler system, aspects of the fire rated
construction, and implementing a staged evacuation scheme with a voice commu-
nication system. The sprinkler system upgrades included a dual street main water
supply, fast response sprinkler heads on apartment levels, and a “Type 2” fire ser-
vice connection. The masonry construction was specified to give a 60/60/60 fire
resistance rating between apartments, the apartments and the atrium, and the walls
surrounding the central services duct. This was an upgrade from the minimum
30/30/30 fire resistance considered to be achieved with plasterboard walls in the
compared compliant building. The staged evacuation scheme and voice communi-
cation system were not considered in the comparative analysis.
The sprinkler effectiveness was considered to be composed of reliability and
efficacy. Sprinkler efficacy was considered to be 0.998 with no uncertainty for both
compliant and alternative building designs, although the determination document
mentions that fast response sprinkler heads are one of the improvements in the alter-
native solution which would be expected to have some influence on efficacy. Sprin-
kler reliability was assumed to be a uniform distribution from 0.994 to 1 for the al-
ternative building and from 0.992 to 0.998 for the compliant building. The increase
in reliability was attributed to the difference between a single town main “Class C”
supply with diesel pump for the compliant building and a dual supply sprinkler
system. Although the building had been constructed at the time of the determi-
nation, there appeared to be some confusion as to the nature of the dual sprinkler
supply: the determination document states that it was a dual street main water sup-
ply, while the supporting documentation for the increase in reliability states that it
was a “Class A” water supply, with a mains water supply using an electric pump
and a tank water supply using a diesel pump. The building layout plans in the
determination document do not identify the location of a water tank for sprinkler
system supply.
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The fire separation effectiveness was not decomposed into reliability and ef-
ficacy. A single parameter was used to consider the effectiveness of the walls and
doors to control the spread of smoke and flame. For the walls, the increased dif-
ficulty in penetrating masonry compared to a frame wall with plasterboard was
considered to increase the mean effectiveness from 0.88 to 0.92. These mean values
were derived from BS PD7974-7, which gives probabilities of 0.75 and 0.65 for ma-
sonry walls and partition walls to achieve 75% of their fire rating, respectively [4]. It
was assumed that the failures occurred at penetrations, which failed either because
they had not been stopped or had been improperly stopped. It was then assumed
that two thirds of these failures were due to improperly stopped penetrations, and
one third were due to the penetration not being stopped at all. As smoke spread is
a different criterion than the wall meeting its fire resistance, the improperly stopped
penetrations were then neglected for the control of smoke spread. Hence the mean
values were calculated:
P (masonry wall controls passage of smoke) = 1− 1/3× 0.25 = 0.92 (11.1)
P (lightweight wall controls passage of smoke) = 1− 1/3× 0.35 = 0.88 (11.2)
Uncertainty in these values was considered by applying a normal distribution
with the means mentioned above and a standard deviation of 0.01 for both cases,
with no further justification on the uncertainty.
The effectiveness of doors from apartments into corridors was considered to
be 0.89 while doors from corridors into stairs was considered to be 0.85, due to their
different usage characteristics. Uncertainty was added by using normal distribu-
tions with standard deviations of 0.05, and truncated at 1.0.
In the initial risk assessment, the stairway pressurisation system effectiveness
was given an efficacy factor of 0.92. Monte Carlo simulations were used to examine
scenarios where leakage reduced air velocity across the door to the apartment of fire
origin below 0.8 m/s for 10 seconds or more. While the Monte Carlo simulation
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did not produce any ineffective cases, a failure rate of 0.002 was assumed. Separate
simulations also looked at the possibility that the stairway pressurisation system
was overwhelmed if the apartment of fire origin was on the windward side of the
building during high winds with an external opening. While it was stated that a
number of Monte Carlo simulations for adverse wind conditions resulted in fail-
ures, the rate was not reported. Ultimately a 0.08 ineffectiveness rate was selected
for adverse wind conditions, giving a combined inefficacy rate of 0.082 and thus an
efficacy rate of 0.92. Pressurization system reliability was calculated based on num-
bers reported by Zhao [7], although the fire damper failure rate was reduced from
0.086 to 0.06 on the basis that there were fewer dampers in the building than nor-
mal. The reliability was calculated to be 0.91, giving an overall effectiveness of 0.84
for the stairway pressurisation system. Uncertainty was considered by applying a
normal distribution with a standard deviation of 0.1, truncated at 1.0.
As a result of the determination process, a second risk assessment was com-
pleted, and considered the uncertainty in the stairway pressurisation system to be
underestimated in the first risk assessment. The second assessment used a uniform
distribution from 0.5 to 0.9 for stairway pressurisation.
Another expert who was asked to review the determination information esti-
mated effectiveness values of 0.94 for the “Class C” single supply building C sprin-
kler system, and 0.97 for the building A “Class B” dual supply sprinkler system.
Lightweight 30 minute fire resistance walls were given an effectiveness of 0.7 and
60 minute masonry walls were given an effectiveness of 0.8. The effectiveness of
the stair pressurisation system was assumed to be 0.1. No justification was given
for these values other than that they were educated estimates. This expert used
BRANZFire to model the effectiveness of the stair pressurisation system.
The comparative analysis conducted for determination 2005/109 did not con-
sider time dependent effects. Non time-dependent event trees were used to com-
pare the risk between the alternative solution building and the compliant design,
although specific scenarios were modelled as a function of time. A sensitivity study
was conducted using standardized b coefficients which showed that the risk out-
comes were most sensitive to the sprinkler system effectiveness, followed by the
pressurisation system and fire barriers.
The conclusion of determination 2005/109 states that the building did not com-
ply with clause C2 of the building code. The risk margin calculated in the risk as-
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sessments was less than the required 75%. However, as the building consent had
already been issued and the building was completed, modifications to the con-
sent requirements were made, including greater commissioning requirements for
the smoke pressurization and a limitation on the consent for Purpose Group SR oc-
cupancy only (attached and multi-unit residential dwellings). At the time of the de-
termination the building was being used as a Purpose Group SA occupancy (spaces
provided for the use of people who will be transient and reside for a temporary
period, typically not more than 90 days).
11.1.2.2 Subsequent determinations
The approach taken in the five subsequent single means of escape determinations
was similar with respect to the effectiveness of the proposed fire safety systems. A
summary of the details of each of the determinations is included below followed by
a discussion of how the fire safety system effectiveness was considered. The DBH
determination documents should be referenced for a more complete description of
the determinations.
The building considered in determination 2005/134 had 16 levels, with the
four bottom levels consisting of the basement, three levels of parking and retail ten-
ancies, and the top 12 tower levels containing eight or ten apartments. The tower
was split with a concrete wall, and each side was mirrored, with a single stairway
and two lifts. The maximum escape height was 43.6 m. The fire safety features
that were considered to make up for the single means of escape were a secondary
electric pump for the sprinkler system, pressurisation of the stairways, and a staged
evacuation scheme including voice communication. The consenting process for this
building was to proceed in stages. At the time of the determination, two stages of
consent had been issued: one for the overall building configuration, and the second
for foundations and drainage. Construction was underway when the application for
the third stage of consent which included the architectural and services content was
lodged with the territorial authority on March 3, 2004. The territorial authority re-
jected the application due to the single means of escape in early 2005, leading to the
determination. The outcome of the determination was that the building commplied
with clause C2 of the building code [8].
Determination 2005/168 involved a 15 level residential high-rise building. The
lower ground floor had service rooms and seven apartments, the second level had
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an entry lobby, mail area, two office spaces, a cafe and 12 apartments. All the upper
levels contained 16 apartments with the exception of the third level which contained
15 because the area above the second level cafe kitchen was void. The features of the
proposed building that were intended to compensate for the single means of escape
included a dual “Class A” water supply for the sprinkler system, pressurisation
for the stairwell, and a “Type 8” voice communication system. This building was
not under construction at the time of the determination, and the outcome of the
determination indicated that the proposed building did not comply with clauses C2
and C3 of the building code [9].
The proposed building that was examined in determination 2005/169 included
two towers above four common levels of basement car parking. One of the towers
was four storeys above ground level, with the ground level including services, an
office, the lobby, and two apartments. All other levels in the towers contained six
apartments. Bridge connections joined the first four storeys of the two towers above
ground level. The features that were identified as compensation for the single means
of escape from the upper levels of the 12 storey tower were a sprinkler system with
a dual “Class B” water supply, the primary supply consisting of a tank boosted by
a diesel pump. The secondary supply was to be a reticulated supply boosted by
either a diesel or electric pump. The stairway was to be pressurised and a Type 8
voice communication system was provided. The outcome of the determination was
that the proposed building did not comply with clauses C2 and C3 of the building
code [10].
The building which resulted in determination 2006/34 was originally an office
building which had been converted to residences. The maximum escape height of
the original building was less than 25 m so it did not require two means of escape.
The determination was a result of proposed modifications to add two storeys to the
building, which increased the maximum escape height to 29.25 m. The features that
were proposed to compensate for the single means of escape included a dual “Class
A” water supply for the sprinkler system and a stairway pressurisation system. The
determination found that the alternative solution proposed met the requirements of
clauses C2 and C3 of the building code [11].
The final single means of escape determination, 2006/52, involved the pro-
posed design of two residential high-rise towers of 13 and 14 storeys above ground
level and connected by lower carparking levels. Features considered to compensate
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for the single means of escape were a dual “Class B” water supply for the sprinkler
system, an increase in the egress stair width from 1000 mm to 1200 mm, and a Type
8 voice communication system. The proposed design of the towers was determined
to not meet the requirements of clauses C2 and C3 of the building code [12].
A nominal value of 0.95 was used for the sprinkler reliability for buildings
with single “Class C” supply sprinkler systems. This value was chosen based on
guidance from PD7974-7(2003). The enhancement of a secondary electrical pump
was estimated to increase the nominal sprinkler system reliability by 0.005 to 0.955.
Feeney’s conclusion that the reliability of the sprinkler system depended on the
pump much more than the availability of water from reticulated systems was ref-
erenced [13] but was recommended to be used with caution. For designs with dual
“Class A” water supplies, combining a reticulated supply with a tank supply, the
nominal sprinkler system reliability was increased to 0.96. Uncertainty in sprinkler
system reliability for both buildings was considered by applying a uniform distri-
bution from .02 below to .02 above the nominal reliability value. Efficacy was again
considered with a 0.95 reduction in sprinkler system effectiveness, with no consid-
eration of uncertainty.
The reliability of smoke alarm systems was estimated with a mean of 0.90,
using the value given in PD7974-7(2003). A normal distribution with a standard
deviation of 0.05 was used to account for uncertainty. An efficacy factor of 0.90
was used with no uncertainty considered. The smoke alarm was not a factor in
the comparative analysis outcome for any of the determinations because the same
system effectiveness was considered for all designs.
Barrier reliability was found using fault tree analysis and data from PD7974-
7(2003). Mean reliabilities of 0.42 and 0.36 were derived for masonry and lightweight
construction, respectively. These values were deemed to be lower than expected,
and since building A only had two barriers while building C had three, the un-
derestimation was considered to comparatively favour building A. Therefore, ad-
justments to the values given in PD7974-7(2003) were made resulting in reliability
values of 0.65 and 0.58. Uncertainty was considered with uniform distributions .10
above and below the mean values. Efficacy was considered to be 1.0, therefore it did
not affect the results.
The reliability of the stair pressurisation was assumed to have a mean of 0.90,
CHAPTER 11. FIRE RISK CASE STUDIES 274
which was taken from PD7974-7(2003). A uniform distribution from 0.50 to 1.0 was
assumed for the stair pressurisation efficacy.
Sensitivity analysis was done using a proprietary algorithm to calculate the
standardized b coefficients. It was found that the risk outcome was most sensitive
to partition barrier effectiveness, followed by the sprinkler system effectiveness and
pressurisation effectiveness.
11.1.3 Ramifications for this research
The examples listed above where probabilistic methods were used for fire safety
applications in New Zealand demonstrate the lack of knowledge regarding the ex-
pected performance of fire safety systems for risk purposes. In many cases, even if
mean values of effectiveness are based on existing data, they are tweaked by “expert
judgement” which is in all cases subjective [14]. One of the major issues identified is
how effectiveness inputs should be modified with changes to the systems installed;
for example, a change from a single water supply for the sprinkler system to a dual
supply. The goal of this project is that B-RISK will be a useful tool to resolve these
issues in the future.
11.1.4 140 William Street case study
A risk-informed approach in evaluating the fire safety of an office building was com-
pleted for the 140 William Street building refurbishment in Melbourne, Australia in
1992 [15]. The building has 41 storeys in total with 37 occupied as offices. One of
the requirements of the refurbishment was to remove asbestos-based fire protection
material from the floor slab soffits and supporting beams. In addition, the deemed-
to-satisfy (DTS) building regulation requirements at the time of the refurbishment
required a sprinkler system designed for the Ordinary Hazard (OH) classification,
while the existing system was designed as Extra Light Hazard (ELH). The proposed
refurbishment did not include replacement of the removed fire protection material
or an upgrade of the sprinkler system to make it adequate for the ordinary hazard
classification.
Fire risk was compared in three building configurations: the existing building,
the proposed refurbished building, and a similar building configuration that met the
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deemed-to-satisfy requirements (known as the “Building Code of Australia” (BCA)
configuration in the original report, called the “deemed-to-satisfy” (DTS) here). The
fire brigade and occupant response was considered in the analysis.
The ELH sprinkler system in the existing building had sprinkler heads typi-
cally installed 4.6 m apart. The ceiling spaces were not sprinklered. Two separate
towns’ mains supplied the sprinkler system, with individual risers for four adja-
cent floors. Each riser had a stop valve. Neither the riser stop valves or the main
stop valve for the entire system were monitored. Pressure to supply water above
the 8th floor was provided by electric pumps backed up by diesel pumps, with sep-
arate pressure switches. The electricity supply for the building was not provided
by a utility but was rather generated in the building by diesel and natural gas gen-
erators. The existing building sprinkler system did not have a fire service water
connection. Flow switches on the sprinkler system risers were directly connected
to the fire brigade. Individual floor flow switches were connected to the building
alarm system but not to the fire brigade.
The OH system required by the Australian DTS document at the time of the
refurbishment for a building of similar configuration to the 140 William Street build-
ing decreased the allowable sprinkler head spacing to 3.5 m. Monitored riser and
main valves, ceiling space sprinklers, and a fire service water connection were re-
quired. The DTS requirements did not include floor flow switches.
For the refurbished building, it was proposed to add monitored floor isolation,
riser, and main valves to the existing system, and a gravity water supply to supple-
ment the two towns’ main supplies. Solenoid valves on each floor were provided
to allow required weekly water availability and flow switch operation testing on
each floor. Fire brigade intervention was included in the sprinkler effectiveness for
the DTS and refurbished buildings due to the inclusion of a fire service inlet which
would allow the sprinkler supply pressure to be boosted by an arriving fire appli-
ance.
The DTS and refurbished building designs included sandwich pressurisation.
The pressurisation system effectiveness was estimated at 90%. The existing building
had smoke detection in the return air ducts only, while the DTS and refurbished
building added detectors to the top of the stairwells and the office side of the fire
doors separating the two areas.
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The probabilities of individual events occurring were assigned by using uni-
form distributions over time. These distributions were then sampled using a Monte
Carlo procedure and combined in the event tree to determine the time to detection
and times to untenability for the simplified modelled enclosures.
The analysis used a measure of expected deaths per occupant per year to con-
clude that the DTS building was safe (4.4 x 10−8 expected deaths per occupant per
year without maintenance, 3.2 x 10−8 with maintenance), the existing building was
safer (7.7 x 10−9 expected deaths per occupant per year), and the refurbished build-
ing was safest (1.5 x 10−9 expected deaths per occupant per year with extra fire
doors, 1.6 x 10−9 without extra fire doors). It was presumed that the stairwell pres-
surisation system was the primary factor in the increase in safety between the exist-
ing building and the refurbished building.
11.2 High intensity residential fires in Alberta, Canada
Light timber residential construction with combustible cladding led to major fires
in Alberta, Canada in the late 1990s and 2000s where they were known as “high
intensity residential fires.” In some cases, these fires occurred in large buildings
despite the presence of installed fire safety systems. The author’s interest in the per-
formance of fire safety systems stemmed from involvement in the investigation of
one such fire in 2009 where sprinklers and passive fire protection features were key
factors in the development of the fire. The inclusion of this case study is primarily
due to the author’s personal involvment in this investigation.
The building involved was a 4 storey timber frame seniors’ assisted living con-
dominium complex, as shown in Figure 11.3. The 4 storey sleeping household areas
of the building were separated into two fire cells by a masonry firewall. A two storey
wing housed a commercial-style kitchen, dining area, and recreational facilities. The
kitchen and dining area were separated from the rest of the structure by another ma-
sonry firewall. The sleeping areas of the building were sprinklered to NFPA 13R [16],
which did not require the attic space to be sprinklered.
The fire consumed the roof and unsprinklered attic space of one of the 4 storey
fire cells containing the sleeping occupancy areas. Fire spread to the other fire cells
was limited by the masonry firewalls. The occupants of the building all escaped
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Figure 11.3: Seniors’ complex fire, Alberta, Canada, 2009 (Photo source: Edmonton Jour-
nal [17]).
without injury; notable because the fire occured at 3:30 am and many occupants
had restricted mobility. Damage to the occupied space of the building was limited
to primarily water damage from firefighting efforts and activated sprinklers posi-
tioned below the ceiling on the top floor. However, the building was a complete loss
due to the effects of the water on the building structure.
The systems involved in the fire performed as expected in terms of life safety
objectives, but failed to protect property. From a social standpoint, the lives of many
of the occupants were impacted by the loss of necessities such as medications, mobil-
ity assistance devices, as well as the loss of personal items of sentimental value, such
as letters, photographs, and other documents. As a result of this fire and other high
intensity residential fires [18] in Alberta, the Alberta Building Code was changed to
require sprinklers installed in the attic space and other concealed spaces of 4 storey
residential timber frame buildings, among other changes [19].
While it does seem that some change was necessary, it did not appear that a
risk-informed approach was taken to evaluate the costs and benefits of changing
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the building regulation requirements. There was no analysis to determine if the
changes would either be sufficient or go too far in modifying the fire risk based on
the increased cost of construction and societal fire risk objectives. It was observed by
the author that evaluating the effectiveness of fire safety systems was uncertain and
open to interpretation, even in a large loss fire where substantial fire investigation
resources were deployed by multiple parties.
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CHAPTER 12
USE OF THE B-RISK MODEL IN RISK-INFORMED FIRE
SAFETY DESIGN
12.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how the B-RISK model might be used
to make decisions in risk-informed fire safety design. Two of the case studies dis-
cussed in Chapter 11 will be used as the basis for the buildings considered; the first
building design that went through the single means of escape (SME) determination
process and the 140 William Street building. Where applicable, particularly for the
140 William Street building, New Zealand regulations and standards are applied
instead of the documents used for the actual building designs since these examples
are for illustrative purposes only and B-RISK is being developed primarily for use
in New Zealand, although ideally it will be useful in other jurisdictions as well.
The focus of this chapter is on the use of the safety systems aspects of B-RISK.
Discussion of other aspects such as the design fire generator are limited. Fuel config-
urations in the simulations were simplified; for example, in the second office build-
ing case study, office workstations were treated as a single fuel item and are not
broken down into their components. Uncertainties in the mass, heat release rate,
and ignition properties of items were not considered, although uncertainty in these
parameters is likely to be large and significant in real scenarios.
The B-RISK model is used to do a comparative analysis between alternative
designs. The deemed-to-satisfy building designs and the alternative designs from
281
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the original case studies are compared, as nearly as practicable. Since this research
only considers fire development, time to untenability was used to compare the de-
signs. The C/VM2 tenability criteria were used as the basis for comparison. Since
internal fire development was the only aspect considered, exterior fire spread, occu-
pant response, and fire service response were not considered. Also, structural fire
resistance is not considered; thus, the main objective of the 140 William Street study
which was to determine if it was necessary to apply floor slab and beam fire pro-
tection is not included. Other fire risk objectives such as property protection are not
considered in this analysis.
12.1.1 General model parameters
The interior temperature was set as a uniform distribution from 15oC to 25oC, the
exterior temperature was set as a uniform distribution from 2oC to 29oC, and the
relative humidity was set at 50%, approximately representing New Zealand condi-
tions. For an actual building design, site weather data should be used to estimate
these parameters.
CO yields were calculated using the built-in model that estimated the yield
based on the global equivalence ratio (GER) [1]. Well-ventilated soot yields were
entered and the B-RISK GER model was used to adjust for reduced ventilation. B-
RISK release version 48 was used for this chapter.
12.2 Common material properties
Three generic materials were used to represent the objects for the two buildings.
Common material properties used among the items are listed in this section.
12.2.1 Ignition
The FTP ignition properties used are summarised in Table 12.1. The ignition prop-
erties were all based on auto ignition data.
For all items, a uniform distribution from 0.3 to 0.4 was used for the radiant
loss fraction.
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Target ignition parameters ABS [2] MDF [2] PU/Polyester [3]
FTP (kWs1/n/m2) 14126 2913 427
n 1.8 1.3 1
q˙′′cr (kW/m2) 25 35 22
Table 12.1: Common auto ignition properties used for all items modelled.
Parameter Units Mean Standard Deviation Lower bound Upper bound
hc MJ/kg 14 1 12 16
Soot yield kg/kg 0.015 0.002 0.01 0.02
CO2 yield kg/kg 1.3 0.15 1.27 1.33
χrad 0.35 0.046 0.3 0.4
Table 12.2: MDF properties estimated from SFPE handbook data on wood products [5].
12.2.2 Foam soot yield
For foam based items, the lognormal distribution described by Robbins and Wade [4]
based on 1995 CBUF data with an outlier removed was used. The log transformed
mean was -3.93 and the standard deviation was 0.78.
12.2.3 MDF properties
For the MDF-based object properties, data from the SFPE handbook for wood prod-
ucts was used [5]. A summary of the relevant parameters is listed in Table 12.2.
12.2.4 Criteria used to evaluate the designs
The criteria used in this analysis to compare the alternate and deemed-to-satisfy
building designs is primarily the time to untenability in the stairwells and a remote
apartment, although tenability in the fire compartment is briefly discussed as well.
Visibility and the fractional effective dose (FED) of carbon monoxide and thermal
radiation are used as the criteria as specified in C/VM2. Fractional effective dose
measures the cumulative effects of the toxic or thermal insult on an occupant over
time. A fractional effective dose of one corresponds to the onset of incapacitation or
death of an average person. The untenable limits are 10 m visibility and 0.3 FEDg
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and FEDth, evaluated at a height of 2.0 m. The FED values are calculated from the
time of fire ignition in each room, so will not be representative of an occupant’s
exposure while travelling through the building during the course of the fire, and is
for illustrative purposes only.
The time to untenability represents the available safe egress time (ASET) for
an occupant. The required safe egress time (RSET) is not considered here because it
is currently beyond the scope of the model. The total simulated time for the B-RISK
model was 600 s for convenience as this is an illustration of the use of B-RISK only.
For a full risk analysis including occupant behaviour which is necessary to deter-
mine the time required for the occupants to egress the building, the simulated time
would need to be sufficient to encompass the longest probabilistic RSET duration.
12.3 SME Building
12.3.1 Principal building characteristics common to both designs
The first scenario is an 18 storey high rise apartment building. The first floor has a
rubbish room, fire services room, entrance lobby, and a truck dock. The second floor
had three apartments, an office, and a plant room. Each floor from 3 to 18 contained
6 apartments, for a total of 99 apartments in the building. All apartments were 9 m
long x 3 m wide for a floor area of 27 m3, with 3 m ceiling height. The four corner
apartments on each floor were configured as studio apartments and the two central
apartments were configured as one-bedroom apartments. An elevation view of the
building is shown in Figure 12.1.
Apartments in the building are intended to be used as short stay serviced
apartments. However, they also can be leased out as unfurnished apartments, so
both options will be considered. A serviced apartment was considered to have spe-
cific fuel packages in constant locations, whereas an unfurnished apartment was
considered to have a variable fuel load magnitude and location.
12.3.2 Proposed alternative building fire safety design
A plan view of the proposed design typical layout for levels 3 to 18 is shown in
Figure 12.2. The doors from the apartments open directly onto the central atrium
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Figure 12.1: Elevation view of scenario 1 building (from DBH determination 2005-109 [6].
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Figure 12.2: Typical level plan view of scenario 1 proposed building (from DBH determina-
tion 2005-109 [6].
which has a walkway around an open vertical column with open stairs on one side
and two lifts on the other.
As discussed in Chapter 11, the proposed design of the SME building did
not meet the C/AS1 deemed-to-satisfy requirements because the maximum escape
height exceeds 25 m and there is a single means of escape. Other changes from
the deemed-to-satisfy requirements include an enhanced sprinkler system with a
dual towns’ mains/on-site tank water supply, apartment level fast response sprin-
kler heads, and a manual fire alarm system connected to the NZFS; 60/60/60 fire
rated construction between apartments, the apartments and atrium, and service
duct walls compared with the 30/30/30 C/AS1 requirement; and a Type 8 voice
communication system with staged evacuation. The evacuation system will not be
included in this analysis since the human response is not included; nor is the fire
resistance rating considered.
12.3.3 Comparison deemed-to-satisfy building fire safety design
The comparison building has a similar design to the proposed building but with
two means of escape. A typical floor layout can be seen in Figure 12.3. While a Type
7e alarm (sprinkler system with smoke detectors and manual call points, local alarm
in sleeping firecells) and 30/30/30 fire resistance rating between fire cells were re-
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Figure 12.3: Typical level plan view of scenario 1 compliant building.
quired, this building does not include the sprinkler system and fire rated construc-
tion enhancements of the proposed building. As short stay serviced apartments, the
relevant C/AS1 purpose group was SA (spaces provided for the use of people who will
be transient and reside for a temporary period, typically not more than 90 days), while for
use as longer term leased apartments the appropriate C/AS1 purpose group was
SR (attached and multi-unit residential dwellings). The determination noted that there
was some discussion regarding the appropriate purpose group for the deemed-to-
satisfy comparison building and ultimately the SR purpose group was utilized. The
SA purpose group was required to have pressurised safe paths, air handling sys-
tem smoke control, and a voice communication system for escape heights exceeding
46 m, which the SR purpose group was not required to have [7].
12.3.4 Fire doors
Fire doors in the building models include the apartment doors, outside door and
shared means of escape doors in the comparison building. Each door was repre-
sented by two vents; one representing leakage and one representing the open or
shut status of the door. For security and privacy reasons, apartment doors would
normally be shut at all times other than when occupants are moving through them.
They may be propped open for moving furniture or for cleaning staff in the case of
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serviced apartments. In case of a fire, the door may be left open by an egressing
occupants or held open by an incapacitated occupant, if they should succumb in the
doorway. An outside door was included for each stairwell and they were consid-
ered to be open for the duration of the fire, as they would be opened as egressing
occupants passed through them. The opening and closing of fire doors during oc-
cupant egress as discussed in Chapter 9 was not included since occupant response
was not simulated and B-RISK does not currently have the capability to include
vents opening and closing during egress.
12.3.5 Sprinkler system layout
As the building is hypothetical, a characteristic water supply curve was assumed,
shown in Figure 12.4. The water supply curve was chosen to allow the hydraulic
requirements to be met with reasonable pipe sizing while still allowing the criti-
cal threshold to be exceeded if more sprinklers were activated than required by the
sprinkler standard. For actual design, the measured water supply curve should be
used. Since the building had more than 3 storeys the use of NZS4515: Fire Sprin-
kler Systems for Life Safety in Sleeping Occupancies [8] was not an option, so the
sprinkler system was designed to NZS4541:2007 [9]. As a residential occupancy, the
sprinkler hazard group was extra low hazard (ELH) per NZS4541:2007 Table 2.1.
Based on the 3 m x 9 m apartment configuration, sprinklers were located on the
long dimension centreline 2.25 m from each end, to provide 13.5 m2 coverage each,
as shown in Figure 12.5. No more than two sprinklers could be activated in the
apartment fire scenario considered here due to the compartmentalisation, although
the hydraulic design was specified to the minimum required in NZS4541:2007 for
ELH, at least 4.1 mm/min or 50 kPa supplied to the most remote four sprinklers.
Both designs used 68oC activation 15 mm sprinklers with 8.0L/min√
kPa
K-factor, with
standard response glass bulbs in the comparison building and quick response glass
bulbs in the alternative building. To meet the hydraulic requirements, 32 mm pipe
was specified throughout. This configuration satisfied the 80% supply flow charac-
teristic criteria using the previously defined hydraulic supply curve. The sprinkler
thermal response parameters used are shown in Table 12.3. The parallel sprinkler
orientation RTI distributions from Tsui et al [10] were chosen as they were more con-
servative than for the perpendicular orientation.
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Figure 12.4: Hypothetical water supply for the SME building, measured at the riser on the
most hydraulically remote floor.
Figure 12.5: Sprinkler layout for one floor of the SME building. Nodes used for the hy-
draulic model are shown. All piping 32 mm diameter, dimensions shown in
m.
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Parameter Distribution Type Distribution Parameters Source
Standard RTI Normal µ=93.4(m s)1/2 σ=4.4(m s)1/2 [10]
Quick RTI Normal µ=39.1(m s)1/2 σ=2.9(m s)1/2 [10]
C Factor Normal µ=0.44 (m/s)−1 σ=0.01 (m/s)−1 [10]
Actuation T Normal µ=72oC σ=0.655oC [11]
Table 12.3: Distributions for the uncertainty in sprinkler parameters, used for both scenar-
ios.
12.3.6 Sprinkler system effectiveness
The distribution for sprinkler reliability reported in Chapter 4 with a mean of 95%
and a standard distribution of 1.6% was used for the single water supply sprinkler
system in the comparison building. No fire incident data has been identified that al-
lows the effect of sprinkler water supply to be isolated, including the NZFS data, but
it was assumed that most installed sprinkler systems have single supplies. The data
in Chapter 3 indicates that the reduction in water supply failure per demand ranges
from approximately 1 fire in 2000 to 1 fire in 100 from data reported by Brammer [12].
To estimate the increase in reliability due to a dual water supply, a uniform distribu-
tion from 5 x 10−5 to 1−2 was added to the reliability distribution for the comparison
building. This resulted in a mean reliability of 95.5% with a standard deviation of
1.63%, shown visually in Figure 12.6. The distribution reported in Chapter 4 for
sprinkler efficacy was used for the sprinklers in both buildings. The upgrade in
sprinkler system water supply between the two building designs would not affect
sprinkler efficacy.
12.3.7 Passive building elements
As this study was conducted prior to the door reliability data collection described in
Chapter 9, door reliability for the remote and fire apartments was estimated using
the residential door data discussed in Chapter 8 from the 1970 UK study [13]. A nor-
mal distribution with a mean reliability of 0.83 and a standard deviation of 0.0038
was estimated from a binomial distribution with n = 9887 and p = 0.83, since B-RISK
did not allow binomial distributions as a distribution type at the time this work was
completed.
The door size was 0.8 m wide x 2 m tall. Door leakage was estimated as a vent
with a uniform distribution for the width from 0.00025 m 0.023 m over the door
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Figure 12.6: Distributions used for sprinkler system reliability for the B-RISK risk-informed
examples. The first number in parenthesis for the log normal distributions is the
mean and the second is the standard deviation. The numbers for the uniform
distribution represent the upper and lower limits.
height of 2.0 m. The bounds of the uniform distribution were based on tight and
loose door leakage as reported by Klote and Milke [14] and described in Chapter 8.
The stairwell leakage was estimated by adding the leakage for all of the apartment
doors to the wall leakage reported by Klote and Milke.
An additional door was included on each floor that was not the fire floor or the
floor with the remote apartment to provide additional flow outlets for the stairwell
pressurisation fan. Since apartment doors opened directly onto the atrium in the
alternate building, the reliability was increased to a mean of 0.95 to account for
security, on the assumption that people would be reluctant to leave their front door
open when they left their apartment.
A large window representing the patio door to the balcony of 2 m x 2 m was
CHAPTER 12. USE OF THE B-RISK MODEL IN RISK-INFORMED FIRE SAFETY DESIGN 292
modelled using the same distribution for the probability that it was open at the time
of the fire as the fire compartment door.
12.3.8 Smoke management systems
The determination is not clear whether stairwell pressurisation was required in the
deemed-to-satisfy building. It was not listed in the determination as an additional
safety feature in the alternative building; however, the risk analysis that was per-
formed did not include pressurisation in the deemed-to-satisfy building design.
Therefore, the deemed-to-satisfy building was run in B-RISK with and without stair-
well pressurisation to determine the sensitivity of the time to untenability to the
presence of the pressurisation system. For the comparisons to the alternative build-
ing, the deemed-to-satisfy building without the stairwell pressurisation system was
used.
In the B-RISK model, the fans were initiated by a smoke detector placed in the
stairwell. A single fan was used for each stairwell, placed at the top of the stairwells
and using fan curve option with a flow rate of 10 m3/s. While the building design
called for four fans, three at the top and one at the bottom, they were not individu-
ally modelled because B-RISK can not model multiple fans in a compartment with
varying elevations and flow characteristics [1]. The design pressure limit was set at
50 Pa. A uniform distribution for the pressure limit from 25 Pa to 75 Pa was used,
based on the recommendation from Klote and Milke discussed in Chapter 10. Uni-
form reliability distributions were also used for the smoke detection system (limits
0.9 and 0.99, based on the simple system fault tree analysis by Gravestock [15]) A uni-
form distribution for the fan reliability (limits 0.72 to 0.97) and for the overall smoke
management system (limits 0.43 to 0.87) based on Gravestock’s [15] analysis, due to a
lack of better information on reliability uncertainty.
As described in the original building design, a drop down window activated
by the smoke detector in the fire compartment was included to provide a flow path
for the fire products to exit the building. The window size and location in the orig-
inal design was not specified so an estimate of 1 m x 1 m at a sill height of 1 m was
used.
The distribution in Chapter 10 for optical density at alarm for a photoelectric
smoke detector with flaming fires was used for both smoke detectors. Photoelectric
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detectors were chosen arbitrarily for these examples, for actual building design the
specified detector type should be used.
12.3.9 Design fires
Three types of apartment design fires were considered: the first used a randomly
placed t2 fire, the second used the item-to-item design fire generator with fixed item
locations representing a short stay furnished apartment, and the third used the item-
to-item design fire generator with random item placement representing a long term
leased apartment.
12.3.10 Apartment fuel package configuration for item-to-item fire spread design
fire
Two potential fuel package configurations for the design fire generator were consid-
ered: one approximating a short stay furnished apartment and one approximating
a long term leased apartment.
12.3.10.1 Short stay furnished apartment
The furniture and contents arrangement for a short stay apartment was considered
static, and the potential for additional fuel load from personal contents was consid-
ered minimal. A typical apartment furniture layout was estimated from diagrams
viewed on the building website, shown in Figure 12.7 [16]. The studio apartment
configuration with one sofa and a TV was used. Typical contents included a king-
sized bed, bedside table, wardrobe, dining set, three seat upholstered foam couch,
TV and stand, and coffee table. It was noted on the website that cots and high chairs
are available for rent, but these items were not considered in the analysis. This is
an example of fuel load uncertainty that could have been considered. The layout is
shown in Figure 12.8. Note that nothing was placed between the wardrobe and the
right end of the apartment because the bathroom was located there and which was
assumed to contain negligible quantities of exposed combustible items.
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Figure 12.7: Short stay furnished apartment item configurations, shown in diagrams from
the building website [16].
Figure 12.8: Floor plan for SME short stay apartment scenario, as displayed in B-RISK.
Sprinkler locations are shown as small squares.
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12.3.10.2 Long term leased apartment
In the case of a long term leased apartment, the location and quantity of contents
were considered to be more uncertain. The fire load energy density (FLED) was es-
timated to have a mean of 500 MJ/m2 and a standard deviation of 200 MJ/m2, based
on data reported in the New Zealand Fire Engineering Design Guide, 3rd edition [17]
for a “home” occupancy. The FLED was assumed to be normally distributed with
a lower bound of 50 MJ/m2. The lower bound approximately corresponded to one
bed and one table present in the room on an energy basis. The same items that were
used for the short stay scenario were used. A maximum of two items were allowed
for each of the item types with the exception of the bed which was only allowed one.
12.3.11 Item data
The item data listed here has been obtained from the literature for exemplar items
where available it is for demonstration only and should not be used for other sce-
narios. The primary goal of these case studies is to demonstrate the ability of B-RISK
to consider fire safety systems, not its ability to create realistic design fires.
Individual types of items and specific properties for individual items are listed
in the section below. Properties common to several items are discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
It should be noted that when using lognormal distributions fit using @Risk for
properties (eg. Hou [18]), the mean and standard distribution are the arithmetic mean
and standard distribution values for the log normal distribution of the standard
variable. The math libraries used by B-RISK use the normally distributed mean and
standard deviation of the log transformed variable, which are the log transformed
values of the geometric mean and standard deviation for the standard variable. This
method of parameter entry is available in @Risk using the RiskLogNorm2 distribu-
tion.
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Figure 12.9: Estimated HRR for the bed, based on furniture calorimeter data from
Madrzykowski and Kerber (shown) [20].
12.3.12 Item descriptions and specific material property estimates
12.3.12.1 Bed
The apartment was assumed to contain one king-sized bed. It has been noted that
predicting the HRR of a bed is difficult due to interactions with the room geometry
and ventilation conditions [19], thus there is a large source of uncertainty that is not
accounted for with a single HRR curve for such an item. Nevertheless, a HRR his-
tory for the bed was estimated from a test performed at NIST, shown in Figure 12.9.
The NIST test included a typical bed setup with a mattress, box spring, and bedding.
The combustible mass was assumed to be 45 kg from the test data. The size of the
bed was 2.03 m x 2.01 m x 0.42 m, which included both mattress and box springs.
CO2 yield and hc distributions were obtained from Hou’s analysis [18] of the
test data, using the total burn period. For the CO2 yield, a lognormal distribution
was used with µ = 0.81 and σ = 0.31 (as noted previously, this was the mean and
standard deviation of the normally distributed logarithm of the CO2 yield). For the
hc distribution, a normal distribution with µ = 21.5 MJ/kg and σ = 6.5 MJ/kg was
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Figure 12.10: Normal distribution using sample mean and standard deviation compared
with the gamma distribution proposed by Hou [18] for the king sized bed hc.
used to approximate the gamma distribution proposed by Hou, since B-RISK did
not include a gamma distribution option at the time. The two distributions can be
seen in Figure 12.10. The HRRPUA was estimated to be 1220 kW/m2 from the peak
HRR divided by the plan area of the bed.
The ignition parameters for the PU/polyester combination and the soot yield
for foam and fabric as described in Section 12.2 were used for the bed.
12.3.12.2 Wardrobe
The wardrobe was assumed to be constructed of 19 mm MDF. The estimated HRR
was obtained from test 61 described by Lawson et al [21], shown in Figure 12.11.
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Figure 12.11: Estimated HRR for the wardrobe, based on furniture calorimeter data from
Lawson et al (shown) [21].
The MDF yields, hc, and ignition parameters described in Section 12.2 were
used for the wardrobe. The combustible mass was estimated to be 120 kg, based on
the NBS test. The dimensions of the wardrobe were 1.23 m x 0.4 m x 1.83 m.
12.3.12.3 Bedside, television, dining and coffee tables
The bedside, television, and coffee tables were approximated as .6 m x 0.6 m x 0.6 m
medium density fibreboard (MDF) cubes, weighing 22 kg. The estimated HRR is
shown in Figure 12.12.
A dining room set with three chairs and a table were included in the contents
of the apartment. The chairs were assumed to provide a negligible contribution to
the fire. The table was simulated as MDF construction, using the same parameters
as used for the other tables.
The MDF yields, hc, and ignition parameters described in Section 12.2 were
used for the tables.
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Figure 12.12: Estimated HRR for the bedside and coffee tables, based on furniture calorime-
ter data from MDF cubes (shown) [2].
12.3.12.4 Television
The television was estimated to have similar characteristics to the mock television
tested for the B-RISK item-to-item validation tests [2]. The combustible mass was
estimated at 3.72 kg. The ABS ignition properties from Section 12.2 were used for
the television. The estimated HRR is shown in Figure 12.13.
For the yields and heat of combustion, plastics data from the SFPE handbook
were used [5]. Specific data for ABS was not available for the CO2 yield or radiant
loss fraction so distributions were estimated from the data for other plastic materi-
als. Table 12.4 lists the properties of ABS used. The HRRPUA was estimated to be
300 kW/m2.
12.3.12.5 Sofa
The sofa was assumed to be a sleeper sofa similar to the one tested by Madrzykowski
and Kerber [20]. The dimensions were 1.83 m x 0.75 m x 0.83 m, and the combustible
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Figure 12.13: Estimated HRR for the television, based on furniture calorimeter data from a
mock TV (shown) [2].
Parameter Units Mean Standard Deviation Lower bound Upper bound
hc MJ/kg 30 2 26 34
Soot yield kg/kg 0.105 0.002 0.085 0.12
CO2 yield kg/kg 2.33 0.15 2.3 2.36
χrad 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.7
Table 12.4: ABS properties estimated from SFPE handbook data [5].
mass was assumed to be 48 kg. The HRR measured by Madrzykowski and Kerber
and the estimated HRR are shown in Figure 12.14.
The ignition parameters for the PU/polyester combination and the soot yield
for foam and fabric as described in Section 12.2 were used for the sofa. The HRRPUA
was estimated to be 1800 kW/m2.
CO2 yield and hc distributions were obtained from Hou’s analysis [18] of the test
data, using the total burn period. For the CO2 yield, a lognormal distribution was
used with µ = 0.7 and σ = 0.17. For the hc distribution, a normal distribution with µ
= 16.9 MJ/kg and σ = 2.8 MJ/kg was used to approximate the gamma distribution
proposed by Hou.
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Figure 12.14: Estimated HRR for the sofa, based on furniture calorimeter data from
Madrzykowski and Kerber (shown) [20].
12.3.12.6 Stove
While stoves are generally non-combustible, stove top fires are common. An item
corresponding to a 30 cm diameter pan with 0.5 kg oil was added at stove top height
(1 m). It was assumed that if the pan was not the first item ignited that it would not
contribute to the room HRR, because it is not likely that an occupant would keep a
pan of oil on the stove any time they were not cooking with it. To prevent ignition by
other items, the FTP parameters were set high. The oil was approximated as light
hydrocarbon oil, with heat of combustion, species yield, and radiant loss fraction
data from the SFPE handbook [5]. The HRR was estimated to be constant at 30 kW
for 140 s, based on the pool area in the pan and the estimated energy content of the
assumed volume of oil.
12.3.12.7 Properties used for t2 design fire
The properties of the sofa for the item-to-item were used with the α distribution
from Young [22] (discussed in Chapter 5) for the t2 design fire scenario.
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12.3.13 Modelled compartments
The modelled compartments for the alternative and compliant buildings are shown
in Figure 12.15. The modelled compartments included the apartment of fire ori-
gin and one remote apartment on the top floor to determine smoke spread into
other apartments. The apartment dimensions were 9 m x 3 m x 3 m high. For
the alternative building, a single vertical compartment was used to model the stair-
well/landing compartment. The model geometry for the alternative building was
similar to that used by one of the experts for the determination [23]. The alternative
stairwell was modelled as a shaft 7.5 m x 4.7 m x 48 m tall. For the compliant build-
ing, the two separate stairwells were included, as well as the horizontal lobby areas
connecting the apartment of fire origin and the remote apartment to the stairwells.
The stairwells were modelled as 48 m tall shafts with plan dimensions of 4.7 m x 2 m.
The lobby dimensions were 9 m x 4.7 m x 3 m high. The B-RISK default boundary
material (concrete) and thickness (100 mm) were used.
12.3.14 B-RISK results
Due to time and computational resource constraints, 500 iterations were completed
for each of the four B-RISK configurations; the alternative building with t2, short
stay, and long term apartment design fires, and the compliant building with the t2
design fire.
12.3.14.1 Comparison between design fire scenarios
The t2, short stay, and long term design fire scenarios produced similar maximum
HRR distributions for the alternative building, as shown in Figure 12.16. This was
due primarily to the sprinklers limiting the maximum HRR for the majority of the
fires in all design fire scenarios, keeping the maximum HRR below 1 MW. There was
more uncertainty in the time to sprinkler activation for the t2 design fire option as
shown in Figure 12.17, due to the greater uncertainty in the t2 growth rate distribu-
tion. If the sprinklers failed to have an effect on the fire the maximum HRR increased
beyond 1 MW in some circumstances, depending on the fire growth rate or how
many items ignited for the t2 and item-to-item fire spread scenarios, respectively,
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(a) Alternative (b) Compliant
Figure 12.15: The B-RISK models for the SME building as seen in Smokeview.
and the total amount of available ventilation determined by the size and number of
open vents. Fires up to approximately 20 MW were simulated in some instances.
These larger fires tended to lead to shorter times to untenability, as expected. Large
fires such as these may begin to adversely affect the compartmentalisation of the
building. This analysis did not include the effects of the fire on the passive building
elements, so additional investigation of these scenarios perhaps using alternative
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Figure 12.16: Maximum HRR histogram comparing design fire scenarios for the SME alter-
native building.
models would be required in a full risk analysis.
The fire did not spread beyond the first item in the majority of the iterations
for the two item-to-item design fire generator scenarios, as shown in Figure 12.18.
Approximately 18% of the iterations for the short stay scenario had fire spread to
one item, which was primarily due to the fact that the TV was placed directly above
the TV stand. There was item-to-item fire spread in approximately 2% of the long
term stay scenario, including one iteration where four items were ignited. As the
random item placement algorithm does not place items over top of each other (as
was the case for the TV on the TV stand in the short stay scenario), the minimum
distance was larger for the long term scenario. The presence of the sprinklers also
prevented item-to-item fire spread. The use of piloted ignition FTP properties for
the item-to-item fire spread input may have increased the number of subsequent
items ignited.
Less than 1% of simulations exceeded the FED criteria for each type of design
fire, both for toxic gases and for thermal radiation, even in the fire compartment.
For the alternative building, neither FED criteria was exceeded in any iterations for
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Figure 12.17: Sprinkler activation time histogram comparing design fire scenarios for the
SME alternative building. NR = no sprinkler response in the simulated time.
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Figure 12.18: Secondary item ignition for the SME alternative building design fire scenarios.
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the stairwell and remote apartment. Figure 12.19 compares the number of iterations
for each type of design fire where the FEDg was reached in the fire compartment.
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Figure 12.19: Histogram of runs reaching the FEDg criteria in the fire compartment for the
SME alternative building design fire scenarios.
More iterations exceeded the visibility criteria with the t2 design fire scenario.
The histogram of times where the visibility was exceeded in the alternative building
are shown in Figure 12.20.
The visibility criteria was exceeded in the stairwell during the simulated time
of 600 s for 35 iterations with the t2 design fire, compared to 38 and 23 for the short
stay and long term stay scenarios, respectively.
There did not appear to be any advantage to using the item-to-item DFG to
generate the design fire relative to using the t2 design fire, so the t2 design fire was
used for the comparison between the compliant and alternative buildings as it was
more computationally efficient to run.
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Figure 12.20: Visibility criteria histograms for the fire compartment and stairwell in the SME
alternative building.
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12.3.14.2 Comparison between the SME compliant and alternative buildings using
the t2 design fire scenario
A comparison of the maximum HRR between the SME compliant and alternative
buildings is shown in Figure 12.21. The maximum HRR for the compliant building
tended to be higher than the alternative building, due to the slower responding
standard response sprinklers in the compliant building. The response time of the
first sprinkler is shown in Figure 12.22.
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Figure 12.21: Maximum HRR histogram comparing the SME alternative and compliant
buildings using the t2 design fire scenario.
The FED criteria was not exceeded for either the compliant or the alternative
buildings for any of the compartments outside of the fire compartment so only vis-
ibility was used for comparison. Figure 12.23 compares the number of runs for the
compliant and alternative buildings where the visibility criteria was exceeded in the
stairs.
Compared to the individual stairwells in the compliant building, the probabil-
ity of exceeding the visibility criteria in the alternative building stairwell within the
simulated time was nearly double. When compared to runs where the visibility cri-
teria in both stairwells in the compliant building was reached (ie. when occupants
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Figure 12.22: Sprinkler activation time histogram comparing the SME alternative and com-
pliant buildings using the t2 design fire scenario.
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Figure 12.23: Visibility criteria histogram comparing stairwell visibility in the SME alterna-
tive and compliant buildings using the t2 design fire scenario.
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in upper floors had no tenable escape route option), the visibility in the alternative
stairwell reached the criteria almost seven times more often.
A comparison between the time to reaching the visibility criteria for the fire
floor lobby in the compliant building and the stairwell in the alternative building
was done as a measure of the risk to the occupants in other apartments on the fire
floor, shown in Figure 12.24. Approximately 70% of the iterations reached the visi-
bility criteria in the compliant building fire floor lobby, compared to the 8% of itera-
tions where the visibility criteria was reached in the alternative building stairwell.
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Figure 12.24: Visibility criteria histogram comparing the SME alternative building stairwell
and the compliant building fire floor lobby using the t2 design fire scenario.
The visibility criteria in the remote apartment was never reached in the com-
pliant building. It was reached in 1.4% of the runs in the alternative building.
12.3.14.3 Effect of stairwell pressurisation
The addition of stairwell pressurisation in the simulated compliant building did not
measurably reduce the estimated probability that both stairwells would become un-
tenable simultaneously, as shown in Figure 12.25, although the probability was only
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1% both with and without pressurisation. In order to reach untenability in both
stairs, a combination of a failed sprinkler system, doors open to both stairwells,
failed pressurisation in both stairwells, and a sufficient fire growth rate to cause un-
tenability within the simulated time had to occur within the same simulation. This
made the outcome sensitive to the random selection of input variables for individ-
ual runs. As expected the probability of individual stairwells becoming untenable
within the simulated time was higher, reaching 7% where pressurisation was not
present and 5% where pressurisation was present, shown in Figure 12.26. The low
probability of both stairwells becoming untenable with or without pressurisation
indicates that pressurisation would have a greater effect on fire risk in the alterna-
tive building compared to the compliant building. The compliant building without
stairwell pressurisation was still safer than the alternative building for occupants
above the fire floor, when comparing tenability in the means of escape during the
simulated time.
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Figure 12.25: Visibility criteria histogram comparing the probability of both stairwells be-
coming untenable in the SME compliant building with and without stairwell
pressurisation, using the t2 design fire scenario.
Based on the ASET analysis described here, it appears that the alternative
building may not as safe as the compliant building for occupants above the fire
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Figure 12.26: Visibility criteria histogram comparing the probability of a single stairwell be-
coming untenable in the SME compliant building with and without stairwell
pressurisation, using the t2 design fire scenario.
floor, although the compliant building may have more risk for occupants on the fire
floor. This does not take different evacuation schemes into consideration, and does
not evaluate if the alternative building is “safe enough” to meet society’s objectives.
12.4 140 William Street
The second building where risk is compared using B-RISK is the 140 William Street
building described in Chapter 1. An elevation view of the building can be seen in
Figure 12.27. A typical plan view of a floor in the building is shown in Figure 12.28.
Similar to the original risk assessment, three building design configurations were
compared with B-RISK; “existing”, “deemed-to-satisfy” (DTS, comparable to the
Building Code of Australia (BCA) configuration in the original report), and “refur-
bished”.
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Figure 12.27: 140 William Street building elevation view, from Thomas et al [24].
CHAPTER 12. USE OF THE B-RISK MODEL IN RISK-INFORMED FIRE SAFETY DESIGN 314
40000
  
S
ta
ir
s
 (
s
)
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
S
ta
ir
s
 (
s
) 
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
L
if
t 
S
h
a
ft
Open plan office area (j)
Lobby (o) Lobby (c)
Enclosure (i)
12500
1
2
5
0
0
30005500
Figure 12.28: 140 William Street building typical plan view, from Thomas et al [24]. Dimen-
sions in mm.
12.4.1 Modelled compartments
In the original report, the fire was assumed to initiate in a small room on one level.
The fire model represented the building space in simplified enclosures as follows:
1. Compartment of fire origin (i)
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2. Remainder of office space on fire floor (j)
3. Outer lobby (o)
4. Inner lobby (c)
5. Stairwell (s)
6. Floor above fire (k).
In the B-RISK model, the fire was assumed to start in the compartment j which
represented the open space on the fire floor, and the entire office area on the floor
was assumed to be open plan. This decision was made to demonstrate the full sprin-
kler system hydraulic modelling capabilities. For actual building design, it would
be necessary to consider fires in both compartment i and j. Since B-RISK is not ca-
pable of directly modelling the exact floor geometry with the lobbies and lift shafts
located in the centre of the office floor, the lobbies and stair shafts were modelled
adjacent to the office area as shown in Figure 12.29. For the existing and refurbished
building, a single combined lobby was modelled on the fire floor and split lobbies
were modelled on the remote floor. For the DTS building, the office areas were con-
nected directly to the stair shafts without lobbies.
12.4.2 Building fire protection features in the B-RISK model
In general, each occupied floor in all three configurations consisted of a mixture of
open-plan office area and a number of small office enclosures surrounding a central
services corridor, which included two protected stairwells and eight lift shafts. The
following sections summarise how each aspect of the building’s fire protection sys-
tems relevant to the scope of this thesis were considered in the risk analysis. For
more detailed information including diagrams, refer to the original report [24].
12.4.2.1 Structural member fire protection
As noted, one of the major changes proposed for the refurbishment was to remove
the asbestos-based fire protection material from the floor slab and associated beams.
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Figure 12.29: The B-RISK models for the 140 William Street building as seen in Smokeview.
A set of fire tests were conducted to determine the performance of the unprotected
structural elements, and it was concluded that they would perform adequately un-
der the required fire conditions. While the major objective of the original study was
to determine if fire protection was required on these elements, it is not considered
here because structural fire protection is not part of the scope of the B-RISK project.
As specific information was not available from the original risk analysis, the
curtain walls of the compartment of fire origin and the floor above the fire were
assumed to be 20 mm plate glass and the walls of the remaining compartments
were assumed to be 100 mm concrete for heat transfer purposes. The floors and
ceilings of all of the compartments were assumed to be 100 mm concrete. Standard
B-RISK database properties were used for both types of materials. Similar leakage
distributions were used as were previously used for the SME building designs.
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12.4.2.2 Fire doors
In all of the buildings, the stairwell access doors are fire-rated and have automatic
closers. For the existing building, a small lobby for each stairwell is also separated
from the outer lobby area by fire-rated doors. The DTS building did not require the
secondary doors since a zone or sandwich pressurisation system was included (the
DTS solution required either secondary doors or the zone pressurisation system).
For the proposed building, the secondary fire doors were included but were held
open and automatically closed in the event that either or both of the two smoke
detectors positioned outside each door activated.
For doors with closers and no hold open devices, the probability that the door
was held open was estimated based on the office data discussed in Chapter 8 from
the 1970 UK study [13]. A normal distribution with a mean reliability of 0.82 and a
standard deviation of 0.0045 was estimated from a binomial distribution with n =
8055 and p = 0.82. Hold open devices for doors equipped with them in the refur-
bished building were activated by the smoke detection system, and were assumed
to have a reliability of 1.
Similar door leakage distributions were used as were previously used for the
SME building designs, discussed in Section 12.3.7.
12.4.2.3 Sprinkler System
Since the water supply flow characteristics present at the building site were not
readily available, a supply flow characteristic at the most remote floor was assumed
as shown in Figure 12.30. The water supply was chosen to meet the OH hydraulic
requirements for the DTS building with reasonable pipe sizing but without excess
supply to ensure the system was challenged. The shape of the curve was chosen to
allow higher spray densities with less sprinklers activated, and to ensure the critical
minimum pressure threshold was reached if more than six sprinklers were activated.
All of the sprinklers on the fire floor were modelled along with the hydraulic
system. The sprinkler thermal response parameters for the 140 William Street build-
ing B-RISK model were the same as described in Table 12.3 for the SME building
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Figure 12.30: Hypothetical water supply for the 140 William Street building, measured at
the riser on the most hydraulically remote floor.
standard response sprinklers. The piping was specified to meet the hydraulic re-
quirements for ELH and OH1 hazard classifications for commercial buildings. For
the ELH classification, the six most hydraulically remote sprinklers were required
to be supplied with a minimum spray density of 4.1 mm/min or a minimum pres-
sure of 50 kPa, with a maximum spacing of 4.6 m and single sprinkler coverage area
of 21 m2. For the OH1 system, the six most hydraulically remote sprinklers were
required to be supplied with a minimum spray density of 5.5 mm/min or a mini-
mum pressure of 50 kPa, with a maximum spacing of 4 m and a maximum coverage
area of 12 m2 per sprinkler. These criteria were based on the NZS 4541:2007, which
were slightly different than the original Australian requirements for the OH hazard
classification which had a maximum spacing of 3.5 m. Sprinkler K factors of 8 L/min√
kPa
were used, with 50 mm and 38 mm piping as shown in shown in Figures 12.31
and 12.32 for the ELH and OH1 configurations, respectively. Due to the limitations
of the B-RISK compartment geometry, the exact sprinkler configuration that would
be present in the room was not specified, but was matched to the modified compart-
ment geometry used in B-RISK.
The fire HRR was set to resume growing if the sprinkler system was “overrun”;
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that is, if the critical minimum supply pressure or spray density was reached. This
resulted in all of the sprinklers activating if the system was overrun.
38 mm 
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Figure 12.31: ELH sprinkler layout for one floor of the 140 William Street building. Nodes
used for the hydraulic model are shown. Dimensions shown in m, except for
nominal pipe diameters shown in mm.
As no data has been found to support the influence of monitored valves on
sprinkler system effectiveness, they were not taken into consideration. The distri-
butions from Chapter 4 for sprinkler reliability and efficacy were used for the exist-
ing and refurbished buildings, while the distributions used for the SME alternative
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Figure 12.32: OH sprinkler layout for one floor of the 140 William Street building. Nodes
used for the hydraulic model are shown. Dimensions shown in m, except for
nominal pipe diameters shown in mm.
building were used for the refurbished building due to the additional gravity water
supply.
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12.4.2.4 Smoke Management System
In the existing building, neither stairwell pressurisation or zone smoke control was
available in case of fire. However, the air handling system would shut down if a
smoke detector activated or the sprinkler pressure switch indicated a low pressure.
For the DTS and refurbished building, both stairwell pressurisation and zone smoke
control were included, activated by the same means as the air handling shut down
in the existing building.
The DTS and refurbished design included more smoke detectors than the ex-
isting building, which only had smoke detectors installed in the return air ducts.
Only the stairwell pressurisation system was included in the B-RISK model,
not the zone smoke control system. Smoke detectors were placed in the stairwells to
activate the fans and in the fire compartment to activate the doors with hold-open
devices for the refurbished building. The hold-open device reliability was set at 1.
The inputs for the pressurisation system were consistent with the SME building as
described in Section 12.3.8.
12.4.3 Design fires
The design fire was located in the open plan office area. Two design fire config-
urations were considered: a t2 fire using the distribution from Young for α and a
randomly populated item-to-item design fire generator configuration using work-
stations as the items. For the t2 fire, the peak HRR was set at a constant 20 MW as per
C/VM2 [25], which was reached if the growth rate was sufficient and the sprinklers
did not intervene due to the available air in the fire compartment. The FLED for the
office floor was estimated to have a mean of 800 MJ/m2 with a standard deviation
of 300 MJ/m2, based on reported data for an “office, business” occupancy [17]. The
FLED was assumed to be normally distributed with a lower bound of 100 MJ/m2,
to prevent an empty floor (FLED = 0 MJ/m2) or a negative FLED. The 100 MJ/m2
lower FLED bound corresponded to a minimum of 64 workstations in the fire com-
partment. The soot yield for both configurations was set to a uniform distribution
from 0.05 kg/kg to 0.2 kg/kg based on the range discussed in BRANZ Study Report
Number 185, which was used as the basis for the C/VM2 soot yield criteria [4].
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Figure 12.33: Heat release rate from two NIST workstation tests [26,27] and the theoretical
HRR used for the B-RISK workstation item.
12.4.3.1 Office workstation
Data published by NIST was used to estimate the contents, combustible mass, and
heat release rate of the workstations [26]. The workstations included partitions, desk,
chair, computer, wastebasket, and papers. The heat release rate reported in the NIST
studies was obtained in a calorimeter and compartment effects were not included.
The combustible mass was assumed to be 100 kg as measured in the NIST Cook
County tests, and primarily made up of ordinary combustible material such as pa-
per, particleboard, and wood, with polyurethane foam in the chair and ABS plastic
for the computer components.
The measured HRR from the NIST tests and the theoretical HRR used for the
B-RISK workstation item are shown in Figure 12.33. The theoretical HRR was a t2
fire with a growth time constant of 250 s to 1055 kW (slightly faster than a medium
fire) up to a peak HRR of 3400 kW and then exponential decay with a time constant
of 0.025 s−1.
To account for the possibility that either an ordinary combustible material like
MDF or paper, plastic like a wastebasket or computer component, or upholstered
CHAPTER 12. USE OF THE B-RISK MODEL IN RISK-INFORMED FIRE SAFETY DESIGN 323
furniture like the office chair might be the first item ignited in the workstation, three
separate items were created with ignition properties for the three types of materials
listed above. The ABS, MDF, and PU/polyester foam combination ignition proper-
ties were used for the three types of item.
As the office workstation represented a composite item made of several materi-
als, the generic heat of combustion, yields, and radiant loss fraction from C/VM2 [25]
were used, with uniform distributions representing ±25% of the nominal values.
12.4.4 B-RISK results
12.4.4.1 Comparison between design fires
The maximum HRR and sprinkler activation characteristics were compared between
the t2 and DFG design fires. The maximum HRR histograms can be seen in Fig-
ure 12.34. The DFG design fire resulted in less iterations with a low maximum HRR.
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Figure 12.34: Comparison of the maximum HRR for the t2 and DFG design fires.
Histograms comparing the first sprinkler activation times for the t2 and DFG
design fires can be seen in Figure 12.35. The single characteristic HRR curve for
the DFG office workstation item resulted in much less spread in sprinkler activation
times, grouped tightly around 250 s for both the existing and DTS building configu-
rations.
CHAPTER 12. USE OF THE B-RISK MODEL IN RISK-INFORMED FIRE SAFETY DESIGN 324
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 NR 
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
First sprinkler activation time (s) 
t² design fire 
DFG design fire 
t² design fire - 
cumulative 
DFG design fire - 
cumulative 
(a) Existing
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 NR 
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
First sprinkler activation time (s) 
t² design fire 
DFG design fire 
t² design fire - cumulative 
DFG design fire - 
cumulative 
(b) DTS
Figure 12.35: Comparison of the first sprinkler activation time for the t2 and DFG design
fires. (NR = no response)
A comparison of the number of sprinklers activated for the t2 and DFG design
fires is shown in Figure 12.36. There were no iterations where sprinklers did not
activate before the maximum simulation time of 600 s was reached, again because
of the fixed HRR for each item. Otherwise, the number of sprinklers activated was
consistent between the two design fire approaches.
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Figure 12.36: Comparison of the number of sprinklers activated for the t2 and DFG design
fires.
The large variation between the two design fire approaches resulted in the
decision to compare the tenability in the stairwells using both approaches.
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12.4.4.2 Comparison between building configurations using the t2 design fire
A comparison of the peak HRR for the three building configurations using the t2
design fire is shown in Figure 12.37. The OH building had a higher probability
of lower peak HRRs due to the closer sprinkler spacing causing the sprinklers to
activate earlier, as shown in Figure 12.38.
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Figure 12.37: Peak HRR for 140 William Street building designs for the t2 design fire.
A histogram of the number of sprinklers activated for each of the three build-
ing designs is shown in Figure 12.39. There was not a significant difference between
the ELH and OH sprinkler system designs.
Comparisons of the probability to reaching the visibility criteria for the fire
compartment, single stairwells, and both stairwells in each iteration can be seen in
Figures 12.40, 12.41, and 12.42, respectively. The refurbished design had a higher
probability of the visibility criteria being reached in the fire compartment relative
to the existing design, possibly due to the higher reliability of the doors with hold
open devices. With the doors closed, the smoke layer would be able to reach a
lower height in the fire compartment as it would not be allowed to flow into the
adjacent compartments as quickly. The probability of reaching the visibility criteria
within the simulated time was low for all buildings, occurring in less than 0.25% of
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Figure 12.38: Sprinkler activation times for the 140 William Street building designs for the
t2 design fire.
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Figure 12.39: Number of sprinklers activated for the 140 William Street building designs for
the t2 design fire.
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simulation runs, so the outcome was sensitive to random input parameter selection
in individual simulations. The DTS design had significantly higher probability of
reaching untenable conditions in the stairwells compared to the existing and refur-
bished building designs.
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Figure 12.40: Histogram showing the probability of reaching the visibility criteria in the 140
William Street fire compartment for the t2 design fire.
12.4.4.3 Comparison between building configurations using the DFG design fire
The secondary items ignited for the DFG design fire are shown in Figure 12.43. The
DTS building had slightly lower numbers of items ignited, likely due to the closer
sprinkler spacing for the OH sprinkler system. Approximately 80% of the iterations
for all three building configurations had no items ignited.
The histogram for the time to reach untenability in the fire compartment using
the DFG design fire is shown in Figure 12.44. Similar to the t2 design fire results, the
DTS building was more likely to reach the visibility criteria sooner than the existing
or refurbished building configuration.
Only two of the iterations using the DFG design fire resulted in the visibility
criteria being reached in the existing configuration, compared to 12 for the DTS con-
figuration and one for the refurbished configuration. This indicates again that the
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Figure 12.41: Histogram showing the probability of reaching the visibility criteria in a single
stair in the 140 William Street building for the t2 design fire.
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Figure 12.42: Histogram showing the probability of reaching the visibility criteria in both
stairs in the 140 William Street building for the t2 design fire.
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Figure 12.43: Secondary items ignited for the 140 William Street building designs using the
DFG design fire.
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Figure 12.44: Time to reach the visibility criteria in the fire compartment for the 140 William
Street building designs using the DFG design fire.
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building ranking from lowest to highest fire risk was the DTS, existing, and refur-
bished building. This conclusion is similar to what was reached in the original risk
assessment.
12.5 Conclusions
B-RISK’s capabilities for modelling fire safety systems have been demonstrated for
two types of buildings, one residential and the other commercial. In its state at the
time of writing, B-RISK can provide a probabilistic estimate of the time to unten-
ability for room contents fires. B-RISK does not provide a complete assessment of
fire risk, but can be used by fire safety practitioners to make risk-informed decisions
along with other information and tools to complete the fire risk picture.
For the purpose of comparatively evaluating fire safety systems, the advanced
item-to-item fire spread calculation ability of the design fire generator did not ap-
pear to make a substantial difference, although this was likely influenced by the
presence of sprinklers which did not allow the majority of the fires to grow to the
point where spread to other items would have occurred.
From a tenability analysis standpoint, the B-RISK analysis predicted that the
compliant building was safer than the alternative building for the SME design for
occupants above the fire floor and less safe for occupants on the fire floor. For the
140 William Street building, the ranking from least safe to most safe using B-RISK
matched the original risk assessment (DTS, existing, refurbished). Additional anal-
ysis taking other factors such as occupant behaviour and fire service response into
consideration would be required to determine the overall comparative level of risk
to the building occupants for both buildings.
It appears that a major limiting factor in the ability of the B-RISK tool to evalu-
ate the comparative risk from competing building designs is the lack of good quality
information on system effectiveness. This thesis has attempted to address some of
the gaps by collecting existing data from the literature, examining recent fire inci-
dent data from the NZFS, and developing new methods for collecting data; however
there are still missing pieces which will be discussed in the future work section in
Chapter 13. It is hoped that more emphasis on collecting high quality information
will be achieved by increasing the awareness of the potential value of the improved
information.
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CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE
WORK
13.1 Conclusions
The following conclusions have been reached as an outcome of this research:
13.1.1 Performance based design requires performance based data
While a paucity of data will likely always be a stumbling block due to the rarity of
fire in buildings, it is clear that current practices for collecting fire system effective-
ness data are not adequate to support risk-informed, performance-based fire safety
building design. Not only does the lack of useful information from fire incident
data prevent the adequate assessment of the performance of future designs, it does
not provide any insights into the effects on societal fire risk from the transition to
performance-based design.
Much of this data needs to come from cooperation with operational staff who
are involved with real fires and the ongoing condition of the building. This in-
cludes operational fire service personnel, those involved with inspection, testing,
and maintenance, and the building staff themselves. If there is no drive for change
from fire safety design practitioners to improve the data collection process, who
stand to benefit from it in the ability to make more informed decisions on the fire
334
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safety performance of building designs, it will not improve because no other stake-
holder has the knowledge of what information is required to assess the fire safety of
buildings on a performance basis.
In order to generate a large enough body of information, the collection of use-
ful data needs to take place on a sustained, ongoing basis. With modern data anal-
ysis capabilities, the accumulating data can be continuously incorporated and eval-
uated as to its relevance.
13.1.2 New advances in technology can be used to improve fire safety system
data collection
A list of recommendations have been made throughout this research to improve
the collection of data on system effectiveness. By linking databases for inspection,
maintenance, testing, and design data with fire incident data, a much better picture
of the factors that influence system performance can be formed. The system perfor-
mance in a fire can be compared to the original objectives from the design data. Any
system deficiencies noted in inspection or testing such as inadequate water supply
pressure can be linked to system performance in actual fires.
The availability of inexpensive microcontrollers, sensors, and integrated cir-
cuits can allow data to be collected on building elements such as doors, as demon-
strated in this thesis. This opens up a potential source of information that would
have been uneconomic to collect without recent technological advances.
13.1.3 B-RISK capabilities for considering fire safety system effectiveness
The new fire safety design tool B-RISK includes a range of capabilities for includ-
ing the effectiveness of fire safety systems. Probabilistic parameters for sprinkler,
passive, and smoke management systems are available for reliability and effective-
ness. Uncertainty in the time-based response of active systems can be considered
with probabilistic parameters for detector response and system effects on the fire.
A new hydraulic module can account for the effects of changing water supply flow
characteristics.
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B-RISK has limitations in considering the effects of systems. The effects of sys-
tem interactions such as the influence of sprinklers on smoke management systems
due to changed smoke characteristics are not included. B-RISK does not include
comprehensive capabilities to include the effects of fire on the systems, such as the
degradation of structural elements over time. B-RISK is primarily capable of con-
sidering the status of systems prior to the time of ignition and during the growth
phase before the fire becomes fully developed. The effects of systems on occupant
behaviour are not included and vice versa.
At the moment, B-RISK is limited to tenability analysis and should be used
in conjunction with other models for occupant and fire service response. A major
limitation in the implementation of the fire safety system capabilities in B-RISK that
have been developed in this research is the previously defined lack of useful infor-
mation to enter into the model input parameters.
13.1.4 Maintaining a “consistent level of crudeness” between model and input
data
The choice of fire model should be evaluated for the specific purpose that it is being
used for in terms of complexity and sources of uncertainty. A zone model may be
sufficiently sophisticated for tenability analysis during early fire development for
many design applications where there are large sources of uncertainty in the model
inputs when considering potential fires over the lifetime of the building. The use of
a more complicated model may provide misplaced confidence in the model results
if the model input uncertainty is not taken into account.
For the cases where a more complicated deterministic model is justified, sources
of uncertainty can be considered by incorporating many of the probabilistic func-
tions from B-RISK with a more sophisticated deterministic model. The use of this
type of tool will be limited by available computational resources, as the increased
computational requirements of the more sophisticated deterministic model will be
multiplied by the number of runs required by the probabilistic component.
13.2 Future work
The following areas of future work would be useful to enhance knowledge of fire
safety system effectiveness for risk-informed fire safety design:
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• As mentioned in the Conclusions section, data collection on fire safety systems
is not ideal for implementation into performance-based design. It would be
useful to monitor how fire incident data is being collected in New Zealand and
work to improve the systems aspect of this data. A study on the cost/benefit
relationship of allocating more resources to data collection would be interest-
ing.
• Experimental work on the effectiveness of sprinklers under different water
supply conditions would be useful to provide more information on the mini-
mum supply requirements for effective sprinkler operation.
• Data on passive building element performance is limited and could be ex-
panded. The door position logging devices described in Chapter 9 can be
modified to log window position. Window position could be measured with
the compass or accelerometer for hinged windows (side and top swinging, re-
spectively) or a linear sensor could be used to track sliding windows. Data on
more types of doors could be collected.
• Data on service penetrations in walls and leakage of doors is currently limited,
more investigation into this area is warranted. This would require gaining
access to service areas of buildings, and thus would be most suited to a person
who already has access to these areas.
• Data on smoke management system effectiveness appears to be particularly
lacking. A database of buildings in New Zealand that have these systems in-
stalled would be useful to track any actual fire incidents that occur in buildings
with these systems. Once fires in buildings with these systems have been iden-
tified, work to attempt to quantify the performance of the smoke management
systems in terms of the fire risk objectives might be possible. One potential
area of research might be to identify if pressure measurement is undertaken
in buildings with stairwell pressurisation systems and therefore if pressure
differential data from both testing and real fire incidents in these buildings is
available.
• Interactions between fire safety systems are not well understood and need to
be developed further to understand the effects of multiple systems on fire risk
in buildings.
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• Potential areas for future research for fire safety system effects on evacua-
tion include additional data collection on door negotiation time, detector and
alarm activation uncertainty and sensitivity, and smoke control system effects
on evacuation (such as increased time to negotiate doors due to differential
pressures).
The following areas of future work would be useful to enhance the ability of
B-RISK to consider fire safety systems effects for risk-informed fire safety design:
• The ability of B-RISK to consider the effects of systems in later stages of fires
could be enhanced by adding models for the performance of passive building
elements in post flashover conditions. At the time of writing there is a project
planned to expand B-RISK’s capabilities to consider the effects of fire on pas-
sive building elements.
• If the B-RISK model is integrated with an evacuation model such as Evacua-
tionNZ [1], a study on the system effects on evacuation proceedings would be
useful.
• If the B-RISK model is integrated with a fire service response model such as
FBIM [2], a study could be conducted using B-RISK on the interactions between
fire safety systems and fire service operations.
• The sprinkler thermal response model can be improved by adding the evapo-
rative cooling model developed by Ruffino and diMarzo [3]. Use of this model
will require data on how much water can be expected to reach unactivated
sprinklers. A set of experiments for this work was originally envisioned as
part of this research to provide some of this information, by measuring sprin-
kler bulb thermal response in the presence of activated sprinklers with water
flowing in fire conditions. A method for measuring sprinkler bulb thermal re-
sponse is described in Chapter 6. The heat release rate would be controlled by
using a LPG burner with a flow controller. These experiments were not com-
pleted for this work due to the February 22, 2011 Christchurch earthquake,
which severely limited laboratory access for approximately six months.
• It may be possible to include the effects of sprinkler spray on fire products
such as smoke in B-RISK, if a suitable submodel is available. Work done by Li
et al [4,5] may be a starting point.
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• A major drawback in the current B-RISK model is that all probabilistic vari-
ables are currently treated as independent variables, with no correlation. This
may not be a realistic assumption; for example, if maintenance is poor in a
building, the reliability of both sprinkler systems and smoke control systems
may be low. If the building does not have a policy of keeping doors closed,
there may be a higher probability of multiple doors being open. One area of
future work may be to add the ability to correlate input variables for B-RISK.
However, it is noted that there is enough difficulty in obtaining data for in-
dependent variables, obtaining evidence of correlations would be even more
difficult and would require additional data collection effort.
• It was observed in the B-RISK case studies that it becomes difficult to resolve
low probability, high consequence scenarios such as the simultaneous failure
of multiple systems in the context of the overall fire risk. An analysis method
could be developed to identify the statistical significance of low probability
events occurring in the model.
• Another approach to improve the ability of B-RISK to accurately portray the
potential risk impact of low probability, high consequence scenarios might be
to develop a method to conduct secondary sets of runs using B-RISK or an-
other model based on the specific input parameter values that result in these
scenarios. The information from this secondary analysis could then be inte-
grated back into the overall risk picture. This would focus computational ef-
fort on the situations where high consequences can occur while still evaluating
overall risk adequately.
Some of the future work listed above, particularly where the B-RISK model
would be used or improved, is suitable for postgraduate Fire Engineering projects.
However, improving data collection from actual buildings and fire incidents should
be ongoing and while aspects of it can be completed by students, it has the best
chance of success if it is championed by persons active in the fire safety field on a
full time basis.
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APPENDIX A
HYDRAULIC MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND VERIFICATION
A.1 Hydraulic model
A hydraulic model was developed in Excel 2007 to solve the flow and pressure in
simple sprinkler systems for analysing the effects of pressure reduction on sprinkler
system performance. The model was adapted for use with sprinkler systems from
an existing model described in the book Hydraulics of Pipeline Systems [1]. Both
metric and imperial units can be used.
The hydraulic model was then transferred to VB.net for incorporation into the
risk-informed design fire tool. The sprinkler system was still defined in Excel, but
a routine was developed to export the sprinkler system to an XML file which could
be read by the VB.net version of the model. The Excel figures in this appendix cor-
respond to the 35 m static head NZS4541:2007 [2] commercial ELH minimum water
supply discussed in Chapter 7. The hydraulic model described here can cope with
different room geometries and sprinkler spacings, although B-RISK is currently lim-
ited to right rectangular prisms for the room geometry. Physically looped pipe sys-
tems can not be handled with this model.
A.1.1 Sprinkler system definition
The sprinkler system is defined in three phases: nodes, pipes, and loops. Each sprin-
kler head, tee, and water supply source are assigned a node number. The number
of junctions is equal to the total number of nodes minus the water supply nodes. A
parameter defines the type of node:
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Figure A.1: Node numbering for an example sprinkler system in the hydraulic model.
• 0: inactive sprinkler
• 1: activated sprinkler
• 2: tee or junction
• 3: water supply (constant head)
• 4: water supply (quadratic function relating head and flow)
Nodes are typically assigned as shown in Figure A.1, with the sprinklers, then
tees or junctions, then the water supply numbered consecutively from node 1. Sprin-
klers are assigned a sprinkler discharge coefficient (K) in units of l/min√
kPa
or gpm√
psi
. Each
node can be assigned an elevation. Figure A.2 shows how the nodes for the ex-
ample system in Figure A.1 were assigned. If a quadratic water supply node was
chosen, water supply flow and pressure data were plotted and quadratic coefficient
parameters were determined by the Excel trendline curve fit function, as shown in
Figure A.3.
After the nodes were defined, the pipe connections between nodes were de-
fined. Pipes were systematically defined by starting at defining the downstream
pipes from each consecutive node as shown in Figure A.4. Each “pipe” could be
composed of up to 4 pipe sections to account for fittings, changes in diameter, and
multiple lengths.
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Figure A.2: The worksheet where the node numbers and characteristics were assigned.
Figure A.3: A water supply worksheet was used to plot water supply flow and pressure
points and curve fit a quadratic function.
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Figure A.4: The connections between nodes were defined as pipes.
Once the pipes were defined, energy equation loops were defined in the Loops
worksheet as shown in Figure A.5. A loop was required for each sprinkler, and
included all of the nodes from the sprinkler back to the water supply.
A.1.2 Hydraulic model physics
The pressures and flows in the hydraulic model were solved by solving the continu-
ity and energy equations for the sprinkler system network. A continuity equation
was set up for a control volume around each node except the water supply as shown
in Figure A.6. If the node was downstream, the flow sign was changed to negative.
Energy equations were set up for each loop as shown in Figure A.7.
The pressure loss for the pipe sections and sprinklers was calculated using the
Hazen Williams equation and sprinkler loss equation respectively as shown below
in metric form, which is recommended by NZS4541:2007.
∆P =
0.605× 108 ×Q1.85
C1.85d4.87
(A.1)
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Figure A.5: Loops were defined as required to calculate the conservation of energy equation.
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
17
18
19
20 Water Supply
Q17-1 Q1-2
Q1
Control 
Volume
Figure A.6: Continuity equations were defined for each node. For the node shown in this
example Q1 = Q17−1 −Q1−2.
∆P =
(
Q
K
)2
(A.2)
In this implementation, the total pressure is used and the velocity pressure is
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Figure A.7: Energy loop equations were set up for each active sprinkler. For the loop shown
in this example hWS = ∆h20−19 + ∆h19−18 + ∆h18−17 + ∆h17−1 + ∆h1 + h1.
not considered, as is allowed by NZS4541:2007. The pressure loss was converted to
head loss by the formula NZS4541:2007 recommends:
P = 10× h (A.3)
where P is in kPa and h is in m, which is an approximation of the usual form:
P = ρgh (A.4)
Once the continuity and energy loss equations were found, the system of con-
tinuity and energy loop equations were rewritten into the form
f(Qpipe 1, ...Qpipe n, Qsprinkler 1, ...Qsprinkler m) = 0 (A.5)
where f is a column vector of the continuity and energy loop equations, n is
the total number of pipes, and m is the total number of active sprinklers. The roots
of the equations in f were solved using the Newton method as described by Larock
et al [1], which uses the equation
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Sprinkler Gagnon Q (gpm) Model Q (gpm) % Difference
1 18.00 17.99 .08%
2 19.08 19.07 .05%
3 20.16 20.10 .30%
4 22.32 22.22 .43%
Total Flow 264.93 265.03 .04%
Table A.1: Comparison of model results to hand calculated results for Gagnon example.
xnew = xold −D−1f (A.6)
to provide iterative approximations of the roots x using the product of the
inverse of the Jacobian matrix D of f and f . The Jacobian matrix is defined as shown
here:
D =

∂f1
∂Qpipe 1
. . . ∂f1
∂Qsprinkler m
... . . .
...
∂fn+m
∂Qpipe 1
. . . ∂fn+m
∂Qsprinkler m
 (A.7)
The inverse of the Jacobian matrix is found by using Gauss-Jordan Elimination
in the VB.net implementation of the hydraulic model and by the built in function
MINVERSE in the Excel implementation.
A.2 Hydraulic model verification
The model was verified by reproducing the example on pages 148 to 157 from
Gagnon [3]. A comparison of the flow rates for the first 4 sprinklers and the total
flow rate is shown in Table A.1. The flow rates were all within 0.5% and the differ-
ences are possibly due to rounding practices used in the hand calculations.
A.3 Visual Basic hydraulic module
The source code for the Visual Basic hydraulic module is included in the following
pages.
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bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(b)b bF(b)b b sbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbb'bbbbrbbbsssbbqbbsbsbs
APPENDIX A. HYDRAULIC MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND VERIFICATION 350
 bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb11bbbbbbbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbssbbssbbb b bb
bbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbbbsbssssb b1
bbbbbbbbbbbbsbbbsbbs(b b )b b1bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'rbbbsbsbbbbbbbrbbbsssbbbbssbbb bbbsbbbbbssbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssbbssbbb b bssbbssbbb b b1
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1 bssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bbb b(bsbsbbb bbsbbs
(b b1)b bb)b b sbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b b1b b(bsbsbbb b
bsbbs(b b1)b bb)b b sbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bmbssbsbhbsbbsbs( sbb(ssbbssbbb b b
bbs bbbsb b1))
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbbssss(b b1)bbbbbbbb'rsbsbsbbsbrbbbsssbbsbbsbssbbbbbbbbbbrbb
bqbbsbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbbbssbsbsb b1
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsbsbs(  b1)b bbssss(b b )bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsbsbs(  bb)b bbssss(b b b b1)bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1 b )b bb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1
 b )b b1bb5b bbsbsbbb bsbsbs(  b )b b sbb( )b bmbssbsbhbsbbsbs( sbb( ))b b( bb15)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b 
bsbsbs(  b )b b sbb( )b bmbssbsbhbsbbsbs( sbb( ))b bbbb5
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'rbbb sbssbsbbbbbbbsssbbbsbbsbbbbsbbbbbsbbbsbbbsbbsbss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 b )b b bbbbbb'mbsbbbsbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b
1)b bbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 bb)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbsbbbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 b )b b bbbbbb' bssb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1 b )b bb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbs
b b1 b )b b(bb bsbssbbbbbbb(b)b b sbb( )b bsbssbbbbbbb(1))
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b
1)b b(sbssbbbbbbb(b)b b sbb( )b bsbs( sbb( ))b bsbssbbbbbbb(1)b b sbb( )b bsbssbbbbbbb(b)
b bbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 bb))
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'Fbbbsbsbbbsbsbbbbbsbbbbb sbsbsbbbsbbbbsbbbbbbbbbbsbsbbbbssbssbbbsb
bsbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsbsbs(  bb)b bbssss(b b )bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsbsbs(  b1)b bbssss(b b b b1)bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1 b )b bb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1
 b )b b1bb5b bbsbsbbb bsbsbs(  b )b b sbb( )b bmbssbsbhbsbbsbs( sbb( ))b b( bb15)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b 
b1b bbsbsbbb bsbsbs(  b )b b sbb( )b bmbssbsbhbsbbsbs( sbb( ))b bbbb5
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'rbbb sbssbsbbbbbbbsssbbbsbbsbbbbsbbbbbsbbbsbbbsbbsbss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 b )b b bbbbbb'mbsbbbsbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b
1)b bbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 bb)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbsbbbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 b )b b bbbbbb' bssb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1 b )b bb(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbs
b b1 b )b b(bb bsbssbbbbbbb(b)b b sbb( )b bsbssbbbbbbb(1))
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b1)b bF(ssbbssbbb b bbbs bbbsb b
1)b b(sbssbbbbbbb(b)b b sbb( )b bsbs( sbb( ))b bsbssbbbbbbb(1)b b sbb( )b bsbssbbbbbbb(b)
b bbsbbs(sbsbs(  b1)b b1 bb))
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
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5bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb11bbbbbbbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbmbb
bbbb bbbbbbmbbbbbbbbsh(bblbbbb( )bssbbsbbbb bbbmbbbbbbb( )bssbbsbbbb)
bbbbbbbb'sbbbbbsbsbbbbsbrbbbbssbbbbbbsbsbbbnbbsbbbbbsbsbb bbbbsbbbbbb_bbbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbbbssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsb bssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsb bssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbssbss( )bssbbsbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbbsssbssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbbsbsbssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbbsb1bssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbsb lbbbssbbsbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbsb sbbbssbbsbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbsbssbssbbsbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbbsbb( )bssbbsbbbb
bbbbbbbbbsssb bbbdbsdssbbbsbbb(b)
bbbbbbbbbsb1b bbbdbsdssbbbsbbb(1)
bbbbbbbbbsbsb bbsb1b bbsb1b b1
bbbbbbbbmbbbsbssbss(bsss bbsbs)
bbbbbbbbmbbbsbbsbb(bsss bbsbs)
bbbbbbbb'sbrsbbsbsbsbb bsbsbbbbbbsbsbbsbsbb 
bbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbbsss
bbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbbsss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssbss(b b )b bb(b b )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssbss(b b b bbsssb b1)b bbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbssbss(b bbb bbsssb b1)b b1bb
bbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbbsss
bbbbbbbbbbbbsb lbbb bssbss(b bb)
bbbbbbbbbbbbsb sbbb bb
bbbbbbbbbbbb'bmsbsbsbsbbbbbbbbbbbsbsbbbrbbbsbssbbbbbbbrbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbb b1bbsbbsss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsbs(ssbss(  bb))b bsbs(sb lbb)bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb lbbb bssbss(  bb)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb sbbb b 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsb lbbb bbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbhsrbs ( bssssb "hbsbb bbsbsbbrbbbb"" bbbsbbb "bbbsb")
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb bsbmbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbb'mbsbsbbssbbqbbbbssb1bbbbbssbsbbsssbbbbbbbbssbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbbsbs
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'bssbbbbbssbsbsssbbbbbsssbbrbbbbbssbsbbsbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbssb bssbss(b b )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'bbsbbbbssbbssbsb _bbbbbbssbbssbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb bbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssbss(b b )b bssbss(sb sbb b )b bsb lbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'msbsbsbbbsb _bbbbbssbsbsbbbssbbb(bbbbbbbssbbb)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsb sbbb  bbbbbbbbssbss(sb sbb b )b bsbss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
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0bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb11bbbbbbbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbb' bbbsbsbbssbssbbbsbsbsbssbsbsbbbbbbbbbbbbbbss bbbbbsbbbsbs
bbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbbsss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbb b  bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'bssbsbbbsbbss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'sssbbbsbbsbsbbbsbbbss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbbsbs
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbb(  b )b b ssbss(  bb)b bssbss(b b )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'bbbbssrbsbbbbbbbbbbsbbbbbsbbbbss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbbsbs
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssbss(  b )b bssbss(  b )b bbsbb(  b )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbbsss
bbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbsb1b b1bbsbbsbs
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb(b b b b(bsb1b b1))b bssbss(b b )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbmbb
bbbb bbbbbbmbbbbbbb_bbb_ sb()
bbbbbbbb'bbbsbbbbbsbsbbbbbbsbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsssb bbbbbbbsbsbb sbbbbbbbbsbbbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbb'bbbsbbbssbbbbsbbbsbcbbbbbbbbbmsbbbbbb
bbbbbbbb'sbbbbbbbbbsbbsbbbbbbssbbbbbbsbsbbbbbbbbbbsbbbbbbsbsbbsbbsbbbbbbbbssbbbbbsbbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbssbbbbsbbbbbbssbmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbsbbbssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsb bssbsbsbrbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbbbbb bbbbssbbsbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbsbsb bsbbsbssbsbsbrbbb'hb bsbsbbbsbbbbsbbbsbbsbbbbbssss
bbbbbbbbbbsbsbbbbbbssbmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbsbsbsssbbsbbsbssbsbsbrbbb'bbbsbbbssbsbbsbbs b1bbsbbsbbsbbs
bbbbbbbb'mbssbbbbbbs_Fbbb()b bssbbsbbbbbsbbbbbbbsbbrbbbbbbbssb bbsb
bbbbbbbbsbsssbbsbbsb bb
bbbbbbbb' bsbbbbbbbbsbbsbbbbbbbbbbbbsbssbsbbbbbbbsbsbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbssbbbbsbbbbbb bmbs bbsbbbbbbssbbb b"bbbbbbbbbb sb"
bbbbbbbbsbbssbbbbsbbbbbb  b""bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbb'bbsbbbsbbbbbbbsbbsbsbsbsbsbsbbbbbbsbb bsss
bbbbbbbbbbbbsbbbbbb b bsbbdbsFbbbbbsb(ssbbbbsbbbbb)
bbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsbbbbbb  b""bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbsblsbmbssbbrsbssbbbsblsbmbbbbbmbssbbrs()
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsblsbmbssbbrsbsrbsbbrsssbbssb bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsblsbmbssbbrsbsrbsbb bbsbssbbbb bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbdsbbrbbFmbssblsbmbbbbbb blsbmbbbbbbrbbbsb(ssbbbbsbbbbb bsblsbmbssbbrs)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbb()
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbmsbbsbbbsbbs("bbbbbbbbb_bbb")
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb' bbsbbbsbbs
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbmsbbsbbbsbbs("bsbbs")
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbsbbsb bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
APPENDIX A. HYDRAULIC MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND VERIFICATION 353
7bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb11bbbbbbbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbmbbbsbbsbbs(bbsbsbbsb b1 b )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbbbsbsbbsb b1
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbs(b b )b bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbbsbbs(b b )b b bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbsssbbsbbsb b1bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'mbssbsbsssbbsbbsbbbbrbssb1bbbb
sbbbsbbsbbbbsbbsbbsbbbsbssb( )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb' bbsbbsbsbs
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbmsbbsbbbsbbs(" bsbs")
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssbsbsb bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbmbbbsbsbsbs(bbssbsbsb b1 b )
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbbbssbsbsb b1
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbsbs(b b )b bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb' bbsbbbssss
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbmsbbsbbbsbbs("qssss")
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbssssb bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb bsbbsb bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbmbbbsbbssss(bbsbssssb b1 bsb bsbbsb b1)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbbbsbssssb b1
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsb1
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssss(b b )b bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbb b bbbbsbsb bsbbsb b1
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbb b bbssss(b b1)b bbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb bbbb bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb bsbFsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbssss(b b )b bbbbb bbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb s
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()b'rbbbbb qssss 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'mbbbbsbbbsbsbsbssbbbbbbsbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbmsbbsbbbsbbs("hbbbsbs_sbssbb")
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbm sbbb bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbmbsbbb bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()b'rbbbbb hbbbsbs_sbssbb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb'mbbbbqbbbbbsbbbsbssbbb(brbbsbss)bbbbsbsbsbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbbsbsssbbsbbsb b1bbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbmbbbsbsbssbbbbbbb(b)
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbmsbbsbbbsbbs("mbssbb")
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFsbbbb bbbbsbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsbssbbbbbbb(b)b bbFmbmbbbbbbsbbsmsbbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb sbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()b'rbbbbb mbssbb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
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bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb11bbbbbbbbbbbbb
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbFmbmbbbbbbbbbsbbs()b'rbbbbb bbbbbbbbb_bbb 
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbdsbbr
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbbbbbsb
bbbbbbbbmbb
bbbbhsbbbb
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APPENDIX B
ISO 9705 COMPARTMENT FIRE TEST CEILING JET AND
SPRINKLER DATA
The figures in this appendix show the modified sprinkler temperature response,
ceiling jet temperature and velocity, and sprinkler response time for the standard
sprinklers. Ceiling jet velocities were not recorded for tests A1 to A3. The tests are
described in Chapter 6.
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Figure B.1: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature, and standard
sprinkler response time for compartment fire test A1.
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Figure B.2: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature, and standard
sprinkler response time for compartment fire test A2.
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Figure B.3: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature, and standard
sprinkler response time for compartment fire test A3.
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Figure B.4: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature and velocity,
and standard sprinkler response time for compartment fire test B2.
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Figure B.5: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature and velocity,
and standard sprinkler response time for compartment fire test C1.
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Figure B.6: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature and velocity,
and standard sprinkler response time for compartment fire test D1.
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
400 
0 60 120 180 240 
V
e
lo
c
it
y
 (
m
/s
) 
T
e
m
p
e
ra
tu
re
 (
°C
) 
Time (s) 
MPE 
MPA 
Ceiling jet temp. 
Ceiling jet vel. 
SPE  
activation 
SPA activation 
Figure B.7: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature and velocity,
and standard sprinkler response time for compartment fire test D2.
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Figure B.8: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature and velocity,
and standard sprinkler response time for compartment fire test D3.
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Figure B.9: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature and velocity,
and standard sprinkler response time for compartment fire test E1.
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Figure B.10: Modified sprinkler temperature response, ceiling jet temperature and velocity,
and standard sprinkler response time for compartment fire test E2.
APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL FIRE DOOR RELIABILITY DATA
This appendix includes additional data collected on fire door reliability. Information
on the probability that individual doors were open for each hour of the day and time
recorded at each position is presented in figures organised by building.
363
APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL FIRE DOOR RELIABILITY DATA 364
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 d
o
o
r 
c
lo
s
e
d
 
Hour of day 
Door 1 
Door 2 
Figure C.1: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for rest home no. 1.
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Figure C.2: Time recorded for each door position for rest home no. 1.
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Figure C.3: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for rest home no. 2.
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Figure C.4: Time recorded for each door position for rest home no. 2.
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Figure C.5: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for rest home no. 3.
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Figure C.6: Time recorded for each door position for rest home no. 3.
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Figure C.7: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for hotel no. 1.
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Figure C.8: Time recorded for each door position for Hotel no. 1.
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Figure C.9: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for hotel no. 2.
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Figure C.10: Time recorded for each door position for hotel no. 2.
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Figure C.11: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for hotel no. 3.
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Figure C.12: Time recorded for each door position for hotel no. 3.
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Figure C.13: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for hotel no. 4,
doors 1-5.
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Figure C.14: Time recorded for each door position for hotel no. 4, doors 1-5.
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Figure C.15: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for hotel no. 4,
doors 6-9.
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Figure C.16: Time recorded for each door position for hotel no. 4, doors 6-9.
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Figure C.17: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for backpackers no.
1.
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Figure C.18: Time recorded for each door position for backpackers no. 1.
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Figure C.19: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for backpackers no.
2.
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Figure C.20: Time recorded for each door position for backpackers no. 2.
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Figure C.21: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for apartment/condo
no. 1.
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Figure C.22: Time recorded for each door position for apartment/condo no. 1.
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Figure C.23: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for apartment/condo
no. 2.
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Figure C.24: Time recorded for each door position for apartment/condo no. 2.
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Figure C.25: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for boarding
house/dorm no. 1.
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Figure C.26: Time recorded for each door position for boarding house/dorm no. 1.
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Figure C.27: Probability that tracked doors were closed by time of day for boarding
house/dorm no. 2.
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Figure C.28: Time recorded for each door position for boarding house/dorm no. 2.
